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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 915172 |
Time | |
Date | 201010 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A321 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb Initial Climb |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Fire/Overheat Warning |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
About the time the large pushback tug was being attached to the airplane; the avionics smoke detector presented on ECAM. The forward entry door was open; the APU was supplying normal cooling aircraft. There were no other indications of malfunctions; except for amber intake/extract door positions on the ECAM pressurization page. With no other immediate signs of smoke; fumes; or overheating; the first officer and I concluded the problem was the usual island problem of smoky ground equipment and salty; humid conditions causing smoke detector activation (which we both have experienced before). I went outside to investigate; smelling no unusual fumes or odors from the avionics exhaust blower air stream; and the tug which by now had its engine off. Returning to the cockpit; the avionics smoke ECAM was still showing. Pressing the clear button failed to remove the ECAM. Just prior to notifying maintenance; the ECAM successfully cleared and did not return with pressing and holding recall. We concluded the tug smoke dissipated; problem over. On take off; at about or right after the climb power call; the first officer points out that there was an amber land as soon as possible ECAM displayed. On investigating; the avionic smoke ECAM reappeared when the recall button was pressed. There were no other indications of smoke/fumes; so we assumed the problem was related to the previous ground incident. Not wanting to return due to an erroneous indication; we unsuccessfully tried to clear the warning. I had the first officer try to contact maintenance control via onboard phone and local operations phone patch to see if possibly we might be able to continue by resetting the warning. With no quick success contacting the company; I decided that an immediate return was the best course of action. In flight we were able to suppress the warning with the emergency cancel button; which gave us a white avionic smoke message in the lower left hand corner of the screen. Recall would redisplay the original warning. There had been no recall warnings evident or suppressed during the before start or taxi out flows and checks. On taxi in; on our return; the suppressed warning white message remained until engine shutdown and the warning would reappear with the recall button. After engine shutdown; there were no longer any warnings.maintenance found one of the smoke sensors dirty. The avionics smoke procedure appears designed for the worst case scenario. The far more likely false warning; on the ground; right after takeoff; or even out in the middle of no where needs to be considered before accomplishing the drastic actions of this procedure when no other indications of trouble are present.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A321 Captain reported a false Avionics Smoke indication while sitting at the gate. After investigation the warning cleared and the flight departed. Shortly after takeoff the warning reappears and the crew; although suspecting a false indication; elected to return to departure airport. A dirty sensor was discovered by maintenance.
Narrative: About the time the large pushback tug was being attached to the airplane; the Avionics Smoke detector presented on ECAM. The forward entry door was open; the APU was supplying normal cooling aircraft. There were no other indications of malfunctions; except for amber intake/extract door positions on the ECAM pressurization page. With no other immediate signs of smoke; fumes; or overheating; the First Officer and I concluded the problem was the usual island problem of smoky ground equipment and salty; humid conditions causing smoke detector activation (which we both have experienced before). I went outside to investigate; smelling no unusual fumes or odors from the avionics exhaust blower air stream; and the tug which by now had its engine off. Returning to the cockpit; the Avionics Smoke ECAM was still showing. Pressing the clear button failed to remove the ECAM. Just prior to notifying Maintenance; the ECAM successfully cleared and did not return with pressing and holding recall. We concluded the tug smoke dissipated; problem over. On take off; at about or right after the climb power call; the First Officer points out that there was an Amber LAND ASAP ECAM displayed. On investigating; the Avionic Smoke ECAM reappeared when the RECALL button was pressed. There were no other indications of smoke/fumes; so we assumed the problem was related to the previous ground incident. Not wanting to return due to an erroneous indication; we unsuccessfully tried to clear the warning. I had the First Officer try to contact Maintenance Control via onboard phone and local operations phone patch to see if possibly we might be able to continue by resetting the warning. With no quick success contacting the Company; I decided that an immediate return was the best course of action. In flight we were able to suppress the warning with the emergency cancel button; which gave us a white Avionic Smoke message in the lower left hand corner of the screen. RECALL would redisplay the original warning. There had been no RECALL warnings evident or suppressed during the before start or taxi out flows and checks. On taxi in; on our return; the suppressed warning white message remained until engine shutdown and the warning would reappear with the RECALL button. After engine shutdown; there were no longer any warnings.Maintenance found one of the smoke sensors dirty. The Avionics Smoke procedure appears designed for the worst case scenario. The far more likely false warning; on the ground; right after takeoff; or even out in the middle of no where needs to be considered before accomplishing the drastic actions of this procedure when no other indications of trouble are present.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.