Narrative:

The weather radar depicted heavy precipitation on final approach to runway xxl. We coordinated deviation west and south of ILS to avoid weather and exceed 250 KT below 10000 ft; however slowed as we maneuvered around weather. We approached from the south west and commenced the ILS DME 1 with ATIS: 1200 ft broken 4 SM light rain. During approach; weather deteriorated to 500 ft broken 1/2 SM rain. I saw the approach lights at da; however; executed an autopilot go-around as published prior to 100 feet AGL due to heavy rain and low visibility. I engaged LNAV and aircraft was at +15 pitch and we got an aural warning 'bank angle' (35 to 40 degrees). I disconnected the autopilot decreased bank angle and rolled out on a northerly heading while the first officer coordinated a heading and 3000 ft altitude. ATC quickly put us on a second approach which we discontinued in order to complete our required checklists. The third approach ended in a normal landing because the heavy rain had moved off the field. This was an extremely challenging approach due to weather; ATC and my lack of experience on a 757 with a glass cockpit modification. I am not type rated in any aircraft with the glass presentation and have minimal experience with glass; especially the speed and altitude tape presentation. This significant change was implemented with an operating manual revision and limited instruction several months ago at a recurrent training. I have requested additional training numerous times; however; management had repeatedly denied my request. Their last response was; 'if we train you then we will have to train everybody.' the reality is most pilots do not need the training because they have been trained and flown the B737; B777; regional jet or any one of the numerous current day military aircraft. The fact is; I have not been trained on any of these aircraft and the company is applying their typical 'one size fits all' approach to flight training. Train to proficiency is no longer the rule at our company. This is the second glass aircraft I have flown and this is my second report concerning the same. I refer you to a recent 7 page safety recommendation from the NTSB directed to the FAA administrator. In this report the NTSB concluded that generalized guidance and training are no longer sufficient to prepare pilots to safely operate glass cockpit avionics; effective pilot instruction and evaluation must be tailored to specific equipment. I will not fly another one of these modified aircraft until I am comfortable with the new technology.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 Captain reports lack of familiarity with upgraded flight instruments and difficulties encountered during a go-around due to low visibility. Requests for additional training have not been honored by the Company.

Narrative: The weather radar depicted heavy precipitation on final approach to Runway XXL. We coordinated deviation west and south of ILS to avoid weather and exceed 250 KT below 10000 FT; however slowed as we maneuvered around weather. We approached from the south west and commenced the ILS DME 1 with ATIS: 1200 FT broken 4 SM light rain. During approach; weather deteriorated to 500 FT broken 1/2 SM rain. I saw the approach lights at DA; however; executed an autopilot go-around as published prior to 100 feet AGL due to heavy rain and low visibility. I engaged LNAV and aircraft was at +15 pitch and we got an aural warning 'Bank Angle' (35 to 40 degrees). I disconnected the autopilot decreased bank angle and rolled out on a northerly heading while the First Officer coordinated a heading and 3000 FT altitude. ATC quickly put us on a second approach which we discontinued in order to complete our required checklists. The third approach ended in a normal landing because the heavy rain had moved off the field. This was an extremely challenging approach due to weather; ATC and my lack of experience on a 757 with a glass cockpit modification. I am not type rated in any aircraft with the glass presentation and have minimal experience with glass; especially the speed and altitude tape presentation. This significant change was implemented with an Operating Manual revision and limited instruction several months ago at a recurrent training. I have requested additional training numerous times; however; Management had repeatedly denied my request. Their last response was; 'if we train you then we will have to train everybody.' The reality is most pilots do not need the training because they have been trained and flown the B737; B777; Regional Jet or any one of the numerous current day military aircraft. The fact is; I have not been trained on any of these aircraft and the company is applying their typical 'one size fits all' approach to flight training. Train to proficiency is no longer the rule at our company. This is the second glass aircraft I have flown and this is my second report concerning the same. I refer you to a recent 7 page Safety Recommendation from the NTSB directed to the FAA Administrator. In this report the NTSB concluded that generalized guidance and training are no longer sufficient to prepare pilots to safely operate glass cockpit avionics; effective pilot instruction and evaluation must be tailored to specific equipment. I will not fly another one of these modified aircraft until I am comfortable with the new technology.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.