Despite the approval of dispatchers; maintenance personnel; and a chief pilot regarding a confusing ...

Attributes
ACN	920960
Time
Date	201011
Local Time Of Day	1201-1800
Place
Locale Reference	ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference	US
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	MD-11
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Cruise
Route In Use	Other Controlled
Flight Plan	IFR
Component
Aircraft Component	Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Person 1
Function	Pilot Not Flying First Officer
Experience	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110 Flight Crew Total 3300 Flight Crew Type 487
Person 2
Function	Captain Pilot Flying
Qualification	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120 Flight Crew Total 12000 Flight Crew Type 4000
Events
Anomaly	Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural MEL

Narrative:

After I reviewed L1 cabin entry door deferral I contacted the dispatcher requesting clarification on limitation section of MEL which requires two life rafts to be on board for overwater flights. Maintenance control advised that manual emergency operation of the L1 cabin entry door via the girt bar would still deploy the slide/life raft and therefore satisfied the MEL requirement for a second life raft to be on board. In addition; dispatch contacted the on-duty MD11 chief pilot who agreed with maintenance control that the MEL was properly referenced and all associated limitations were met for our flight. We then departed. After being airborne a little over an hour we received an ACARS message instructing us to return to the departure airport. A maintenance control supervisor advised that the L1 cabin entry door/slide should have been deferred entirely. Our aircraft was unauthorized for overwater flight. We returned and dumped approximately 35;000 pounds of fuel in order to land below max allowable landing weight.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Despite the approval of Dispatchers; Maintenance personnel; and a Chief Pilot regarding a confusing MEL procedure; the flight crew of an MD11 was instructed to do an air turnback when a Maintenance Supervisor determined they were all wrong and the aircraft was not legal for flight.

Narrative: After I Reviewed L1 Cabin Entry Door deferral I contacted the Dispatcher requesting clarification on limitation section of MEL which requires two life rafts to be on board for overwater flights. Maintenance Control advised that manual emergency operation of the L1 Cabin Entry Door via the girt bar would still deploy the slide/life raft and therefore satisfied the MEL requirement for a second life raft to be on board. In addition; Dispatch contacted the on-duty MD11 Chief Pilot who agreed with Maintenance Control that the MEL was properly referenced and all associated limitations were met for our flight. We then departed. After being airborne a little over an hour we received an ACARS message instructing us to return to the departure airport. A Maintenance Control Supervisor advised that the L1 Cabin Entry Door/Slide should have been deferred entirely. Our aircraft was unauthorized for overwater flight. We returned and dumped approximately 35;000 pounds of fuel in order to land below max allowable landing weight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Despite the approval of dispatchers; maintenance personnel; and a chief pilot regarding a confusing MEL procedure; the flight crew of an MD11 was instructed to do an air turnback when a maintenance supervisor determined they were all wrong and the aircraft was not legal for flight.