Narrative:

I am writing this letter regarding apparent new policies on fuel planning and subsequent questionable dispatch releases. Recently; certain dispatch releases have contained alarmingly minimal fuel requirements. Additional concerns are that management is trying to manipulate fuel loads with a reversed priority. It appears that revenue performance and available seats are placed ahead of a proper fuel plan that considers safety; destination options; and alternates second. Under this revised guidance; dispatchers are limiting the flight crew options once at a destination; which is a safety compromise. Only after a safe and proper fuel load is determined; should the possibility of bumped revenue and fuel stops be considered. Recent discussions indicate that dispatch training has introduced a new doctrine of lighter fuel loads on certain routes. Their ultimate goal is to 'more closely align excess fuel loads on the [different] fleets.' in preparation for mountain flying; they want to 'wean' the pilots down to required fuel only (or as close as possible) to allow longer stage lengths while still maintaining passenger and baggage capacity. The trainer was quoted as using new planning factors as follows: on VFR days; required fuel only; on less than VFR days and flights to outstations; required fuel; plus alternate fuel; plus ideally no more than X pounds of extra fuel; and on less than VFR days on flights to the hub; they want required fuel; plus alternate fuel; plus ideally no more than xx pounds of extra fuel. Indications are that the weaning process began a few weeks ago and will continue system wide until the minimum fuel numbers are achieved. While we can all agree landing at the destination airport with excess fuel on a day with VFR weather from take off to touch down could be wasteful; this should not be the mindset if we are going to be doing longer legs on this fleet. With longer legs come greater deviations (both in their numbers and distances) around weather which will increase the flight time and fuel burn. This will be especially true in texas and the southwest states.the above paragraphs provide an important back drop to the following real life examples: I was operating flight with an original planned fuel load of 9000 pounds. Taxi fuel was 300 pounds; burn fuel was 4673 pounds; reserve fuel was 1950 pounds; and alternate fuel was 1680 pounds; no holding fuel. Required fuel was 8603 pounds. Additional fuel was 397 pounds. A review of the weather showed our destination as IMC with overcast skies at 1000 ft (AGL). For our own planning purposes we checked the ATIS at our destination and determined that the RNAV approach was in use because of the winds which had a MDA of 880 (AGL) ft. I knew this dispatch fuel load would be unacceptable. With a ceiling close to the MDA we were concerned with the possibility of a missed approach and the immediate need to proceed to the alternate as the planned fuel would not allow for a second attempt to land at the planned destination. This original plan also precluded the possibility of holding and waiting for a change in the weather. Several other questions were raised such as the possibility of a system malfunction with accompanying aircraft performance degrades; ice accretion; unfavorable winds; etc.; that are acute concerns during a minimum fuel divert. I felt the threat to be too great but could be minimized with more fuel; so I requested additional fuel. When I called dispatch to explain my situation and request for more fuel; the conversation was professional; but one of the first things asked was 'how many passengers are we going to need to bump?' I replied it should be minimal as we do have children in the boarding area. While I understand that bumping passengers is a corporate concern it should not be the first factor in any decision regarding revenue flights for a part 121 operation. With safety being our number one priority; bumped revenue should be considered only after we upload the safe and properfuel load. After the conversation with the dispatcher an additional fuel was uploaded and we had our new numbers. We were able to take three more passengers than it was originally booked to and did have to leave behind three non-revenue passengers.here is the real concern. We took off with about 9200 pounds of fuel. When we began our approach the fuel gauges were indicating about 4200 pounds. There was a significant difference between our planned burn and actual burn (notice when we put in the extra fuel it only increased our planned burn by 6 pounds). The additional fuel burned looks to be related to the higher than planned take-off weight circuitous departure path and altitude hold downs. With all of this said; if we did not take the additional fuel and had one unforeseen delay such as a prolonged taxi or being additionally restricted to a lower altitude due to congested air traffic in the northeast; it appears we would not have had enough fuel to make even one attempt at an approach at our destination without eating into our reserve fuel. If the weather was at or near minimums we would have been forced to divert immediately to our alternate.we as a pilot group are in total support of a joint effort to conserve fuel. However; to have hard and fast numbers for every flight is unrealistic. We suggest implementing sound guidelines rather than having dispatch trainers attempting to 'wean' crews off of fuel existing fuel planning expectations. You 'wean' yourself off of an addictive habit; not a safety of flight item. Furthermore; when a crew asks for more fuel and gives a valid reason; the conversation should not start with the question of how many passengers will need to be bumped. Finally; the law of unintended consequences should really be heeded. How do the dispatch computers calculate the alternate fuel? Does it allow for one full approach and then climb from a published decision altitude (da)? Or; does it only provide for the aircraft to arrive overhead the field at 10;000 ft and then go directly to the alternate? Is there any real fuel savings if we need to divert unnecessarily with a minimum fuel load? How do you factor in the costs associated with the ensuing operational mess associated with a diversion and customer dissatisfaction? Once we answer those questions it might give us a better idea on how conservative we should really be on fuel. We feel there needs to be a concerted effort on the part of management to communicate their intentions and revised policies with appropriate documentation and training to the cockpit crews. We as a pilot group stand by to help with implementing fuel savings measures; but not in the interest of compromising safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain laments the industry attitude towards legal fuel reserves and 'safe' fuel quantities.

Narrative: I am writing this letter regarding apparent new policies on fuel planning and subsequent questionable dispatch releases. Recently; certain dispatch releases have contained alarmingly minimal fuel requirements. Additional concerns are that management is trying to manipulate fuel loads with a reversed priority. It appears that revenue performance and available seats are placed ahead of a proper fuel plan that considers safety; destination options; and alternates second. Under this revised guidance; dispatchers are limiting the flight crew options once at a destination; which is a safety compromise. Only after a safe and proper fuel load is determined; should the possibility of bumped revenue and fuel stops be considered. Recent discussions indicate that dispatch training has introduced a new doctrine of lighter fuel loads on certain routes. Their ultimate goal is to 'more closely align excess fuel loads on the [different] fleets.' In preparation for mountain flying; they want to 'wean' the pilots down to required fuel only (or as close as possible) to allow longer stage lengths while still maintaining passenger and baggage capacity. The trainer was quoted as using new planning factors as follows: on VFR days; required fuel only; on less than VFR days and flights to outstations; required fuel; plus alternate fuel; plus ideally no more than X LBS of extra fuel; and on less than VFR days on flights to the hub; they want required fuel; plus alternate fuel; plus ideally no more than XX LBS of extra fuel. Indications are that the weaning process began a few weeks ago and will continue system wide until the minimum fuel numbers are achieved. While we can all agree landing at the destination airport with excess fuel on a day with VFR weather from take off to touch down could be wasteful; this should not be the mindset if we are going to be doing longer legs on this fleet. With longer legs come greater deviations (both in their numbers and distances) around weather which will increase the flight time and fuel burn. This will be especially true in Texas and the Southwest States.The above paragraphs provide an important back drop to the following real life examples: I was operating flight with an original planned fuel load of 9000 LBS. Taxi fuel was 300 LBS; Burn fuel was 4673 LBS; Reserve fuel was 1950 LBS; and Alternate fuel was 1680 LBS; NO HOLDING FUEL. Required Fuel was 8603 LBS. Additional Fuel was 397 LBS. A review of the weather showed our destination as IMC with overcast skies at 1000 FT (AGL). For our own planning purposes we checked the ATIS at our destination and determined that the RNAV approach was in use because of the winds which had a MDA of 880 (AGL) FT. I knew this dispatch fuel load would be unacceptable. With a ceiling close to the MDA we were concerned with the possibility of a missed approach and the immediate need to proceed to the alternate as the planned fuel would not allow for a second attempt to land at the planned destination. This original plan also precluded the possibility of holding and waiting for a change in the weather. Several other questions were raised such as the possibility of a system malfunction with accompanying aircraft performance degrades; ice accretion; unfavorable winds; etc.; that are acute concerns during a minimum fuel divert. I felt the threat to be too great but could be minimized with more fuel; so I requested additional fuel. When I called Dispatch to explain my situation and request for more fuel; the conversation was professional; but one of the first things asked was 'how many passengers are we going to need to bump?' I replied it should be minimal as we do have children in the boarding area. While I understand that bumping passengers is a corporate concern it should not be the first factor in any decision regarding revenue flights for a Part 121 operation. With safety being our number one priority; bumped revenue should be considered only AFTER we upload the safe and properfuel load. After the conversation with the Dispatcher an additional fuel was uploaded and we had our new numbers. We were able to take three more passengers than it was originally booked to and did have to leave behind three non-revenue passengers.Here is the real concern. We took off with about 9200 LBS of fuel. When we began our approach the fuel gauges were indicating about 4200 LBS. There was a significant difference between our planned burn and actual burn (notice when we put in the extra fuel it only increased our planned burn by 6 LBS). The additional fuel burned looks to be related to the higher than planned take-off weight circuitous departure path and altitude hold downs. With all of this said; if we did not take the additional fuel and had one unforeseen delay such as a prolonged taxi or being additionally restricted to a lower altitude due to congested air traffic in the northeast; it appears we would not have had enough fuel to make even one attempt at an approach at our destination without eating into our reserve fuel. If the weather was at or near minimums we would have been forced to divert immediately to our alternate.We as a pilot group are in total support of a joint effort to conserve fuel. However; to have hard and fast numbers for every flight is unrealistic. We suggest implementing sound guidelines rather than having dispatch trainers attempting to 'wean' crews off of fuel existing fuel planning expectations. You 'wean' yourself off of an addictive habit; not a safety of flight item. Furthermore; when a crew asks for more fuel and gives a valid reason; the conversation should not start with the question of how many passengers will need to be bumped. Finally; the law of unintended consequences should really be heeded. How do the dispatch computers calculate the alternate fuel? Does it allow for one full approach and then climb from a published Decision Altitude (DA)? Or; does it only provide for the aircraft to arrive overhead the field at 10;000 FT and then go directly to the alternate? Is there any real fuel savings if we need to divert unnecessarily with a minimum fuel load? How do you factor in the costs associated with the ensuing operational mess associated with a diversion and customer dissatisfaction? Once we answer those questions it might give us a better idea on how conservative we should really be on fuel. We feel there needs to be a concerted effort on the part of management to communicate their intentions and revised policies with appropriate documentation and training to the cockpit crews. We as a pilot group stand by to help with implementing fuel savings measures; but not in the interest of compromising safety.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.