Narrative:

We were cleared to taxi to runway 19R via 'a' and hold short of runway 19L, the primary light aircraft runway. There were 2 small aircraft and an medium large transport in front of us. The medium large transport was holding short of taxiway left. One of the small aircraft taxied around it and departed from runway 19L. The other small aircraft pulled off onto the wide run up area to the east of taxiway a. This put the small aircraft in a position that placed it behind, thus in the jet blast zone of the hold line for runway 19L. The medium large transport was cleared to cross runway 19L and departed runway 19R. We were instructed to hold short of runway 19L on 'left'. In fact, we were told to 'taxi up around the corner and hold short of 19L.' I surmise that this was done as it is not unusual to hold short of 'left' to allow light aircraft to taxi past and depart on runway 19L, and obviously the local controller did not want us to do that. I taxied up to and held short of runway 19R on taxiway left. The small aircraft was still behind me in the run up area. These instructions came from the local controller for runway 19R and not ground. It must be noted that there are 2 local controllers, one for runway 19L and one for runway 19R, operating on different frequencys, 126.8 and 119.9 respectively. At this time there was evidently a change in local controllers as a female voice was not controling 126.8. She issued a long stream of instructions to several aircraft. One instruction I understood to be, '...cross runway 19L and hold short of runway 19R.' there was such a stream of instructions coming from the tower that it was impossible to get in an acknowledgement. At this critical moment of communications, apparently my first officer was distracted and did not hear the tower's instructions. I cautiously applied power because I knew the small aircraft was behind. When the engines spooled up, we started to move slowly across the hold line. As we were moving, my first officer said, 'are we cleared to cross?' I said, 'yes.' he then said that there was an aircraft on final. I told him I saw it. What I did not know was that he was looking at an small aircraft on short final for runway 19L and I was looking at an small transport on a 2 mi final for runway 19L! I was unable to see the small aircraft as it was hiddenfrom my view by the cockpit window posts and overhead, and had been hidden from view on its left base leg by the position of my aircraft. As this was occurring the first officer said he would confirm the crossing instructions as there was an aircraft on final. I said ok, but I had the small transport in sight and saw no problem. He then said not the small transport, but the small aircraft on short final for runway 19L. I immediately stopped the aircraft, and bending down to look under the overhead and around the window posts, saw the small aircraft on about a 1/2 mi final for runway 19L. At this point I realized that I had penetrated the runway 19L environment. I was now in a box. If I applied sufficient power to move forward, it would have to be a maximum power application, which at best I figured would accomplish only 2 things: blow over the small aircraft behind me in the run up area and succeed in moving us just far enough forward, in the time remaining, to put my tail right in front of the small transport on final. I elected to stay where we were because, although we were past the hold line, there was sufficient room in front of us for the small aircraft to pass and land on the runway should it be unable to go around. We asked for confirmation on the crossing clearance as there was an aircraft on short final for runway 19L. The controller caustically confirmed we had been cleared to cross and that in any case, we were on the runway. At this point, the small aircraft on final for runway 19L executed a go around. I don't know whether this was an instruction from the runway 19L controller (remember he was on a different frequency) or whether it was initiated by the pilot. In summary, I feel that there were several contributing factors to this occurrence, the primary of which was too much traffic in to little space. The runway 19R controller should not have issued a stream of instructions to several different aircraft west/O receiving any readbacks. There was no question that the controller was trying to expedite traffic, but rather than doing it in a methodical way, it sounded more like panic instructions. When I was cleared to cross runway 19L, if I had been advised of the aircraft turning final for runway 19L, I possibly could have seen it, or at least have avoided the confusion that developed between my first officer and myself re which aircraft we had in sight. Also, had I been informed of the conflicting traffic, I really don't think I would have even attempted to cross runway 19L as I feel the traffic was too close to have allowed a safe crossing. On my part, I probably should have been explicit with my first officer re his monitoring of the radio and traffic during this phase of operation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG UNCLEAR ON CLRNC STARTED TO CROSS RWY, THEN STOPPED IN RWY ENVIRONMENT CAUSING SMA TO GO AROUND.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 19R VIA 'A' AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 19L, THE PRIMARY LIGHT ACFT RWY. THERE WERE 2 SMA AND AN MLG IN FRONT OF US. THE MLG WAS HOLDING SHORT OF TXWY L. ONE OF THE SMA TAXIED AROUND IT AND DEPARTED FROM RWY 19L. THE OTHER SMA PULLED OFF ONTO THE WIDE RUN UP AREA TO THE E OF TXWY A. THIS PUT THE SMA IN A POS THAT PLACED IT BEHIND, THUS IN THE JET BLAST ZONE OF THE HOLD LINE FOR RWY 19L. THE MLG WAS CLRED TO CROSS RWY 19L AND DEPARTED RWY 19R. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 19L ON 'L'. IN FACT, WE WERE TOLD TO 'TAXI UP AROUND THE CORNER AND HOLD SHORT OF 19L.' I SURMISE THAT THIS WAS DONE AS IT IS NOT UNUSUAL TO HOLD SHORT OF 'L' TO ALLOW LIGHT ACFT TO TAXI PAST AND DEPART ON RWY 19L, AND OBVIOUSLY THE LCL CTLR DID NOT WANT US TO DO THAT. I TAXIED UP TO AND HELD SHORT OF RWY 19R ON TXWY L. THE SMA WAS STILL BEHIND ME IN THE RUN UP AREA. THESE INSTRUCTIONS CAME FROM THE LCL CTLR FOR RWY 19R AND NOT GND. IT MUST BE NOTED THAT THERE ARE 2 LCL CTLRS, ONE FOR RWY 19L AND ONE FOR RWY 19R, OPERATING ON DIFFERENT FREQS, 126.8 AND 119.9 RESPECTIVELY. AT THIS TIME THERE WAS EVIDENTLY A CHANGE IN LCL CTLRS AS A FEMALE VOICE WAS NOT CTLING 126.8. SHE ISSUED A LONG STREAM OF INSTRUCTIONS TO SEVERAL ACFT. ONE INSTRUCTION I UNDERSTOOD TO BE, '...CROSS RWY 19L AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 19R.' THERE WAS SUCH A STREAM OF INSTRUCTIONS COMING FROM THE TWR THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET IN AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT OF COMS, APPARENTLY MY F/O WAS DISTRACTED AND DID NOT HEAR THE TWR'S INSTRUCTIONS. I CAUTIOUSLY APPLIED PWR BECAUSE I KNEW THE SMA WAS BEHIND. WHEN THE ENGS SPOOLED UP, WE STARTED TO MOVE SLOWLY ACROSS THE HOLD LINE. AS WE WERE MOVING, MY F/O SAID, 'ARE WE CLRED TO CROSS?' I SAID, 'YES.' HE THEN SAID THAT THERE WAS AN ACFT ON FINAL. I TOLD HIM I SAW IT. WHAT I DID NOT KNOW WAS THAT HE WAS LOOKING AT AN SMA ON SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 19L AND I WAS LOOKING AT AN SMT ON A 2 MI FINAL FOR RWY 19L! I WAS UNABLE TO SEE THE SMA AS IT WAS HIDDENFROM MY VIEW BY THE COCKPIT WINDOW POSTS AND OVERHEAD, AND HAD BEEN HIDDEN FROM VIEW ON ITS LEFT BASE LEG BY THE POS OF MY ACFT. AS THIS WAS OCCURRING THE F/O SAID HE WOULD CONFIRM THE XING INSTRUCTIONS AS THERE WAS AN ACFT ON FINAL. I SAID OK, BUT I HAD THE SMT IN SIGHT AND SAW NO PROB. HE THEN SAID NOT THE SMT, BUT THE SMA ON SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 19L. I IMMEDIATELY STOPPED THE ACFT, AND BENDING DOWN TO LOOK UNDER THE OVERHEAD AND AROUND THE WINDOW POSTS, SAW THE SMA ON ABOUT A 1/2 MI FINAL FOR RWY 19L. AT THIS POINT I REALIZED THAT I HAD PENETRATED THE RWY 19L ENVIRONMENT. I WAS NOW IN A BOX. IF I APPLIED SUFFICIENT PWR TO MOVE FORWARD, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE A MAX PWR APPLICATION, WHICH AT BEST I FIGURED WOULD ACCOMPLISH ONLY 2 THINGS: BLOW OVER THE SMA BEHIND ME IN THE RUN UP AREA AND SUCCEED IN MOVING US JUST FAR ENOUGH FORWARD, IN THE TIME REMAINING, TO PUT MY TAIL RIGHT IN FRONT OF THE SMT ON FINAL. I ELECTED TO STAY WHERE WE WERE BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH WE WERE PAST THE HOLD LINE, THERE WAS SUFFICIENT ROOM IN FRONT OF US FOR THE SMA TO PASS AND LAND ON THE RWY SHOULD IT BE UNABLE TO GO AROUND. WE ASKED FOR CONFIRMATION ON THE XING CLRNC AS THERE WAS AN ACFT ON SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 19L. THE CTLR CAUSTICALLY CONFIRMED WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO CROSS AND THAT IN ANY CASE, WE WERE ON THE RWY. AT THIS POINT, THE SMA ON FINAL FOR RWY 19L EXECUTED A GO AROUND. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS AN INSTRUCTION FROM THE RWY 19L CTLR (REMEMBER HE WAS ON A DIFFERENT FREQ) OR WHETHER IT WAS INITIATED BY THE PLT. IN SUMMARY, I FEEL THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS OCCURRENCE, THE PRIMARY OF WHICH WAS TOO MUCH TFC IN TO LITTLE SPACE. THE RWY 19R CTLR SHOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED A STREAM OF INSTRUCTIONS TO SEVERAL DIFFERENT ACFT W/O RECEIVING ANY READBACKS. THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT THE CTLR WAS TRYING TO EXPEDITE TFC, BUT RATHER THAN DOING IT IN A METHODICAL WAY, IT SOUNDED MORE LIKE PANIC INSTRUCTIONS. WHEN I WAS CLRED TO CROSS RWY 19L, IF I HAD BEEN ADVISED OF THE ACFT TURNING FINAL FOR RWY 19L, I POSSIBLY COULD HAVE SEEN IT, OR AT LEAST HAVE AVOIDED THE CONFUSION THAT DEVELOPED BTWN MY F/O AND MYSELF RE WHICH ACFT WE HAD IN SIGHT. ALSO, HAD I BEEN INFORMED OF THE CONFLICTING TFC, I REALLY DON'T THINK I WOULD HAVE EVEN ATTEMPTED TO CROSS RWY 19L AS I FEEL THE TFC WAS TOO CLOSE TO HAVE ALLOWED A SAFE XING. ON MY PART, I PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXPLICIT WITH MY F/O RE HIS MONITORING OF THE RADIO AND TFC DURING THIS PHASE OF OPERATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.