Narrative:

The clearance was ruudy two departure (RNAV) from runway 24. Weather was VFR with high winds and gusts. Wind shear advisory was in effect. Departure as depicted is to climb heading 240 to intercept 260 course to wentz; cross wentz at 1;500; then via 280 track to tasca; cross tasca at 2;000. As gear was up and first segment climb came to an end the egpws gave an audible tone associated with the beginning of a wind shear alert followed with the audible warning 'wind shear - wind shear' and red annunciators indicating wind shear. We left the flaps at 10 degrees and power at take off setting. We did not know where in the wind shear we physically were. I found myself pushing full forward with both hands on the control column and still increasing altitude to 2;000 MSL. I feared that we would at any second encounter the associated down draft.after a few seconds of uninterrupted flight we corrected back to 1;500 MSL. I notified tower that we had encounter wind shear after take off. They queried airspeed deviations. I could not give a precise answer to that because altitude was more of a concern as pitch control was lost for a few seconds. I told them our event was loss of altitude control and egpws wind shear warning. We were handed off to departure where I advised that we had encountered wind shear after take off and had gained altitude to 2;000 MSL and had corrected to 1;500 MSL. They informed me that they would advise teterboro tower. No other questions were asked. The flight proceeded without any more abnormalities.configuration remained unchanged until we were sure we were out of wind shear conditions. Two reasons as to why I did not change power. One: I had both hands on the control column pushing full forward to the stop and the aircraft was still climbing. Two: I feared that reducing thrust and encountering the opposite effect of wind shear at less that 2;000 AGL would not be smart or safe. The thought of commanding the first officer to reduce thrust did exist; but fearing putting ourselves behind the power curve at such close proximity to the ground made me change my mind. We flew the aircraft according to wind shear escape training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Their inability to check their rate of ascent due to windshear caused the Flight Crew of a BE400 to violate the altitude restrictions on the RUUDY RNAV SID from TEB.

Narrative: The clearance was RUUDY Two departure (RNAV) from Runway 24. Weather was VFR with high winds and gusts. Wind shear advisory was in effect. Departure as depicted is to climb heading 240 to intercept 260 course to WENTZ; cross WENTZ at 1;500; then via 280 track to TASCA; cross TASCA at 2;000. As gear was up and first segment climb came to an end the EGPWS gave an audible tone associated with the beginning of a wind shear alert followed with the audible warning 'wind shear - wind shear' and red annunciators indicating wind shear. We left the flaps at 10 degrees and power at take off setting. We did not know where in the wind shear we physically were. I found myself pushing full forward with both hands on the control column and still increasing altitude to 2;000 MSL. I feared that we would at any second encounter the associated down draft.After a few seconds of uninterrupted flight we corrected back to 1;500 MSL. I notified Tower that we had encounter wind shear after take off. They queried airspeed deviations. I could not give a precise answer to that because altitude was more of a concern as pitch control was lost for a few seconds. I told them our event was loss of altitude control and EGPWS wind shear warning. We were handed off to departure where I advised that we had encountered wind shear after take off and had gained altitude to 2;000 MSL and had corrected to 1;500 MSL. They informed me that they would advise Teterboro Tower. No other questions were asked. The flight proceeded without any more abnormalities.Configuration remained unchanged until we were sure we were out of wind shear conditions. Two reasons as to why I did not change power. One: I had both hands on the control column pushing full forward to the stop and the aircraft was still climbing. Two: I feared that reducing thrust and encountering the opposite effect of wind shear at less that 2;000 AGL would not be smart or safe. The thought of commanding the First Officer to reduce thrust did exist; but fearing putting ourselves behind the power curve at such close proximity to the ground made me change my mind. We flew the aircraft according to wind shear escape training.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.