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Attributes | |
ACN | 926483 |
Time | |
Date | 201101 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural MEL Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Number two engine EICAS 'reverser disagree' message was deferred on an emb-145LR aircraft which involved deactivating the number two engine thrust reverser (TR) and locking it out with the lockout bolt. First officer X; who did the exterior preflight thought the lockout bolt was in. We took off for ZZZ1 and landed without incident. Later on that evening I received a phone call from a different first officer who told me the lockout bolt that maintenance is supposed to put in; was either not put in; or it fell out. We had a short overnight [previously] in ZZZ; it was dark out; and very early in the morning. First officer X might have missed that the lockout bolt was missing. Suggest making sure that maintenance does put the lockout pin in; or preflight the aircraft better.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Two pilots report about a # 2 engine 'Reverser Disagree' EICAS message that was deferred on an EMB-145LR aircraft. The MEL procedure required a reverser Lockout bolt be installed prior to dispatch. After flying multiple flights; First Officer was informed the Lockout bolt was not installed.
Narrative: Number two engine EICAS 'Reverser Disagree' message was deferred on an EMB-145LR aircraft which involved deactivating the number two engine Thrust Reverser (TR) and locking it out with the lockout bolt. First Officer X; who did the exterior preflight thought the lockout bolt was in. We took off for ZZZ1 and landed without incident. Later on that evening I received a phone call from a different First Officer who told me the lockout bolt that Maintenance is supposed to put in; was either not put in; or it fell out. We had a short overnight [previously] in ZZZ; it was dark out; and very early in the morning. First Officer X might have missed that the lockout bolt was missing. Suggest making sure that Maintenance does put the lockout pin in; or preflight the aircraft better.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.