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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 882297 |
Time | |
Date | 201004 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dawn |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 170/175 ER&LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor |
Narrative:
We got smoke and fumes in the cockpit and forward cabin during the take off roll. During taxi out; there were no problems or anything abnormal with the ecs (environmental control system). The ecs was configured normally for take off. We were cleared for take off and as toga was set there was a faint smell of something oily. As the takeoff roll continued; the smell became stronger and a visible haze developed in the cockpit. Around 80 KTS was when an aborted takeoff was done. We then slowed and pulled off and stopped on the nearest taxiway. The fumes and smoke then did not get worse and did not persist. I then called the flight attendants and told them to stand by since I heard them calling each other as we were slowing. The a flight attendant then quickly mentioned there's smoke on the cabin and it was moving forward from the aft cabin. We then ran the checklist for air conditioning smoke. We were already on the ground and the situation was not getting worse so we did not use the crew oxygen masks. I then contacted the flight attendants as the first officer notified ground of our situation. The a flight attendant reported there's a strong odor and that there's a haze in the cabin but wasn't getting worse and the B flight attendant said she can see a haze mid cabin but doesn't smell anything. Since the situation wasn't getting worse I made a decision to then taxi back to the gate and told the flight attendants if the smell or smoke got worse to call back. All the appropriate checklists; contacting company; and coordinating with operations was done while taxiing to the gate. After getting to the gate; I told maintenance personnel what happened. They checked out the plane while I coordinated with the flight attendants; dispatch; and gate agent to determine what to do with the passengers. I also had a chance to talk with the flight attendants about what exactly they saw. The a flight attendant told me that she started to smell something as she heard the engines spool up for takeoff and as we started our takeoff roll she noticed a haze start to form in the cabin and her throat started to itch. She also said that two of the passengers in first class said that it was a strong oily smell. The B flight attendant said she did not smell anything but as she heard the engines reduce thrust she looked down the aisle and noticed smoke coming in the mid cabin. After about 10 to 15 minutes one of the mechanics said that it was caused by coffee grounds in pack 2 and you could smell it from outside. The first officer and I both went outside with the mechanic to see. The first officer and I could both smell the burnt coffee smell but we both told the mechanic that smell is totally different then what we smelled during takeoff. I also told the mechanic that what the flight attendants reported to me would be consistent with pack 1 being the problem. I also said if there was any way we could go somewhere and run up the engines to reproduce what happened. He said there wasn't; other then taxiing away; and it was pack 2 for sure. The maintenance personnel deferred pack 2 and signed the log off. Dispatch then called and told me it was just signed off and we were going to take the same aircraft. I told dispatch that my crew and I don't believe the problem was fixed properly and we think it was possible pack 1 causing the problem. I also said that if we go and it happens again then the passengers would be further alarmed. I called the chief pilot and told him what I thought and he said he would get maintenance to come out again. Maintenance came back and told us to deplane. After we got all the passengers off one of the maintenance personnel was in the cockpit so I walked to the cockpit and asked if they were going to run up the engines to see if they can reproduce what happened. He didn't look up but said yea. I then told them I think it maybe pack 1 according to what happened; the smell was oily smelling and didn't smell like burned coffee. He didn't respond but continued to play tetris on his phone. I thanked him for listening and walked away. The company then decided to switch aircraft and the flight departed without incident. As for maintenance; I feel that they were too quick to come to the conclusion of what the problem was. The passengers and crew were already subjected to a rejected takeoff and that is itself can rattle everyone involved. Throw in something like smoke in the cabin at the same time and the passengers are really going to be watching the decisions of the crew and maintenance. It shouldn't be looming in anyone's minds if its' going to happen again once the plane is signed off. Also I think that maintenance should be exposed to CRM. In a situation like this they were very much a part of my crew. The first officer and I both voiced our opinion that with what we experienced we thought the problem may be pack 1. But pack 2 was signed off because it seemed like the easier fix and doing an engine runup to replicate the conditions and figure out exactly what's going on was too much work. It took me to call the chief pilot to get it looked into more and even then the attitudes of the maintenance personnel onboard was like I was interrupting their play time to work. A few more seconds on the takeoff and we would have been airborne with a major emergency. I have been made aware since then that it was in fact pack 2 that was causing the problem. I stand by my decision to have maintenance look further into the issue before continuing the flight on the same aircraft. I feel that if we were able to look further together into the issue then my crew and I would have been assured that the incident would not happen again on the same plane.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A E170 Captain reported experiencing smoke and fumes on takeoff roll. The takeoff was aborted and another aircraft assigned to the flight.
Narrative: We got smoke and fumes in the cockpit and forward cabin during the take off roll. During taxi out; there were no problems or anything abnormal with the ECS (environmental control system). The ECS was configured normally for take off. We were cleared for take off and as TOGA was set there was a faint smell of something oily. As the takeoff roll continued; the smell became stronger and a visible haze developed in the cockpit. Around 80 KTS was when an aborted takeoff was done. We then slowed and pulled off and stopped on the nearest taxiway. The fumes and smoke then did not get worse and did not persist. I then called the Flight Attendants and told them to stand by since I heard them calling each other as we were slowing. The A Flight Attendant then quickly mentioned there's smoke on the cabin and it was moving forward from the aft cabin. We then ran the checklist for Air Conditioning Smoke. We were already on the ground and the situation was not getting worse so we did not use the crew oxygen masks. I then contacted the Flight Attendants as the First Officer notified Ground of our situation. The A Flight Attendant reported there's a strong odor and that there's a haze in the cabin but wasn't getting worse and the B Flight Attendant said she can see a haze mid cabin but doesn't smell anything. Since the situation wasn't getting worse I made a decision to then taxi back to the gate and told the Flight Attendants if the smell or smoke got worse to call back. All the appropriate checklists; contacting Company; and coordinating with Operations was done while taxiing to the gate. After getting to the gate; I told maintenance personnel what happened. They checked out the plane while I coordinated with the flight attendants; Dispatch; and Gate Agent to determine what to do with the passengers. I also had a chance to talk with the Flight Attendants about what exactly they saw. The A Flight Attendant told me that she started to smell something as she heard the engines spool up for takeoff and as we started our takeoff roll she noticed a haze start to form in the cabin and her throat started to itch. She also said that two of the passengers in first class said that it was a strong oily smell. The B Flight Attendant said she did not smell anything but as she heard the engines reduce thrust she looked down the aisle and noticed smoke coming in the mid cabin. After about 10 to 15 minutes one of the Mechanics said that it was caused by coffee grounds in pack 2 and you could smell it from outside. The First Officer and I both went outside with the Mechanic to see. The First Officer and I could both smell the burnt coffee smell but we both told the Mechanic that smell is totally different then what we smelled during takeoff. I also told the Mechanic that what the Flight Attendants reported to me would be consistent with pack 1 being the problem. I also said if there was any way we could go somewhere and run up the engines to reproduce what happened. He said there wasn't; other then taxiing away; and it was pack 2 for sure. The maintenance personnel deferred pack 2 and signed the log off. Dispatch then called and told me it was just signed off and we were going to take the same aircraft. I told Dispatch that my crew and I don't believe the problem was fixed properly and we think it was possible pack 1 causing the problem. I also said that if we go and it happens again then the passengers would be further alarmed. I called the Chief Pilot and told him what I thought and he said he would get Maintenance to come out again. Maintenance came back and told us to deplane. After we got all the passengers off one of the maintenance personnel was in the cockpit so I walked to the cockpit and asked if they were going to run up the engines to see if they can reproduce what happened. He didn't look up but said yea. I then told them I think it maybe pack 1 according to what happened; the smell was oily smelling and didn't smell like burned coffee. He didn't respond but continued to play Tetris on his phone. I thanked him for listening and walked away. The company then decided to switch aircraft and the flight departed without incident. As for maintenance; I feel that they were too quick to come to the conclusion of what the problem was. The passengers and crew were already subjected to a rejected takeoff and that is itself can rattle everyone involved. Throw in something like smoke in the cabin at the same time and the passengers are really going to be watching the decisions of the crew and maintenance. It shouldn't be looming in anyone's minds if its' going to happen again once the plane is signed off. Also I think that maintenance should be exposed to CRM. In a situation like this they were very much a part of my crew. The First Officer and I both voiced our opinion that with what we experienced we thought the problem may be pack 1. But pack 2 was signed off because it seemed like the easier fix and doing an engine runup to replicate the conditions and figure out exactly what's going on was too much work. It took me to call the Chief Pilot to get it looked into more and even then the attitudes of the maintenance personnel onboard was like I was interrupting their play time to work. A few more seconds on the takeoff and we would have been airborne with a major emergency. I have been made aware since then that it was in fact pack 2 that was causing the problem. I stand by my decision to have maintenance look further into the issue before continuing the flight on the same aircraft. I feel that if we were able to look further together into the issue then my crew and I would have been assured that the incident would not happen again on the same plane.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.