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ZAB controller described a loss of all communications during the transition from vscs to vtab equipment; suggesting checklist procedures be developed to prevent future communications failures.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 893538 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201006 |
| Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | ZAB.ARTCC |
| State Reference | NM |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | SR22 |
| Flight Phase | Cruise |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Airspace Violation All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
[We had a] scheduled transition from vscs (voice switching & control system) to vtabs (vscs training and backup system). During switchover; sector 15 vscs failed to transition to vtabs. All communication resources lost at sector. [I] attempted to identify problems and advised supervisor; who advised technical personnel. Ama initiated hand-off approximately 30 east of pnh level 5000; but entering ZAB mia of 5200. [I] was unable to advise ama of mia requirements. Ama apparently was now unexpectedly busy with aircraft returning to their frequency; and was unable to contract sector 15. Estimate failure lasted 2 to 3 minutes before resolved; ama immediately advised to climb the aircraft to 060. The problem apparently resulted in failure to 'flip a switch' prior to vtabs changeover. Recommendation; have technicians and operational personnel utilize some kind of checklist prior to authorizing vtabs switchover.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZAB Controller described a loss of all communications during the transition from VSCS to VTAB equipment; suggesting checklist procedures be developed to prevent future communications failures.
Narrative: [We had a] scheduled transition from VSCS (Voice Switching & Control System) to VTABS (VSCS Training and Backup System). During switchover; Sector 15 VSCS failed to transition to VTABS. All communication resources lost at sector. [I] attempted to identify problems and advised Supervisor; who advised technical personnel. AMA initiated hand-off approximately 30 east of PNH level 5000; but entering ZAB MIA of 5200. [I] was unable to advise AMA of MIA requirements. AMA apparently was now unexpectedly busy with aircraft returning to their frequency; and was unable to contract Sector 15. Estimate failure lasted 2 to 3 minutes before resolved; AMA immediately advised to climb the aircraft to 060. The problem apparently resulted in failure to 'flip a switch' prior to VTABS changeover. Recommendation; have technicians and operational personnel utilize some kind of checklist prior to authorizing VTABS switchover.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.