Narrative:

I cleared an A300 for takeoff on runway 17R (RNAV SID akuna). A B737-800 was about 2 mile final for runway 17R when they stated they were going around. I noticed the B737-800 appeared high and asked to verify they were going around; and they replied affirmative. The A300 was airborne really quickly and climbed very aggressive. The B737-800 was now only about 2.5 miles behind and climbing out as well. I issued visual separation instructions to the B737-800 and he read everything back to me very well. I switched the A300 to departure and turned the B737-800 to a heading of 150. The pilot asked me 'how high do you want me' and I replied maintain 3;000 and that I was going to coordinate a west-side arrival since he was already parking at the west-side. I looked at the B737-800's altitude and he was at 2;700 climbing to 3;000 and the A300 was already outside the upper radar set filter limit of 5;000. I asked the B737-800 if they went around due to the high angle of approach; he replied yes and they didn't think they would achieve a stable approach. When I switched the B737-800 to departure there was more than enough vertical separation. While on break after this session; I found out that the B737-800 did not reply with his full call sign upon acknowledgment of the visual separation; thus the rule was not usable. My supervisor advised me that the 150 heading did not protect enough for the akuna SID departure. Because the B737-800 had turned to the 150 heading before even reaching the runway and the aggressive climb rate of the A300; there was supposedly no error involved after all. I was told two different things within an hour about the error's outcome; so I wanted to report this. Recommendation; I shouldn't have pushed the A300 out in front of the B737-800 arriving. I felt I had the time; and in fact did have time to clear the A300 for takeoff in enough time for the B737-800 to land without going around. Last; I should have coordinated a 130 heading with approach and got divergence right off and not worry about the rest of tedious and cumbersome visual separation requirements.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DFW Controller described a potential conflict between an arrival and departure from Runway 17R due to an unexpected go around event; the reporter's utilization of visual separation questioned.

Narrative: I cleared an A300 for takeoff on Runway 17R (RNAV SID AKUNA). A B737-800 was about 2 mile final for Runway 17R when they stated they were going around. I noticed the B737-800 appeared high and asked to verify they were going around; and they replied affirmative. The A300 was airborne really quickly and climbed very aggressive. The B737-800 was now only about 2.5 miles behind and climbing out as well. I issued visual separation instructions to the B737-800 and he read everything back to me very well. I switched the A300 to departure and turned the B737-800 to a heading of 150. The pilot asked me 'how high do you want me' and I replied maintain 3;000 and that I was going to coordinate a west-side arrival since he was already parking at the West-side. I looked at the B737-800's altitude and he was at 2;700 climbing to 3;000 and the A300 was already outside the upper RADAR set filter limit of 5;000. I asked the B737-800 if they went around due to the high angle of approach; he replied yes and they didn't think they would achieve a stable approach. When I switched the B737-800 to departure there was more than enough vertical separation. While on break after this session; I found out that the B737-800 did not reply with his full call sign upon acknowledgment of the visual separation; thus the rule was not usable. My Supervisor advised me that the 150 heading did not protect enough for the AKUNA SID departure. Because the B737-800 had turned to the 150 heading before even reaching the runway and the aggressive climb rate of the A300; there was supposedly no error involved after all. I was told two different things within an hour about the error's outcome; so I wanted to report this. Recommendation; I shouldn't have pushed the A300 out in front of the B737-800 arriving. I felt I had the time; and in fact did have time to clear the A300 for takeoff in enough time for the B737-800 to land without going around. Last; I should have coordinated a 130 heading with approach and got divergence right off and not worry about the rest of tedious and cumbersome visual separation requirements.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.