Narrative:

We were inbound to lax. Normally we maintain 5000' until smo, then descend and clearance to land is given by the controller. But, on 5/fri/88, the controller descended us from 5000 to 4000' about 10 NM west of smo. By doing this the controller took us out of the TCA and placed us in airspace known as the lax VFR corridor. At no time prior to or after the incident were we given traffic information. The first officer had just finished giving a passenger briefing for landing and we were doing the before landing checklist. I looked down to check the landing lights on and when I looked up there was a light twin engine aircraft in front of us, it appeared to be a small transport type. Our altitude was 4100-4200' MSL. The small transport Y was about 200' higher and about 1/8 mi in front of us. He appeared to be in level cruise flight and was headed north or nwbound. There was no time to take any evasive action. I think there are several solutions to this incident. First eliminate the lax VFR corridor or move it (offshore or inland). Second, do not descend, climb or turn aircraft so as to place them out of the TCA when they are within 25 NM of the airport. Third, if traffic conditions are such that aircraft must be taken out of protected airspace, then the controllers should be made to separate the aircraft from all observed radar targets. I have 3600 plus hours as a pilot and 7 yrs experience as an air traffic controller. It is my opinion that departure and arrival routes at lax are about as safe as they can get west/O doing a complete airspace overhaul. I also think that the requirement for giving traffic information should be given a higher priority instead of being on a workload permitting basis.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMT ON VECTOR FOR DOWNWIND AT LAX BELOW THE TCA HAD CLOSE CALL WITH VFR SMT NORTHWESTBOUND, NO TRAFFIC ADVISORY FROM ATC.

Narrative: WE WERE INBND TO LAX. NORMALLY WE MAINTAIN 5000' UNTIL SMO, THEN DSND AND CLRNC TO LAND IS GIVEN BY THE CTLR. BUT, ON 5/FRI/88, THE CTLR DSNDED US FROM 5000 TO 4000' ABOUT 10 NM W OF SMO. BY DOING THIS THE CTLR TOOK US OUT OF THE TCA AND PLACED US IN AIRSPACE KNOWN AS THE LAX VFR CORRIDOR. AT NO TIME PRIOR TO OR AFTER THE INCIDENT WERE WE GIVEN TFC INFO. THE F/O HAD JUST FINISHED GIVING A PAX BRIEFING FOR LNDG AND WE WERE DOING THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST. I LOOKED DOWN TO CHK THE LNDG LIGHTS ON AND WHEN I LOOKED UP THERE WAS A LIGHT TWIN ENG ACFT IN FRONT OF US, IT APPEARED TO BE A SMT TYPE. OUR ALT WAS 4100-4200' MSL. THE SMT Y WAS ABOUT 200' HIGHER AND ABOUT 1/8 MI IN FRONT OF US. HE APPEARED TO BE IN LEVEL CRUISE FLT AND WAS HEADED N OR NWBOUND. THERE WAS NO TIME TO TAKE ANY EVASIVE ACTION. I THINK THERE ARE SEVERAL SOLUTIONS TO THIS INCIDENT. FIRST ELIMINATE THE LAX VFR CORRIDOR OR MOVE IT (OFFSHORE OR INLAND). SECOND, DO NOT DSND, CLB OR TURN ACFT SO AS TO PLACE THEM OUT OF THE TCA WHEN THEY ARE WITHIN 25 NM OF THE ARPT. THIRD, IF TFC CONDITIONS ARE SUCH THAT ACFT MUST BE TAKEN OUT OF PROTECTED AIRSPACE, THEN THE CTLRS SHOULD BE MADE TO SEPARATE THE ACFT FROM ALL OBSERVED RADAR TARGETS. I HAVE 3600 PLUS HRS AS A PLT AND 7 YRS EXPERIENCE AS AN AIR TFC CTLR. IT IS MY OPINION THAT DEP AND ARR ROUTES AT LAX ARE ABOUT AS SAFE AS THEY CAN GET W/O DOING A COMPLETE AIRSPACE OVERHAUL. I ALSO THINK THAT THE REQUIREMENT FOR GIVING TFC INFO SHOULD BE GIVEN A HIGHER PRIORITY INSTEAD OF BEING ON A WORKLOAD PERMITTING BASIS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.