Narrative:

Our airline was bought by a competitor about 1 1/2 yrs ago. My former airline operated medium large transport. The new airline has specific policies, procedures and philosophies that differ from the former airline that I believe contributed significantly to the experience which I am about to describe. At the former airline, the first officer's were taught to automatically extend flaps and slats when the aircraft was saluted away from the ramp agent. The new airline allows slat/flap extension only after the aircraft is away from the ramp and upon command of the captain. The airport where my incident occurred has a designated ramp area all the way to the taxiway serving the main runway. Therefore, because of past reprimands, the cockpit crewmembers are disciplined to adhere to the company policy of slat/flap extension. After starting engines and completing the after start checklist, I started to taxi. Upon reaching the outbnd taxiway, I observed a line of about 15 aircraft awaiting takeoff. Because of the distance of our planned flight, fuel conservation was prudent. I therefore shut down 1 engine to save fuel. We could not complete the taxi checklist (which includes slats/flaps) because company policy prohibits accomplishing this task while taxiing on 1 engine. My former airline used a single engine taxi before takeoff checklist, which assured extension of the slats and flaps. We were #6 for takeoff on the parallel runway when the tower controller asked if we could accept an intersection takeoff vs waiting for full length. A review of the aircraft's performance charts indicated that we could accept the offer and we responded in the affirmative. Our workload was increased during this short period of time. We were now communicating with the tower, observing landing traffic for a potential takeoff slot, reviewing takeoff performance data, starting an engine, taxiing onto a connecting taxiway leading to the runway, and completing another after start checklist. Per company policies, I called for the before takeoff checklist rolling onto the takeoff runway. I knew the next landing aircraft was rapidly approaching the runway, and the tower was trying to expedite our departure when we received our cleared for takeoff clearance. I advanced the power levers and immediately the voice warning system said, 'flaps/slats.' at this point it was obvious that we had not accomplished the taxi checklist. I selected slats to takeoff and flaps to 11 degrees immediately. In fact, so fast that the voice warning only cycled 1 time. Simultaneously, the first officer confirmed that all other items of the taxi checklist were complete and we took off. With knowledge of the accident, our experience was indeed eye opening. For the purposes of standardization, the new airline did not accept any of the former airlines operating policies or procedures (including checklists), even though there were 22 yrs of operation with the former airline--and many checklist improvements over that period of time to assure the safest of operations. This report is being submitted due to the similarity of the accident. There is an obvious need for proper authorities to consider factors such as past practices before approving checklists on airlines that have been merged or bought out.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF WARNING HORN WHEN FLAPS SLATS NOT PROPERLY POSITIONED.

Narrative: OUR AIRLINE WAS BOUGHT BY A COMPETITOR ABOUT 1 1/2 YRS AGO. MY FORMER AIRLINE OPERATED MLG. THE NEW AIRLINE HAS SPECIFIC POLICIES, PROCS AND PHILOSOPHIES THAT DIFFER FROM THE FORMER AIRLINE THAT I BELIEVE CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE EXPERIENCE WHICH I AM ABOUT TO DESCRIBE. AT THE FORMER AIRLINE, THE F/O'S WERE TAUGHT TO AUTOMATICALLY EXTEND FLAPS AND SLATS WHEN THE ACFT WAS SALUTED AWAY FROM THE RAMP AGENT. THE NEW AIRLINE ALLOWS SLAT/FLAP EXTENSION ONLY AFTER THE ACFT IS AWAY FROM THE RAMP AND UPON COMMAND OF THE CAPT. THE ARPT WHERE MY INCIDENT OCCURRED HAS A DESIGNATED RAMP AREA ALL THE WAY TO THE TXWY SERVING THE MAIN RWY. THEREFORE, BECAUSE OF PAST REPRIMANDS, THE COCKPIT CREWMEMBERS ARE DISCIPLINED TO ADHERE TO THE COMPANY POLICY OF SLAT/FLAP EXTENSION. AFTER STARTING ENGS AND COMPLETING THE AFTER START CHKLIST, I STARTED TO TAXI. UPON REACHING THE OUTBND TXWY, I OBSERVED A LINE OF ABOUT 15 ACFT AWAITING TKOF. BECAUSE OF THE DISTANCE OF OUR PLANNED FLT, FUEL CONSERVATION WAS PRUDENT. I THEREFORE SHUT DOWN 1 ENG TO SAVE FUEL. WE COULD NOT COMPLETE THE TAXI CHKLIST (WHICH INCLUDES SLATS/FLAPS) BECAUSE COMPANY POLICY PROHIBITS ACCOMPLISHING THIS TASK WHILE TAXIING ON 1 ENG. MY FORMER AIRLINE USED A SINGLE ENG TAXI BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST, WHICH ASSURED EXTENSION OF THE SLATS AND FLAPS. WE WERE #6 FOR TKOF ON THE PARALLEL RWY WHEN THE TWR CTLR ASKED IF WE COULD ACCEPT AN INTXN TKOF VS WAITING FOR FULL LENGTH. A REVIEW OF THE ACFT'S PERFORMANCE CHARTS INDICATED THAT WE COULD ACCEPT THE OFFER AND WE RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. OUR WORKLOAD WAS INCREASED DURING THIS SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. WE WERE NOW COMMUNICATING WITH THE TWR, OBSERVING LNDG TFC FOR A POTENTIAL TKOF SLOT, REVIEWING TKOF PERFORMANCE DATA, STARTING AN ENG, TAXIING ONTO A CONNECTING TXWY LEADING TO THE RWY, AND COMPLETING ANOTHER AFTER START CHKLIST. PER COMPANY POLICIES, I CALLED FOR THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST ROLLING ONTO THE TKOF RWY. I KNEW THE NEXT LNDG ACFT WAS RAPIDLY APCHING THE RWY, AND THE TWR WAS TRYING TO EXPEDITE OUR DEP WHEN WE RECEIVED OUR CLRED FOR TKOF CLRNC. I ADVANCED THE PWR LEVERS AND IMMEDIATELY THE VOICE WARNING SYS SAID, 'FLAPS/SLATS.' AT THIS POINT IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WE HAD NOT ACCOMPLISHED THE TAXI CHKLIST. I SELECTED SLATS TO TKOF AND FLAPS TO 11 DEGS IMMEDIATELY. IN FACT, SO FAST THAT THE VOICE WARNING ONLY CYCLED 1 TIME. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE F/O CONFIRMED THAT ALL OTHER ITEMS OF THE TAXI CHKLIST WERE COMPLETE AND WE TOOK OFF. WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACCIDENT, OUR EXPERIENCE WAS INDEED EYE OPENING. FOR THE PURPOSES OF STANDARDIZATION, THE NEW AIRLINE DID NOT ACCEPT ANY OF THE FORMER AIRLINES OPERATING POLICIES OR PROCS (INCLUDING CHKLISTS), EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE 22 YRS OF OPERATION WITH THE FORMER AIRLINE--AND MANY CHKLIST IMPROVEMENTS OVER THAT PERIOD OF TIME TO ASSURE THE SAFEST OF OPS. THIS RPT IS BEING SUBMITTED DUE TO THE SIMILARITY OF THE ACCIDENT. THERE IS AN OBVIOUS NEED FOR PROPER AUTHORITIES TO CONSIDER FACTORS SUCH AS PAST PRACTICES BEFORE APPROVING CHKLISTS ON AIRLINES THAT HAVE BEEN MERGED OR BOUGHT OUT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.