Narrative:

The PATTS1 departure procedure has been a safety issue for sector 47 for months now. Besides putting band aid fixes to the known safety issues; these problems still arise and loss of separation can very easily be had. I took the hand off on air carrier X (E145) and the aircraft was changed to my frequency below 10;000 ft MSL and prior to bonnz intersection. In trail was air carrier Y (A319) which was also switched to my frequency prior to 10;000 ft MSL and prior to bonnz. The much better performing air carrier Y was out-climbing air carrier X with about 6.5 miles. Worried about a potential overtake; I asked air carrier Y his speed. Being short of bonnz; but about to level at 14;000 ft; the pilot responded 250 KTS. Further questioning led to find out that this was not assigned by boston departure but merely flying the SID as assigned. If I had never questioned the situation; I am very sure that these two aircraft would have been in an overtake situation would have ensued and separation would have been lost. There was no attempt by the boston departure controller to provide the '5 miles constant or increasing' as required by the common LOA. Very shortly thereafter two more successive departures left boston on the PATTS1 SID to enter my airspace. Just as stated above; both aircraft were on my frequency climbing to 14;000 ft MSL and prior to bonnz. The first aircraft; air carrier Z (E190); asked me 5 miles prior to bonnz when he was expected to disregard the 250 KTS speed restriction. I questioned his statement to find out that the boston departure controller had issued maximum speed as soon as possible. The pilot was confused; I was confused; and in no way did this provide for positive separation with the trailing aircraft. There was no land line communication with boston departure during any part of these events. Stop these ridiculous procedures until all known safety issues are resolved. Educate boston departure controllers on their lack of providing positive separation by both the ATC 7110.65 and the ZBW/A90 LOA.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZBW Controller chronicled several departure overtake situations allegedly set up A90 controllers; noting A90 Controller should be briefed on the separation requirements and LOA procedures.

Narrative: The PATTS1 departure procedure has been a safety issue for sector 47 for months now. Besides putting band aid fixes to the known safety issues; these problems still arise and loss of separation can very easily be had. I took the hand off on Air Carrier X (E145) and the aircraft was changed to my frequency below 10;000 FT MSL and prior to BONNZ intersection. In trail was Air Carrier Y (A319) which was also switched to my frequency prior to 10;000 FT MSL and prior to BONNZ. The much better performing Air Carrier Y was out-climbing Air Carrier X with about 6.5 miles. Worried about a potential overtake; I asked Air Carrier Y his speed. Being short of BONNZ; but about to level at 14;000 FT; the pilot responded 250 KTS. Further questioning led to find out that this was not assigned by Boston Departure but merely flying the SID as assigned. If I had never questioned the situation; I am very sure that these two aircraft would have been in an overtake situation would have ensued and separation would have been lost. There was no attempt by the Boston Departure Controller to provide the '5 miles constant or increasing' as required by the common LOA. Very shortly thereafter two more successive departures left Boston on the PATTS1 SID to enter my airspace. Just as stated above; both aircraft were on my frequency climbing to 14;000 FT MSL and prior to BONNZ. The first aircraft; Air Carrier Z (E190); asked me 5 miles prior to BONNZ when he was expected to disregard the 250 KTS speed restriction. I questioned his statement to find out that the Boston Departure Controller had issued maximum speed as soon as possible. The pilot was confused; I was confused; and in no way did this provide for positive separation with the trailing aircraft. There was no land line communication with Boston Departure during any part of these events. Stop these ridiculous procedures until all known safety issues are resolved. Educate Boston Departure controllers on their lack of providing positive separation by both the ATC 7110.65 and the ZBW/A90 LOA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.