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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 912317 |
Time | |
Date | 201009 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B757-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Turbine Engine |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250 Flight Crew Total 17950 Flight Crew Type 6000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Other Pilot Pushing |
Narrative:
I'm flying a transcontinental flight; full; heavy; extra fuel; with weather on the east coast; close to max TOGW probably requiring a max EPR takeoff. Earlier today; the left engine had an egt exceedence--minor--but an exceedence on takeoff on an earlier flight. We turned the plane down based on max EPR takeoff and no corrective action on the engine. The engine was inspected and complied with an egt exceedence maintenance inspection; but no corrective action taken. We felt the chances were very high of another exceedence on takeoff with no maintenance action on the engine. Our chief pilot and the two maintenance guys stopped by flight operations during our two hour weather flow delay to educate us on maintenance procedures and engine tolerances with respect to egt. I appreciate that management is under pressure for departure completions. However; although they were cordial; this is one of the most blatant cases of pilot pushing I've seen in a long time. We were literally surrounded in flight operations by the three guys trying to talk us into taking the plane. It was interesting that what was actually wrong with the engine was never addressed. Maintenance kept saying that there was no write-up; therefore; nothing wrong with the plane. The engine self reported on the ACARS condition monitoring system. Maintenance did the over-temp inspection; but insisted that there was nothing wrong; so there was nothing on the engine to work on; so their answer was to do nothing. We were trying to come up with alternatives so we could take the flight. Plane change; engine run; recent max EPR takeoff histories. Their bottom line was there was nothing wrong with the plane. An egt over-temp on a normal takeoff? Maintenance control said it was a high time engine and due to be changed at the end of the month anyway. So why did it over-temp? I don't know; but we needed answers; and maintenance was not giving us enough information to make a good decision. Maintenance said aircraft routers would not consider a swap since maintenance said there was nothing wrong and could not understand why we wouldn't take the plane. Dispatch said the routers had not been contacted by maintenance regarding a refusal. Maintenance did all they could to convince us that the over-temp was not a real over-temp and the engine had all kinds of safety margin and buffers in the over-temp requirements. I kept telling them; that's fine; I understand maintenance limits are different; but we have to go by the FAA approved flight manual limits. There is a good chance it would exceed our limits again. Our basic premise was; if we could know that the engine would go to maximum EPR without an over temp; we would take the plane. That was our argument from the beginning. So one solution; since we had two hours to play with; have maintenance take the plane and do an engine run. The maintenance guy in operations said he would arrange that. Problem solved. But later local line maintenance said there was no write up and since there was no write up they could not get permission from the FAA so they weren't going to do an engine run up. Since when does maintenance have to get FAA permission to do an engine run? In the end; after I suggested several times; over several hours; that we check the records for maximum EPR takeoffs and pull the engine conditioning monitoring data for that takeoff. They finally did this; and satisfied our requirement for data to support our position. Two hours later we checked the data found a recent maximum EPR takeoff that was well in limits. In the end; we initially refused the plane because we needed more information on the left engine condition than maintenance control [would or] could provide us. No one was interested in fixing the basic problem. We; the pilots; ended up doing a maintenance function by trying to solve the situation. We presented several alternatives to an outright refusal; but not only were rebuffed; and were pressured into taking the plane without adequately investigating the basic cause of the original problem. We were trying to be reasonable; but it was getting difficult to get the point across without histrionics. In summary; yes; we felt we were being pressured into taking the plane. No; we were not satisfied with maintenance in their practices and handling of the problem. I believe my authority was questioned indirectly. I don't know if the chief pilot had nothing better to do right then; but he was the chief pilot with a maintenance supervisor and another flight manager surrounding us in flight operations. What would you think? We had fairly calm and reasoned discussions; and in the end we took the plane after a lot more information was dug up; but it sure seemed that we; the flight crew; were the only ones interested in flight safety vs. Is it legal.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B757-200 flight crew debated the merits of accepting an aircraft; which had suffered an EGT exceedance on a previous takeoff; with flight operations and maintenance managers.
Narrative: I'm flying a transcontinental flight; full; heavy; extra fuel; with weather on the East coast; close to max TOGW probably requiring a Max EPR takeoff. Earlier today; the left engine had an EGT exceedence--minor--but an exceedence on takeoff on an earlier flight. We turned the plane down based on max EPR takeoff and no corrective action on the engine. The engine was inspected and complied with an EGT exceedence maintenance inspection; but no corrective action taken. We felt the chances were very high of another exceedence on takeoff with no maintenance action on the engine. Our Chief Pilot and the two maintenance guys stopped by flight operations during our two hour weather flow delay to educate us on maintenance procedures and engine tolerances with respect to EGT. I appreciate that management is under pressure for departure completions. However; although they were cordial; this is one of the most blatant cases of pilot pushing I've seen in a long time. We were literally surrounded in flight operations by the three guys trying to talk us into taking the plane. It was interesting that what was actually wrong with the engine was never addressed. Maintenance kept saying that there was no write-up; therefore; nothing wrong with the plane. The engine self reported on the ACARS condition monitoring system. Maintenance did the over-temp inspection; but insisted that there was nothing wrong; so there was nothing on the engine to work on; so their answer was to do nothing. We were trying to come up with alternatives so we could take the flight. Plane change; engine run; recent Max EPR takeoff histories. Their bottom line was there was nothing wrong with the plane. An EGT over-temp on a normal takeoff? Maintenance Control said it was a high time engine and due to be changed at the end of the month anyway. So why did it over-temp? I don't know; but we needed answers; and Maintenance was not giving us enough information to make a good decision. Maintenance said aircraft routers would not consider a swap since Maintenance said there was nothing wrong and could not understand why we wouldn't take the plane. Dispatch said the routers had not been contacted by Maintenance regarding a refusal. Maintenance did all they could to convince us that the over-temp was not a real over-temp and the engine had all kinds of safety margin and buffers in the over-temp requirements. I kept telling them; that's fine; I understand Maintenance limits are different; but we have to go by the FAA approved flight manual limits. There is a good chance it would exceed our limits again. Our basic premise was; if we could know that the engine would go to MAX EPR without an over temp; we would take the plane. That was our argument from the beginning. So one solution; since we had two hours to play with; have Maintenance take the plane and do an engine run. The Maintenance guy in operations said he would arrange that. Problem solved. But later local line Maintenance said there was no write up and since there was no write up they could not get permission from the FAA so they weren't going to do an engine run up. Since when does Maintenance have to get FAA permission to do an engine run? In the end; after I suggested several times; over several hours; that we check the records for MAX EPR takeoffs and pull the engine conditioning monitoring data for that takeoff. They finally did this; and satisfied our requirement for data to support our position. Two hours later we checked the data found a recent MAX EPR takeoff that was well in limits. In the end; we initially refused the plane because we needed more information on the left engine condition than Maintenance Control [would or] could provide us. No one was interested in fixing the basic problem. We; the pilots; ended up doing a maintenance function by trying to solve the situation. We presented several alternatives to an outright refusal; but not only were rebuffed; and were pressured into taking the plane without adequately investigating the basic cause of the original problem. We were trying to be reasonable; but it was getting difficult to get the point across without histrionics. In summary; yes; we felt we were being pressured into taking the plane. No; we were not satisfied with Maintenance in their practices and handling of the problem. I believe my authority was questioned indirectly. I don't know if the Chief Pilot had nothing better to do right then; but he was the Chief Pilot with a Maintenance Supervisor and another Flight Manager surrounding us in flight operations. What would you think? We had fairly calm and reasoned discussions; and in the end we took the plane after a lot more information was dug up; but it sure seemed that we; the flight crew; were the only ones interested in flight safety vs. is it legal.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.