Narrative:

After takeoff it was discovered that the landing gear would not retract. While I reviewed the abnormal procedures and thus determined that the situation could not be rectified in flight, ewr departure was informed of our decision to return for landing, and ATC was also notified that our situation did not warrant any special assistance. At no time was an emergency declared, our gear was confirmed down and in a locked detent. The cabin crew and passenger were told of our return to ewr. The approximately time in flight: 15 mins. At the gate I entered into the aircraft logbook what I considered to be the cause--some type of malfunction in the ground shift mechanism. Learned gear pins with flags were found in wheel wells. Background of events: during my exterior inspection of the aircraft, there were not any gear pins with or west/O flags in any main wheel well. I inspected each well, target light plus red down and locked indication tape. This is the direct area where pins would be located if installed. First officer confirms all gear pins were on board in the cockpit during his interior inspection. All checklists were completed by the flight crew. Nothing in logbook to indicate to flight crew that pins had been installed or reinstalled. After all the checklists were completed by flight crew, maintenance arrived in cockpit and then left to work on hydraulic system. At push time, maintenance gave the cockpit a thumbs up signal, indicating they had completed securing the aircraft. Push crew showed me the usual gear pin inserted in the nosewheel and saluted me off for taxi. I was never informed of anything that might have looked unusual by the man on the headset. All indications point to the fact that the gear pins were reinstalled after flight crew completed all the company required checks. The concept of a sterile cockpit should perhaps be extended to certain activities related to the aircraft after a preflight is complete. If any deviation must be made re: this concept, the captain must be immediately informed in detail of any activity relating to the aircraft. Improvement in communication between maintenance, ground personnel and cockpit crews. Better dialogue between and within each individual department strengthening of ground personnel training. Improve recognition of very basic items on aircraft exterior and ramp that might indicate a potential problem exists. Consideration of stress training. How to better cope with the pressures of getting aircraft off many gates as rapidly as possible west/O compromising safety. Review history of past events with employees. This is an educational tool for many who constantly work around aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG MADE TKOF FROM EWR WITH MAIN GEAR PINS STILL INSTALLED. RETURN LAND.

Narrative: AFTER TKOF IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE LNDG GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT. WHILE I REVIEWED THE ABNORMAL PROCS AND THUS DETERMINED THAT THE SITUATION COULD NOT BE RECTIFIED IN FLT, EWR DEP WAS INFORMED OF OUR DECISION TO RETURN FOR LNDG, AND ATC WAS ALSO NOTIFIED THAT OUR SITUATION DID NOT WARRANT ANY SPECIAL ASSISTANCE. AT NO TIME WAS AN EMER DECLARED, OUR GEAR WAS CONFIRMED DOWN AND IN A LOCKED DETENT. THE CABIN CREW AND PAX WERE TOLD OF OUR RETURN TO EWR. THE APPROX TIME IN FLT: 15 MINS. AT THE GATE I ENTERED INTO THE ACFT LOGBOOK WHAT I CONSIDERED TO BE THE CAUSE--SOME TYPE OF MALFUNCTION IN THE GND SHIFT MECHANISM. LEARNED GEAR PINS WITH FLAGS WERE FOUND IN WHEEL WELLS. BACKGROUND OF EVENTS: DURING MY EXTERIOR INSPECTION OF THE ACFT, THERE WERE NOT ANY GEAR PINS WITH OR W/O FLAGS IN ANY MAIN WHEEL WELL. I INSPECTED EACH WELL, TARGET LIGHT PLUS RED DOWN AND LOCKED INDICATION TAPE. THIS IS THE DIRECT AREA WHERE PINS WOULD BE LOCATED IF INSTALLED. F/O CONFIRMS ALL GEAR PINS WERE ON BOARD IN THE COCKPIT DURING HIS INTERIOR INSPECTION. ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED BY THE FLT CREW. NOTHING IN LOGBOOK TO INDICATE TO FLT CREW THAT PINS HAD BEEN INSTALLED OR REINSTALLED. AFTER ALL THE CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED BY FLT CREW, MAINT ARRIVED IN COCKPIT AND THEN LEFT TO WORK ON HYD SYS. AT PUSH TIME, MAINT GAVE THE COCKPIT A THUMBS UP SIGNAL, INDICATING THEY HAD COMPLETED SECURING THE ACFT. PUSH CREW SHOWED ME THE USUAL GEAR PIN INSERTED IN THE NOSEWHEEL AND SALUTED ME OFF FOR TAXI. I WAS NEVER INFORMED OF ANYTHING THAT MIGHT HAVE LOOKED UNUSUAL BY THE MAN ON THE HEADSET. ALL INDICATIONS POINT TO THE FACT THAT THE GEAR PINS WERE REINSTALLED AFTER FLT CREW COMPLETED ALL THE COMPANY REQUIRED CHKS. THE CONCEPT OF A STERILE COCKPIT SHOULD PERHAPS BE EXTENDED TO CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE ACFT AFTER A PREFLT IS COMPLETE. IF ANY DEVIATION MUST BE MADE RE: THIS CONCEPT, THE CAPT MUST BE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED IN DETAIL OF ANY ACTIVITY RELATING TO THE ACFT. IMPROVEMENT IN COM BTWN MAINT, GND PERSONNEL AND COCKPIT CREWS. BETTER DIALOGUE BTWN AND WITHIN EACH INDIVIDUAL DEPT STRENGTHENING OF GND PERSONNEL TRNING. IMPROVE RECOGNITION OF VERY BASIC ITEMS ON ACFT EXTERIOR AND RAMP THAT MIGHT INDICATE A POTENTIAL PROB EXISTS. CONSIDERATION OF STRESS TRNING. HOW TO BETTER COPE WITH THE PRESSURES OF GETTING ACFT OFF MANY GATES AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE W/O COMPROMISING SAFETY. REVIEW HISTORY OF PAST EVENTS WITH EMPLOYEES. THIS IS AN EDUCATIONAL TOOL FOR MANY WHO CONSTANTLY WORK AROUND ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.