Narrative:

During departure roll; at approximately 90 KTS; I noticed what appeared to be environmental smoke in the cockpit. We aborted the take-off and performed memory items for smoke in the cockpit and notified ATC to roll the fire department as we had smoke in the cockpit. The smoke immediately dissipated as we cleared the runway into the terminal ramp. The operations personal were at the gate immediately and we returned and deplaned the passengers quickly; leaving all personal belongings in the aircraft. I spoke with the flight attendant on the short taxi to the gate and he informed me that very little; if any; smoke had made it into the passenger cabin. The fire department assessed the aircraft and found no evidence of a fire. Dispatch and maintenance control were notified and I left a message with the chief pilot regarding the event. Maintenance control then requested we run the aircraft to try to isolate the problem. The first run up at idle resulted in no smoke present in the aircraft. We then took the aircraft to a run up area on the field to perform a high power check on the bleed and pack system. Upon our first attempt at configuring bleed 1 and pack 1 on; we noticed smoke in the cockpit. Again; we performed memory items; checklists; and returned to the gate. I then notified maintenance control of the results on the run up and they were quick to have an answer to the problem; defer pack 1 and operate the flight. I was very uneasy with the quick decision after such a problematic event and I did not feel like the aircraft was safe to operate with passengers on board. The contract maintenance individual and I both agreed that before any passengers board the aircraft we should check the #2 bleed and pack system. When I notified maintenance control of my intentions to do another run up before attempting a revenue flight they seemed very irritated. They were under the impression that I had already tested all systems and isolated it to pack #1. I calmly explained that after smoke had entered the aircraft once again; we figured the test was over and the aircraft was out of service. The first officer and I agreed to a third engine run up to test the #2 system. With the #2 bleed feeding the #2 pack; no smoke was present. With the #1 bleed providing air to the #2 pack we almost immediately had smoke present in the passenger cabin. We again performed memory items; checklist; and returned to the gate. It was now apparent that the issue was in the #1 engine and associated bleed system. I; again; contacted maintenance control and they were quick to tell me they would just defer the entire #1 system. I told maintenance control that they could handle the corrective action with contract maintenance and I was not going to defer the system on the phone with him. I then spoke with my first officer and voiced my concerns about not only the aircraft; but the fact we inhaled smoke three times and I did not feel fit to fly. He agreed and we both placed fatigue calls to scheduling and notified dispatch of the aircraft status. The flight was then canceled and we went to the hotel for roughly 10 hours of rest. Overall; I feel this event was handled extremely well. The only suggestions I have for improvement is on the part of maintenance control. I fully understand they are under pressure to get an aircraft back in service; but it should never involve mocking or pushing a crew into taking an unsafe airplane with passengers on a flight. I was amazed that any person; maintenance especially; would be so eager to get passengers back on an aircraft that obviously just had a system malfunction that could result in serious aircraft damage and risk the safety of passengers. It put me in a defensive situation where I had to be the last line of defense in refusing to operate an unsafe aircraft. My goal; like all captains; is the make 100% sure the aircraft is safe to operate with passengers and it was clear through this experience that I had more resistance then I did help in achieving that goal.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Following a rejected takeoff due to smoke in the cockpit; an ERJ Captain assisted Maintenance Control to evaluate and resolve the source. The outcome of the diagnosis effort was less than harmonious and the flight crew felt physiologically incapable of continuing and the flight was ultimately canceled.

Narrative: During departure roll; at approximately 90 KTS; I noticed what appeared to be environmental smoke in the cockpit. We aborted the take-off and performed memory items for smoke in the cockpit and notified ATC to roll the fire department as we had smoke in the cockpit. The smoke immediately dissipated as we cleared the runway into the terminal ramp. The operations personal were at the gate immediately and we returned and deplaned the passengers quickly; leaving all personal belongings in the aircraft. I spoke with the Flight Attendant on the short taxi to the gate and he informed me that very little; if any; smoke had made it into the passenger cabin. The fire department assessed the aircraft and found no evidence of a fire. Dispatch and Maintenance Control were notified and I left a message with the Chief Pilot regarding the event. Maintenance Control then requested we run the aircraft to try to isolate the problem. The first run up at idle resulted in no smoke present in the aircraft. We then took the aircraft to a run up area on the field to perform a high power check on the bleed and pack system. Upon our first attempt at configuring bleed 1 and pack 1 on; we noticed smoke in the cockpit. Again; we performed memory items; checklists; and returned to the gate. I then notified Maintenance Control of the results on the run up and they were quick to have an answer to the problem; defer pack 1 and operate the flight. I was very uneasy with the quick decision after such a problematic event and I did not feel like the aircraft was safe to operate with passengers on board. The Contract Maintenance individual and I both agreed that before any passengers board the aircraft we should check the #2 bleed and pack system. When I notified Maintenance Control of my intentions to do another run up before attempting a revenue flight they seemed very irritated. They were under the impression that I had already tested all systems and isolated it to pack #1. I calmly explained that after smoke had entered the aircraft once again; we figured the test was over and the aircraft was out of service. The First Officer and I agreed to a third engine run up to test the #2 system. With the #2 bleed feeding the #2 pack; no smoke was present. With the #1 bleed providing air to the #2 pack we almost immediately had smoke present in the passenger cabin. We again performed memory items; checklist; and returned to the gate. It was now apparent that the issue was in the #1 engine and associated bleed system. I; again; contacted Maintenance Control and they were quick to tell me they would just defer the entire #1 system. I told Maintenance Control that they could handle the corrective action with Contract Maintenance and I was not going to defer the system on the phone with him. I then spoke with my First Officer and voiced my concerns about not only the aircraft; but the fact we inhaled smoke three times and I did not feel fit to fly. He agreed and we both placed fatigue calls to Scheduling and notified Dispatch of the aircraft status. The flight was then canceled and we went to the hotel for roughly 10 hours of rest. Overall; I feel this event was handled extremely well. The only suggestions I have for improvement is on the part of Maintenance Control. I fully understand they are under pressure to get an aircraft back in service; but it should never involve mocking or pushing a crew into taking an unsafe airplane with passengers on a flight. I was amazed that any person; Maintenance especially; would be so eager to get passengers back on an aircraft that obviously just had a system malfunction that could result in serious aircraft damage and risk the safety of passengers. It put me in a defensive situation where I had to be the last line of defense in refusing to operate an unsafe aircraft. My goal; like all Captains; is the make 100% sure the aircraft is safe to operate with passengers and it was clear through this experience that I had more resistance then I did help in achieving that goal.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.