Narrative:

During climb to FL190 we received an anti ice duct warning message. The flight conditions were sudden accumulation of ice and moderate turbulence. I was the flying pilot and requested a call to ATC for a continued climb to get out of icing and also requested the QRH be reviewed. In a very short time the tops were reached and with the additional altitude requested from ATC we were able to quickly leave icing conditions. I coordinated a hold with ATC in order to evaluate and determine the best course of action. I assessed the level of ice accumulated by looking out at the wing and winglet; window frame; and wipers. Ice was accumulated on the non heated surfaces; however; the wing itself was free of ice accumulation. While slowing to a more suitable holding speed; the first officer emphasized the ice accumulation warning from the QRH and I assured her the wing appeared clean and we were using a prudent speed of above 230K. I also pointed out that it was clearly visible. We contacted the dispatcher and determined the most favorable weather was at our destination. Fuel was a factor. We could see the back of the system containing the icing to our right and stretching out over our filed STAR route. We coordinated with ATC and went north to join a different arrival following another flight who's crew provided continuous updates. The flight required a descent through a cloud layer and the anti ice was placed back to the on position and functioned normally. The arrival was uneventful until the five mile final when a medical helicopter intruded into the the approach path and the tower issued a go around. Go around was standard and a quick return for a visual was accomplished; we were watching fuel levels and were at around 3500 pounds. During the second approach the same helicopter departed and the tower was vocal to them about staying clear. The first officer keyed up and reported to the tower that we must land; which I felt conveyed an inaccurate message concerning our condition of flight. We were above minimum fuel and the airport was VFR. Landing and taxi were uneventful. At the gate maintenance arrived and checked the anti-ice system. They found an open loop and deferred it. While trying to preflight the next leg the first officer conveyed to me she was not satisfied with maintenance's assessment and felt it was unsafe. I rechecked with maintenance and felt they had done the correct action. At this point the first officer had contacted the duty chief pilot and she told me that we should check with maintenance control to verify that ZZZ maintenance had done things correctly. She advised she was told by the chief pilot she had called that you cannot trust ZZZ maintenance. I spoke to maintenance control and flight standards along with the fleet manager. I felt that things had been done correctly and it was safe to proceed. I had a difficult time rounding up the crew and coordinating a resolution. First officer left the aircraft a couple of times leaving me guessing. The flight attendants rightfully became concerned and ultimately refused to fly. The first officer was unsure of the circumstances and eventually called in fatigued. Flight was canceled.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A serious breakdown in communication between the Captain and First Officer regarding the Maintenance deferral of a malfunctioning Pneumatic duct temperature sensor ultimately resulted in the refusal of the First Officer and the flight attendants to staff a subsequent flight.

Narrative: During climb to FL190 we received an Anti Ice Duct Warning MSG. The flight conditions were sudden accumulation of ice and moderate turbulence. I was the flying pilot and requested a call to ATC for a continued climb to get out of icing and also requested the QRH be reviewed. In a very short time the tops were reached and with the additional altitude requested from ATC we were able to quickly leave icing conditions. I coordinated a hold with ATC in order to evaluate and determine the best course of action. I assessed the level of ice accumulated by looking out at the wing and winglet; window frame; and wipers. Ice was accumulated on the non heated surfaces; however; the wing itself was free of ice accumulation. While slowing to a more suitable holding speed; the First Officer emphasized the ice accumulation warning from the QRH and I assured her the wing appeared clean and we were using a prudent speed of above 230K. I also pointed out that it was clearly visible. We contacted the Dispatcher and determined the most favorable weather was at our destination. Fuel was a factor. We could see the back of the system containing the icing to our right and stretching out over our filed STAR route. We coordinated with ATC and went north to join a different arrival following another flight who's crew provided continuous updates. The flight required a descent through a cloud layer and the anti ice was placed back to the on position and functioned normally. The arrival was uneventful until the five mile final when a medical helicopter intruded into the the approach path and the Tower issued a go around. Go around was standard and a quick return for a visual was accomplished; we were watching fuel levels and were at around 3500 pounds. During the second approach the same helicopter departed and the Tower was vocal to them about staying clear. The First Officer keyed up and reported to the Tower that we must land; which I felt conveyed an inaccurate message concerning our condition of flight. We were above minimum fuel and the airport was VFR. Landing and taxi were uneventful. At the gate Maintenance arrived and checked the Anti-ice system. They found an open loop and deferred it. While trying to preflight the next leg the First Officer conveyed to me she was not satisfied with Maintenance's assessment and felt it was unsafe. I rechecked with Maintenance and felt they had done the correct action. At this point the First Officer had contacted the Duty Chief Pilot and she told me that we should check with Maintenance Control to verify that ZZZ Maintenance had done things correctly. She advised she was told by the Chief Pilot she had called that you cannot trust ZZZ Maintenance. I spoke to Maintenance Control and Flight Standards along with the Fleet Manager. I felt that things had been done correctly and it was safe to proceed. I had a difficult time rounding up the crew and coordinating a resolution. First Officer left the aircraft a couple of times leaving me guessing. The flight attendants rightfully became concerned and ultimately refused to fly. The First Officer was unsure of the circumstances and eventually called in fatigued. Flight was canceled.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.