Narrative:

For departure we were at maximum atgw; with maximum EPR set for takeoff because of a 4 knot tailwind. Normal events during taxi out and line up for position and hold. When cleared for take off 1.1 EPR was set; stabilized; and auto throttle engaged. Within 1 or 2 seconds of max EPR being set; we heard a loud 1 event bang. I called for and performed the abort from a slow ground speed; but kept slowly moving down the runway to where I could exit. We advised the flight attendants and passengers to remain seated. With no adverse engine indications; and a low cycle thump; thump; thump; I thought we had just blown a nose tire. Tower was rolling emergency equipment to meet us as we exited the runway. As we rolled to a stop; the vibrations we took as a tire thump did not stop and it became apparent to us we had an engine problem. As we shut down engines right after stopping; interphone conversations began with cabin crew. Those on the left side of the aircraft reported flames out the front and rear of the engine during the bang event. Relief pilot went back to the cabin and observed cowl damage. With crash fire rescue equipment now on scene and in VHF contact; we asked them if we had any fluid leaks; fires; or other adverse events outside. With a negative report; we relayed this to the cabin crew as they were standing by for possible unfolding events that could force us into an evacuation. They then went into an armed door guarding mode for the next 2 hours it took us to be towed back to the terminal. We were heavy and it took a relay of two tugs to get us back to terminal without overheating the tugs. I have had an in flight bearing failure on the 777 which resulted in landing thrust reversing of the engine making extreme noise and vibration. I would call that event like a loud banshee shrill with heavy airframe vibration and adverse engine indications that ceased upon engine shutdown. This event had just the low cycle vibration; normal engine noise; and no adverse cockpit engine indications. Crash fire rescue equipment reported we had dropped parts from start of takeoff to our taxiway stopped position. In a post flight debrief of the entire crew; on the way to our hotel; cabin crew said how important the 'remain in your seats' PA was to them. Those on the left side seeing and hearing a bang/flash event out of the engine were ready to evacuate and were going through mental evac decisions; thoughts and preparations. Our quick PA was very much appreciated. Post flight inspection from my point of view looked like a first stage fan blade failure. As I do not believe this was a bird or other FOD ingestion event on our takeoff; I would guess blade failure caused a cascading event that chewed up other fan blades; and destroyed most of the stator vane assemblies aft of the fan. There were uncontained fan area penetrations in the forward engine cowl; and associated internal fan duct destruction. At the rear end of the lower fan duct cowl edge; there were other areas of damage. In closing I feel we were fortunate the event happened early in the takeoff allowing for a slow speed reject. While our training prepares us well for the physical actions of an abort; it is the mental evaluation and coordination gymnastics of the individual events that we are never as prepared for as we are the physical actions. All cockpit and cabin crew were very experienced and that was reflected in their professional actions. Passengers were kept informed of developments in a timely manner and were described as 'great' by cabin crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B777-200 flight crew experienced a fan blade failure early in the takeoff roll; leading to a reject decision.

Narrative: For departure we were at maximum ATGW; with maximum EPR set for takeoff because of a 4 knot tailwind. Normal events during taxi out and line up for position and hold. When cleared for take off 1.1 EPR was set; stabilized; and auto throttle engaged. Within 1 or 2 seconds of max EPR being set; we heard a loud 1 event bang. I called for and performed the abort from a slow ground speed; but kept slowly moving down the runway to where I could exit. We advised the flight attendants and passengers to remain seated. With no adverse engine indications; and a low cycle thump; thump; thump; I thought we had just blown a nose tire. Tower was rolling emergency equipment to meet us as we exited the runway. As we rolled to a stop; the vibrations we took as a tire thump did not stop and it became apparent to us we had an engine problem. As we shut down engines right after stopping; interphone conversations began with cabin crew. Those on the left side of the aircraft reported flames out the front and rear of the engine during the bang event. Relief Pilot went back to the cabin and observed cowl damage. With CFR now on scene and in VHF contact; we asked them if we had any fluid leaks; fires; or other adverse events outside. With a negative report; we relayed this to the cabin crew as they were standing by for possible unfolding events that could force us into an evacuation. They then went into an armed door guarding mode for the next 2 hours it took us to be towed back to the terminal. We were heavy and it took a relay of two tugs to get us back to terminal without overheating the tugs. I have had an in flight bearing failure on the 777 which resulted in landing thrust reversing of the engine making extreme noise and vibration. I would call that event like a loud banshee shrill with heavy airframe vibration and adverse engine indications that ceased upon engine shutdown. This event had just the low cycle vibration; normal engine noise; and no adverse cockpit engine indications. CFR reported we had dropped parts from start of takeoff to our taxiway stopped position. In a post flight debrief of the entire crew; on the way to our hotel; cabin crew said how important the 'remain in your seats' PA was to them. Those on the left side seeing and hearing a bang/flash event out of the engine were ready to evacuate and were going through mental evac decisions; thoughts and preparations. Our quick PA was very much appreciated. Post flight inspection from my point of view looked like a first stage fan blade failure. As I do not believe this was a bird or other FOD ingestion event on our takeoff; I would guess blade failure caused a cascading event that chewed up other fan blades; and destroyed most of the stator vane assemblies aft of the fan. There were uncontained fan area penetrations in the forward engine cowl; and associated internal fan duct destruction. At the rear end of the lower fan duct cowl edge; there were other areas of damage. In closing I feel we were fortunate the event happened early in the takeoff allowing for a slow speed reject. While our training prepares us well for the physical actions of an abort; it is the mental evaluation and coordination gymnastics of the individual events that we are never as prepared for as we are the physical actions. All cockpit and cabin crew were very experienced and that was reflected in their professional actions. Passengers were kept informed of developments in a timely manner and were described as 'great' by cabin crew.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.