Narrative:

Daytona beach was using the parallel runways 7L and 7R. The wind was very strong out of the north approximately heading 320 through 350 at speeds between 10 and 16 knots. I asked the supervisor two times to switch to runway 34 to be aligned with the wind and he refused. Aircraft X attempted to land on 7L; went off the edge of the runway to the south; and went around. The pilot was quite shaken up and was unable to follow simple instructions. I finally was able to get aircraft X to land on runway 34 after the supervisor gave me permission. We still did not switch to the runway aligned with the wind. At the time of the event the airport was slow to moderate and there was no capacity issues for going to a single runway operation. Even if there was some concern we just received a briefing telling us that the FAA shall not sacrifice safety for capacity. This is another example of safety culture changes just being ignored in the field.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DAB controller described a runway excursion event involving a C172 attempting to land on Runway 7L when surface winds dictated the use of Runway 34; the reporter claiming FAA's safety culture is ignored in the field.

Narrative: Daytona Beach was using the parallel Runways 7L and 7R. The wind was very strong out of the north approximately heading 320 through 350 at speeds between 10 and 16 knots. I asked the Supervisor two times to switch to Runway 34 to be aligned with the wind and he refused. Aircraft X attempted to land on 7L; went off the edge of the runway to the south; and went around. The pilot was quite shaken up and was unable to follow simple instructions. I finally was able to get Aircraft X to land on Runway 34 after the Supervisor gave me permission. We still did not switch to the runway aligned with the wind. At the time of the event the airport was slow to moderate and there was no capacity issues for going to a single runway operation. Even if there was some concern we just received a briefing telling us that the FAA SHALL NOT sacrifice safety for capacity. This is another example of safety culture changes just being ignored in the field.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.