Narrative:

After landing on runway 31R at dfw airport I was cleared to exit the last high speed turnoff and hold short of runway 35R. I taxied behind another aircraft also approaching to hold short of runway 35R. Both of us taxied slowly to approach the hold short line when tower cleared the preceeding aircraft to cross runway 35R and hold short of runway 35L. I continued to taxi slowly to hold short of runway 35R. I rechked my airport diagram page to verify the layout of the northeast side of the airport as I have rarely used that area previously. Unfortunately, I misread the diagram and was looking to approach parallel taxiway left which would then lead me to hold short of runway 35R. It so happens that taxiway left is between runways 35R and 35L not before runway 35R as I had read. I saw to my left some ground lights that I assumed were from taxiway left so I continued taxiing ahead expecting too soon to see the runway 35R hold line. Instead I found that I saw the white runway markings of the departure end of runway 17L and my aircraft was 1/8 of the way into the runway end. I immediately looked left and saw an aircraft on short final for runway 35R. I added power and continued to cross runway 35R so as to clear the runway completely. As I had already transgressed the runway, I felt the safest action to take was to continue to cross as opposed to stopping part way on the runway. After our crossing tower called us to confirm we were holding short of runway 35R as instructed. We responded that we had mistakenly crossed the runway, were well clear and holding short of runway 35L. The following factors contributed to this incident: because I was unfamiliar with that portion of the airport I relied on my airport diagram to orient myself. Unfortunately I misread the txwys on the diagram. The yellow hold short lines may not be marked brightly enough for night use. Even though I had both runway turnoff lights and the taxi light on, I never did see the hold short line. Very fortunately there was never any danger to any aircraft. However, I fully realize the gravity of the incursion and accept full responsibility for the actions of my crew. All of us were trying to be alert. We knew full well what our clearance was but still made a mistake. We were quite surprised to find ourselves inadvertently crossing the runway. After gate arrival, I made several telephone calls to the tower but only heard a busy signal. I wanted to explain the incident and to apologize. I certainly learned a valuable lesson. My crew and I should have paid closer attention to the proper interpretation of the airport diagram so we could have been more aware of the environment around us! Supplemental information from acn 95087: we taxied ahead to close the space gap and get up to the hold short line for runway 35R. Neither the captain nor I saw the CAT ii or regular hold short line (I believe). As we saw the wide white runway edge line on the east edge of runway 35R we realized, almost simultaneously, that we were moving just fast enough to make it impossible to fully stop west/O putting some front portion of our aircraft across the actual runway edge. Fortunately, the only aircraft in sight that intended to use runway 35R was still airborne with a height of at least 100' and on final for runway 35R. In the next fraction of a second the captain did what I would have done (and was thinking about), in that he pwred up and crossed the runway so as to be fully clear of the runway as soon as possible. After clearing runway 35R and resting on taxiway 19, the tower called us and asked us where we were. I believe the controller asked us if we were on the east side of runway 35R. I replied that we were clear of runway 35R and, in fact, between the 2 runways (35L and right). I also quipped that I thought the tower had asked us to hurry across runway 35R. This was unfair to the tower controller, but it was the only thing I could think of to hold off a discussion of proper clrncs and procedures on the tower frequency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT TAXIED ACROSS ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: AFTER LNDG ON RWY 31R AT DFW ARPT I WAS CLRED TO EXIT THE LAST HIGH SPD TURNOFF AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 35R. I TAXIED BEHIND ANOTHER ACFT ALSO APCHING TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 35R. BOTH OF US TAXIED SLOWLY TO APCH THE HOLD SHORT LINE WHEN TWR CLRED THE PRECEEDING ACFT TO CROSS RWY 35R AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 35L. I CONTINUED TO TAXI SLOWLY TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 35R. I RECHKED MY ARPT DIAGRAM PAGE TO VERIFY THE LAYOUT OF THE NE SIDE OF THE ARPT AS I HAVE RARELY USED THAT AREA PREVIOUSLY. UNFORTUNATELY, I MISREAD THE DIAGRAM AND WAS LOOKING TO APCH PARALLEL TXWY L WHICH WOULD THEN LEAD ME TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 35R. IT SO HAPPENS THAT TXWY L IS BTWN RWYS 35R AND 35L NOT BEFORE RWY 35R AS I HAD READ. I SAW TO MY LEFT SOME GND LIGHTS THAT I ASSUMED WERE FROM TXWY L SO I CONTINUED TAXIING AHEAD EXPECTING TOO SOON TO SEE THE RWY 35R HOLD LINE. INSTEAD I FOUND THAT I SAW THE WHITE RWY MARKINGS OF THE DEP END OF RWY 17L AND MY ACFT WAS 1/8 OF THE WAY INTO THE RWY END. I IMMEDIATELY LOOKED LEFT AND SAW AN ACFT ON SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 35R. I ADDED PWR AND CONTINUED TO CROSS RWY 35R SO AS TO CLEAR THE RWY COMPLETELY. AS I HAD ALREADY TRANSGRESSED THE RWY, I FELT THE SAFEST ACTION TO TAKE WAS TO CONTINUE TO CROSS AS OPPOSED TO STOPPING PART WAY ON THE RWY. AFTER OUR XING TWR CALLED US TO CONFIRM WE WERE HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 35R AS INSTRUCTED. WE RESPONDED THAT WE HAD MISTAKENLY CROSSED THE RWY, WERE WELL CLEAR AND HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 35L. THE FOLLOWING FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT: BECAUSE I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THAT PORTION OF THE ARPT I RELIED ON MY ARPT DIAGRAM TO ORIENT MYSELF. UNFORTUNATELY I MISREAD THE TXWYS ON THE DIAGRAM. THE YELLOW HOLD SHORT LINES MAY NOT BE MARKED BRIGHTLY ENOUGH FOR NIGHT USE. EVEN THOUGH I HAD BOTH RWY TURNOFF LIGHTS AND THE TAXI LIGHT ON, I NEVER DID SEE THE HOLD SHORT LINE. VERY FORTUNATELY THERE WAS NEVER ANY DANGER TO ANY ACFT. HOWEVER, I FULLY REALIZE THE GRAVITY OF THE INCURSION AND ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTIONS OF MY CREW. ALL OF US WERE TRYING TO BE ALERT. WE KNEW FULL WELL WHAT OUR CLRNC WAS BUT STILL MADE A MISTAKE. WE WERE QUITE SURPRISED TO FIND OURSELVES INADVERTENTLY XING THE RWY. AFTER GATE ARR, I MADE SEVERAL TELEPHONE CALLS TO THE TWR BUT ONLY HEARD A BUSY SIGNAL. I WANTED TO EXPLAIN THE INCIDENT AND TO APOLOGIZE. I CERTAINLY LEARNED A VALUABLE LESSON. MY CREW AND I SHOULD HAVE PAID CLOSER ATTN TO THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE ARPT DIAGRAM SO WE COULD HAVE BEEN MORE AWARE OF THE ENVIRONMENT AROUND US! SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 95087: WE TAXIED AHEAD TO CLOSE THE SPACE GAP AND GET UP TO THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 35R. NEITHER THE CAPT NOR I SAW THE CAT II OR REGULAR HOLD SHORT LINE (I BELIEVE). AS WE SAW THE WIDE WHITE RWY EDGE LINE ON THE E EDGE OF RWY 35R WE REALIZED, ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY, THAT WE WERE MOVING JUST FAST ENOUGH TO MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO FULLY STOP W/O PUTTING SOME FRONT PORTION OF OUR ACFT ACROSS THE ACTUAL RWY EDGE. FORTUNATELY, THE ONLY ACFT IN SIGHT THAT INTENDED TO USE RWY 35R WAS STILL AIRBORNE WITH A HEIGHT OF AT LEAST 100' AND ON FINAL FOR RWY 35R. IN THE NEXT FRACTION OF A SECOND THE CAPT DID WHAT I WOULD HAVE DONE (AND WAS THINKING ABOUT), IN THAT HE PWRED UP AND CROSSED THE RWY SO AS TO BE FULLY CLEAR OF THE RWY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AFTER CLRING RWY 35R AND RESTING ON TXWY 19, THE TWR CALLED US AND ASKED US WHERE WE WERE. I BELIEVE THE CTLR ASKED US IF WE WERE ON THE E SIDE OF RWY 35R. I REPLIED THAT WE WERE CLR OF RWY 35R AND, IN FACT, BTWN THE 2 RWYS (35L AND R). I ALSO QUIPPED THAT I THOUGHT THE TWR HAD ASKED US TO HURRY ACROSS RWY 35R. THIS WAS UNFAIR TO THE TWR CTLR, BUT IT WAS THE ONLY THING I COULD THINK OF TO HOLD OFF A DISCUSSION OF PROPER CLRNCS AND PROCS ON THE TWR FREQ.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.