Narrative:

I was the second officer and after departure; the captain (pilot flying) directed the landing gear to be raised and the initiation of the after takeoff checklist. All systems were working normally until the flaps were raised to the flaps 2. Upon retraction to flaps 2; the green le (leading edge) flaps light did not illuminate and the amber le flaps remained illuminated. The trailing edge flaps indicated normal. After confirmation with the captain and first officer; I announced the stabilizer; 'add 20 KTS mms (maximum maneuvering speed)'. While I was opening the QRH; the pilots were coordinating a safe altitude and heading to fly. We were assigned a northerly heading and 4;000 ft MSL. While the pilots were ensuring the safe operation of the aircraft; I determined that the correct checklist to use was the 'led failure during flap retraction' checklist. Once the aircraft was stable; the captain handed the controls over to the first officer and provided me his undivided attention. I suggested that we run the 'led failure during flap retraction' checklist and the captain agreed. During the initial reading of the checklist; the captain and I both misunderstood the checklist question. The checklist asks; 'position test selector shows normal led's and aircraft is flying stable'. We initially answered the question no; because we both mis-identified the le flaps light for the position test selector. I did check the position test selector. In the flaps 2 position; the indications were normal. Even though we checked the led position test selector; we mis-diagnosed the malfunction and answered the question no. This decision was made because we agreed that even though the position test selector indicated correct; the le flaps light was incorrect; therefore resulting in the checklist being continued. We continued the checklist until it directs to extend the flaps to 5 on schedule and then to check the position test selector. The following question asks; 'leds positioned normally'. The answer was yes. The checklist then directs to plan on a normal landing using normal mms; bug; and markers. After the above was completed; the aircraft was on an extended final and the decision was made to return. The after takeoff and in range checklist were completed. I then realized that we did not do something correct. I turned my seat around and asked the jump seater; a current B727 first officer; if he noticed any mistakes. He pointed out to me that we were misunderstanding the checklist question. I then re-read the checklist and with the correct diagnosis the QRH states; 'assume a faulty indication; continue flight at normal speeds'. As soon as I could; I notified the captain of my findings. The captain immediately assessed the situation to determine if we could continue to destination. Since the fuel on board was less than the required fuel on the release; the captain decided that we would land; refuel; have maintenance troubleshoot; and get back in the air as soon as possible. After landing the crew referenced the MEL. A write-up was made and maintenance deferred the write-up. The crew; along with maintenance; thoroughly discussed the malfunction and how we could have done things better as a crew. After getting fuel; a new release and a new weight and balance; we departed. At no time was safety of flight compromised. We all understand what mistake was made and how to ensure complete correctness in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 Flight Engineer reports misunderstanding a 'LED FAILURE DURING FLAP RETRACTION' checklist leading to a return to departure airport when the flight could have been continued to destination had it been interpreted correctly.

Narrative: I was the Second Officer and after departure; the Captain (pilot flying) directed the landing gear to be raised and the initiation of the After Takeoff Checklist. All systems were working normally until the flaps were raised to the Flaps 2. Upon retraction to Flaps 2; the green LE (leading edge) Flaps light did not illuminate and the amber LE Flaps remained illuminated. The trailing edge flaps indicated normal. After confirmation with the Captain and First Officer; I announced the stabilizer; 'add 20 KTS MMS (Maximum Maneuvering Speed)'. While I was opening the QRH; the pilots were coordinating a safe altitude and heading to fly. We were assigned a northerly heading and 4;000 FT MSL. While the pilots were ensuring the safe operation of the aircraft; I determined that the correct checklist to use was the 'LED FAILURE DURING FLAP RETRACTION' checklist. Once the aircraft was stable; the Captain handed the controls over to the First Officer and provided me his undivided attention. I suggested that we run the 'LED FAILURE DURING FLAP RETRACTION' checklist and the Captain agreed. During the initial reading of the checklist; the Captain and I both misunderstood the checklist question. The checklist asks; 'POSITION TEST SELECTOR SHOWS NORMAL LED'S AND AIRCRAFT IS FLYING STABLE'. We initially answered the question NO; because we both mis-identified the LE FLAPS light for the POSITION TEST SELECTOR. I did check the POSITION TEST SELECTOR. In the flaps 2 position; the indications were normal. Even though we checked the LED POSITION TEST SELECTOR; we mis-diagnosed the malfunction and answered the question NO. This decision was made because we agreed that even though the POSITION TEST SELECTOR indicated correct; the LE FLAPS light was incorrect; therefore resulting in the checklist being continued. We continued the checklist until it directs to extend the flaps to 5 on schedule and then to check the position test selector. The following question asks; 'LEDS POSITIONED NORMALLY'. The answer was YES. The checklist then directs to plan on a normal landing using normal MMS; Bug; and Markers. After the above was completed; the aircraft was on an extended final and the decision was made to return. The After Takeoff and In Range checklist were completed. I then realized that we did not do something correct. I turned my seat around and asked the jump seater; a current B727 First Officer; if he noticed any mistakes. He pointed out to me that we were misunderstanding the checklist question. I then re-read the checklist and with the correct diagnosis the QRH states; 'Assume a faulty indication; continue flight at normal speeds'. As soon as I could; I notified the Captain of my findings. The Captain immediately assessed the situation to determine if we could continue to destination. Since the fuel on board was less than the required fuel on the release; the Captain decided that we would land; refuel; have Maintenance troubleshoot; and get back in the air as soon as possible. After landing the crew referenced the MEL. A write-up was made and Maintenance deferred the write-up. The crew; along with Maintenance; thoroughly discussed the malfunction and how we could have done things better as a crew. After getting fuel; a new release and a new weight and balance; we departed. At no time was safety of flight compromised. We all understand what mistake was made and how to ensure complete correctness in the future.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.