Narrative:

I was assigned to the irl associate radar position. The irl radar controller took a hand off from the agc radar controller on an A319 at FL350 landing syr via psb VOR. At that time; the irl radar controller had hand offs on two aircraft crossing the path of the A319; another air carrier flight inbound to phl and a BE40 landing ttn. Both of these flights were eastbound over jst. Both were at FL340. The two eastbound jets were to cross the ZNY boundary at FL250; per the LOA. The A319 was to cross the boundary between the irl sector and the bkl sector at FL290; also per the LOA. In between the phl and ttn flights; the irl radar controller also had another air carrier flight at FL310; also inbound to phl. The only way to get each of these four aircraft to their LOA altitudes was to descend either the syr inbound and then ladder down the phl area traffic over top or vice versa. The irl radar controller; being very newly certified; was too lax in accomplishing this task. As a result; he decided to reroute the A319 via beeps syr; therefore allowing the irl controller to leave the A319 at FL350; and execute a hand off to the fkl sector. Shortly thereafter; the fkl associate radar controller called me at the irl associate radar position and requested the A319 be put back on his original route over psb. I explained to him that I was the 'D-guy'; I hinted that I was not the one talking on the frequency; ended the call and passed the instructions along to irl controller. A number of seconds later; the fkl associate controller called me again with more instructions. I repeated that I was the 'D-guy'; I hinted that I was not the one talking on the frequency; ended the call and passed along the information to the irl controller. In the meantime; the irl had turned the BE40 to a heading of 060 degrees to effect spacing behind the other air carrier. It was around this time that I observed the BE40 veering towards the fkl/bkl sectors. It was also around this time that I received another call from the fkl associate controller with an additional instruction for the A319. I repeated that I was just the 'D-guy'; hinting that I was not the one talking on the frequency; ended the call and passed along the latest instructions to the irl controller. The cleveland center management team insists on funneling critical radar instructions through the associate radar position. Contributing factors in this event include: 1. The inability of the agc-right controller to correctly space two phl area inbounds with another phl inbound worked by another sector. 2. The inability of the irl-right controller to expedite descent on either the phl area inbounds or the syr inbound and then ladder the other traffic down over top.3. The inability of the fkl-right controller to accept the A319's routing over beeps intersection; a routing that is approved by many area 7 controllers. 4. The unsafe practice of the cleveland center management team insisting that important radar-type instructions go through the associate radar position; thereby leading to critical loss of time along with the possibility of something being 'lost in translation'. This practice must come to arecommendation; contributing factors in this event include: 1. The inability of the agc-right controller to correctly space two phl area inbounds with another phl inbound worked by another sector. 2. The inability of the irl-right controller to expedite descent on either the phl area inbounds or the syr inbound and then ladder the other traffic down over top.3. The inability of the fkl-right controller to accept the A319's routing over beeps intersection; a routing that is approved by many area 7 controllers. 4. The unsafe practice of the cleveland center management team insisting that important radar-type instructions go through the associate radar position; thereby leading to critical loss of time along with the possibility of something being 'lost in translation'. This practice must come to a halt as soon as possible.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A ZOB Associate Controller described a very confused coordination problem that involving several RADAR and Associate RADAR positions. The result was a near loss of separation.

Narrative: I was assigned to the IRL Associate RADAR Position. The IRL RADAR Controller took a hand off from the AGC RADAR Controller on an A319 at FL350 landing SYR via PSB VOR. At that time; the IRL RADAR Controller had hand offs on two aircraft crossing the path of the A319; another Air Carrier flight inbound to PHL and a BE40 landing TTN. Both of these flights were eastbound over JST. Both were at FL340. The two eastbound jets were to cross the ZNY boundary at FL250; per the LOA. The A319 was to cross the boundary between the IRL Sector and the BKL Sector at FL290; also per the LOA. In between the PHL and TTN flights; the IRL RADAR Controller also had another Air Carrier flight at FL310; also inbound to PHL. The only way to get each of these four aircraft to their LOA altitudes was to descend either the SYR inbound and then ladder down the PHL area traffic over top or vice versa. The IRL RADAR Controller; being very newly certified; was too lax in accomplishing this task. As a result; he decided to reroute the A319 via BEEPS SYR; therefore allowing the IRL Controller to leave the A319 at FL350; and execute a hand off to the FKL Sector. Shortly thereafter; the FKL associate Radar Controller called me at the IRL Associate RADAR position and requested the A319 be put back on his original route over PSB. I explained to him that I was the 'D-guy'; I hinted that I was not the one talking on the frequency; ended the call and passed the instructions along to IRL Controller. A number of seconds later; the FKL Associate Controller called me again with more instructions. I repeated that I was the 'D-guy'; I hinted that I was not the one talking on the frequency; ended the call and passed along the information to the IRL Controller. In the meantime; the IRL had turned the BE40 to a heading of 060 degrees to effect spacing behind the other Air Carrier. It was around this time that I observed the BE40 veering towards the FKL/BKL sectors. It was also around this time that I received another call from the FKL Associate Controller with an additional instruction for the A319. I repeated that I was just the 'D-guy'; hinting that I was not the one talking on the frequency; ended the call and passed along the latest instructions to the IRL Controller. The Cleveland Center Management Team insists on funneling critical RADAR instructions through the ASSOCIATE RADAR POSITION. Contributing factors in this event include: 1. The inability of the AGC-R Controller to correctly space two PHL area inbounds with another PHL inbound worked by another sector. 2. The inability of the IRL-R Controller to expedite descent on either the PHL area inbounds or the SYR inbound and then ladder the other traffic down over top.3. The inability of the FKL-R Controller to accept the A319's routing over BEEPS Intersection; a routing that is approved by many AREA 7 Controllers. 4. The unsafe practice of the Cleveland Center Management Team insisting that important RADAR-type instructions go through the Associate RADAR position; thereby leading to critical loss of time along with the possibility of something being 'lost in translation'. This practice must come to aRecommendation; contributing factors in this event include: 1. The inability of the AGC-R Controller to correctly space two PHL area inbounds with another PHL inbound worked by another sector. 2. The inability of the IRL-R Controller to expedite descent on either the PHL area inbounds or the SYR inbound and then ladder the other traffic down over top.3. The inability of the FKL-R Controller to accept the A319's routing over BEEPS Intersection; a routing that is approved by many AREA 7 Controllers. 4. The unsafe practice of the Cleveland Center Management Team insisting that important RADAR-type instructions go through the Associate RADAR position; thereby leading to critical loss of time along with the possibility of something being 'lost in translation'. This practice must come to a halt ASAP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.