37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 913946 |
Time | |
Date | 201010 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | SR22 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Approach Departure Handoff / Assist |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural FAR Deviation - Track / Heading All Types |
Narrative:
A cirrus departed on an IFR flight plan; with a filed altitude of 5;000 ft. Approximately 10 miles west of a nearby airport; the cirrus advised that they wanted to simulate an emergency and requested an ILS to runway xx at ZZZ. The aircraft was cleared to ZZZ via radar vectors direct; and issued vectors to the ILS xx final approach course. The pilot advised the approach would terminate in a missed approach; and the issued missed approach instructions were to climb and maintain 5;000; and upon entering controlled airspace proceed direct ZZZ1. The pilot acknowledged the instructions and made no further inquiry. The aircraft was vectored onto and was established on the localizer; and a frequency change was approved. At that point; a different voice (who I later found out to be an designated FAA pilot examiner; and that this was an FAA checkride) informed me (not requested) that they were doing 'the localizer runway xx; circle to land runway yy; to the published missed approach'. I then informed the cirrus that they were not cleared for that approach; and the missed approach instructions were as previously stated; and a frequency change was approved. The aircraft reported on the missed approach; and at they were executing the published missed approach; which is a turn approximately 180 degrees different than the missed approach instructions I issued the aircraft. The aircraft was re-identified and I again told them they were not authorized to do the published missed approach; and to say intentions. The aircraft requested and received vectors for another ILS xx approach. After a published missed approach was executed; the aircraft was cleared via radar vectors to the airport per the request of the pilot. The aircraft requested the RNAV/GPS runway zz approach; and was given a vector until able direct zzzzz for the GPS approach. After several miles; the voice of the examiner informed me that they would be doing some 'unusual attitude maneuvers' and would advise when they were direct zzzzz. I told the aircraft to maintain VFR since it seemed obvious to me the aircraft had no intention of maintaining the standards of IFR flight; but transmission was never acknowledged. The altitude of the aircraft fluctuated up and down approximately 300 ft; though they were never authorized to vacate 3;000 ft and never canceled their IFR flight plan. The aircraft eventually advised they were direct zzzzz; and I made sure they were able to maintain an altitude since there would be other aircraft in the terminal area and as far as I was concerned the aircraft was still being treated as IFR. The aircraft was handed off to the next sector and landed without further issue. I cannot think of a single action ATC could have taken to prevent any of these pilot deviations. My instructions were as clear and concise as possible; and as far as I can tell the aircraft just decided to take a different course of action without formally requesting any of the deviations that I observed. I could have easily accommodated a published missed approach on their first ILS to ZZZ; but informing me of their actions at the final approach fix; being denied; and then doing it anyway is unsafe and utterly ridiculous. I could have also easily accommodated a block altitude to do the airwork; but one was never requested in spite of that being an obvious necessity to legally deviate from an assigned altitude. The fact that a designated pilot examiner was on the aircraft; and seemingly had absolutely no idea of her responsibilities to legally fly an IFR flight plan were is beyond comprehension to me. It is fortunate that there no other aircraft in the area; because this aircraft could have prevented a very serious safety risk; especially when they were seemingly unable to follow basic control instructions.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Approach Controller reported a Cirrus with a designated flight check examiner on board deliberately disregarded ATC insructions.
Narrative: A Cirrus departed on an IFR flight plan; with a filed altitude of 5;000 FT. Approximately 10 miles west of a nearby airport; the Cirrus advised that they wanted to simulate an emergency and requested an ILS to Runway XX at ZZZ. The aircraft was cleared to ZZZ via radar vectors direct; and issued vectors to the ILS XX final approach course. The pilot advised the approach would terminate in a missed approach; and the issued missed approach instructions were to climb and maintain 5;000; and upon entering controlled airspace proceed direct ZZZ1. The pilot acknowledged the instructions and made no further inquiry. The aircraft was vectored onto and was established on the localizer; and a frequency change was approved. At that point; a different voice (who I later found out to be an designated FAA pilot examiner; and that this was an FAA checkride) informed me (not requested) that they were doing 'the localizer Runway XX; circle to land Runway YY; to the published missed approach'. I then informed the Cirrus that they were not cleared for that approach; and the missed approach instructions were as previously stated; and a frequency change was approved. The aircraft reported on the missed approach; and at they were executing the published missed approach; which is a turn approximately 180 degrees different than the missed approach instructions I issued the aircraft. The aircraft was re-identified and I again told them they were not authorized to do the published missed approach; and to say intentions. The aircraft requested and received vectors for another ILS XX approach. After a published missed approach was executed; the aircraft was cleared via radar vectors to the airport per the request of the pilot. The aircraft requested the RNAV/GPS Runway ZZ approach; and was given a vector until able direct ZZZZZ for the GPS approach. After several miles; the voice of the examiner informed me that they would be doing some 'unusual attitude maneuvers' and would advise when they were direct ZZZZZ. I told the aircraft to maintain VFR since it seemed obvious to me the aircraft had no intention of maintaining the standards of IFR flight; but transmission was never acknowledged. The altitude of the aircraft fluctuated up and down approximately 300 FT; though they were never authorized to vacate 3;000 FT and never canceled their IFR flight plan. The aircraft eventually advised they were direct ZZZZZ; and I made sure they were able to maintain an altitude since there would be other aircraft in the terminal area and as far as I was concerned the aircraft was still being treated as IFR. The aircraft was handed off to the next sector and landed without further issue. I cannot think of a single action ATC could have taken to prevent any of these pilot deviations. My instructions were as clear and concise as possible; and as far as I can tell the aircraft just decided to take a different course of action without formally requesting any of the deviations that I observed. I could have easily accommodated a published missed approach on their first ILS to ZZZ; but informing me of their actions at the final approach fix; being denied; and then doing it anyway is unsafe and utterly ridiculous. I could have also easily accommodated a block altitude to do the airwork; but one was never requested in spite of that being an obvious necessity to legally deviate from an assigned altitude. The fact that a designated pilot examiner was on the aircraft; and seemingly had absolutely no idea of her responsibilities to legally fly an IFR flight plan were is beyond comprehension to me. It is fortunate that there no other aircraft in the area; because this aircraft could have prevented a very serious safety risk; especially when they were seemingly unable to follow basic control instructions.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.