Narrative:

I was training a developmental on DR1 with all airports in the airspace in a south flow. The DR1 hand off position was staffed by a newly certified controller. There was moderate to heavy precipitation/weather south and southeast of dfw and south of dal blocking the normal departure corridors and airspace. Jets off dal normally climb on a 130 heading to 50 but due to weather were coordinated to climb to 30 on a 180 degree heading off dal with a blanket approval from dallas south who owns that airspace. The north jets off of dfw were being vectored early after blanket coordination through dallas south airspace eastbound. And then [the jets] turned north through feeder east airspace for weather and to miss the dal jet departures. The jets off of dal were being manually released by the hand off controller because they wanted immediate west turns to avoid weather which turned them directly into the dfw jet departures. There was pressure to get all of the dfw departures airborne as soon as possible because dfw was in 60 minute delays due to combined routes and mit restrictions from ZFW due to weather outside of our airspace. A request came for a release on a northbound jet off dal; a B737; and because he would have to climb into DR2/3's airspace instead of DR1's due to weather; I instructed the hand off controller to coordinate with DR2/3 for the release then change the data tag to the DR2/3 symbol; and tell dal tower to assign the new departure frequency to B737. The data tag was not changed; the departure frequency was not changed and the heading assigned to the departure was 190 degrees now due to the weather. The hand off controller then approved a point out from the dallas south satellite controller on an overflight at 30 directly over dal airport on a 210 heading. The thinking was that theoretically with 20 degrees divergence; the jet off dal would be able to climb above the overflight aircraft. He/she did not advise me or the developmental of the plan. The point out overflight at 30 now blocked the departure path of the dfw departures that were still on automatic releases. A air carrier jet off dfw checked on the frequency on a 150 heading converging with the 30 traffic climbing to 100 and the developmental asked him to expedite his climb so as to climb above the dallas south airspace as soon as possible; but could not turn him to avoid the 30 traffic until he cleared the dfw tower airspace out of 30. The B737 checked in airborne climbing to 30 and wanting an immediate right turn unaware of the 30 traffic immediately off his right. Slightly before the B737 departure; the data tag at that point; which had been only a limited data block at 30; appeared yellow on our scope. I do not know whether the hand off controller made him yellow; or the dallas south controller did; but I took the frequency and stopped B737 at 20 in the middle of a 24 MVA to avoid the 30 traffic and turned him immediately to a heading of 180. I turned an air carrier jet off dfw to an immediate turn north to go behind general aviation overflight that was on the dallas south frequency and unaware that two jets where being pried away from him. I told the hand off controller to hand off the B737 to the DR2/3 controller and I climbed the jet to 40 once he was established on the 180 heading a safely diverging from the overflight and switched him to the DR2/3 frequency. In retrospect it was fortuitous that the hand off controller did not change the data tag or that dal tower did not give the new departure frequency; as DR2/3 was also training and unaware of the point out given at 30 and may have not been told of the departure coming off to him off dal. I could hear the confusion in the air carrier pilots' voice that he was being vectored into the weather and kept low over the top of the downtown dallas skyline; and he even insisted on a climb and turn after my instructions; but I told him it was to avoid traffic and he complied. I have never in my careeras an air traffic controller had to stop an aircraft below the MVA to avoid other aircraft. It felt wrong in every way; but my instincts for separation kicked in and to my knowledge there was no loss of separation between the aircraft. It is evident to me that the training we are giving is lacking in completeness as we are rushing to push people through the training program due to lack of staffing. The extra caution used in weather conditions was disregarded here; as well as incomplete communication. Recommendation; it is a known fact at D10 that the training for the hand off positions is incomplete and not emphasized enough. There is too little time devoted to this training and it is inconsistent. It is not staffed often enough for those who are inexperienced; to get good at the job; or to learn from the years of experience of the veterans while they are either working the position or training others.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: D10 controller providing OJT experienced a MVA separation event when forced to assign an altitude below MVA requirements to insure separation with an overflight aircraft; the reporter listing hand off controller errors as causal factors in this instance.

Narrative: I was training a Developmental on DR1 with all airports in the airspace in a south flow. The DR1 hand off position was staffed by a newly certified controller. There was moderate to heavy precipitation/weather south and southeast of DFW and south of DAL blocking the normal departure corridors and airspace. Jets off DAL normally climb on a 130 heading to 50 but due to weather were coordinated to climb to 30 on a 180 degree heading off DAL with a blanket approval from Dallas South who owns that airspace. The north jets off of DFW were being vectored early after blanket coordination through Dallas South airspace eastbound. And then [the jets] turned north through Feeder East airspace for weather and to miss the DAL jet departures. The jets off of DAL were being manually released by the Hand Off Controller because they wanted immediate west turns to avoid weather which turned them directly into the DFW jet departures. There was pressure to get all of the DFW departures airborne as soon as possible because DFW was in 60 minute delays due to combined routes and MIT restrictions from ZFW due to weather outside of our airspace. A request came for a release on a northbound jet off DAL; a B737; and because he would have to climb into DR2/3's airspace instead of DR1's due to weather; I instructed the Hand Off Controller to coordinate with DR2/3 for the release then change the data tag to the DR2/3 symbol; and tell DAL Tower to assign the new departure frequency to B737. The data tag was not changed; the departure frequency was not changed and the heading assigned to the departure was 190 degrees now due to the weather. The Hand Off Controller then approved a point out from the Dallas South Satellite Controller on an overflight at 30 directly over DAL airport on a 210 heading. The thinking was that theoretically with 20 degrees divergence; the jet off DAL would be able to climb above the overflight aircraft. He/she did not advise me or the Developmental of the plan. The point out overflight at 30 now blocked the departure path of the DFW departures that were still on automatic releases. A air carrier jet off DFW checked on the frequency on a 150 heading converging with the 30 traffic climbing to 100 and the Developmental asked him to expedite his climb so as to climb above the Dallas South airspace as soon as possible; but could not turn him to avoid the 30 traffic until he cleared the DFW Tower airspace out of 30. The B737 checked in airborne climbing to 30 and wanting an immediate right turn unaware of the 30 traffic immediately off his right. Slightly before the B737 departure; the data tag at that point; which had been only a limited data block at 30; appeared yellow on our scope. I do not know whether the Hand Off Controller made him yellow; or the Dallas South Controller did; but I took the frequency and stopped B737 at 20 in the middle of a 24 MVA to avoid the 30 traffic and turned him immediately to a heading of 180. I turned an air carrier jet off DFW to an immediate turn north to go behind general aviation overflight that was on the Dallas South frequency and unaware that two jets where being pried away from him. I told the Hand Off Controller to hand off the B737 to the DR2/3 Controller and I climbed the jet to 40 once he was established on the 180 heading a safely diverging from the overflight and switched him to the DR2/3 frequency. In retrospect it was fortuitous that the Hand Off Controller did not change the data tag or that DAL Tower did not give the new departure frequency; as DR2/3 was also training and unaware of the point out given at 30 and may have not been told of the departure coming off to him off DAL. I could hear the confusion in the air carrier pilots' voice that he was being vectored into the weather and kept low over the top of the downtown Dallas skyline; and he even insisted on a climb and turn after my instructions; but I told him it was to avoid traffic and he complied. I have never in my careeras an air traffic controller had to stop an aircraft below the MVA to avoid other aircraft. It felt wrong in every way; but my instincts for separation kicked in and to my knowledge there was no loss of separation between the aircraft. It is evident to me that the training we are giving is lacking in completeness as we are rushing to push people through the training program due to lack of staffing. The extra caution used in weather conditions was disregarded here; as well as incomplete communication. Recommendation; it is a known fact at D10 that the training for the hand off positions is incomplete and not emphasized enough. There is too little time devoted to this training and it is inconsistent. It is not staffed often enough for those who are inexperienced; to get good at the job; or to learn from the years of experience of the veterans while they are either working the position or training others.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.