Narrative:

My first officer and I were dealing with a red boxed FD (flight director) on both pfds (primary flight displays) when within eighteen miles of the localizer (localizer). We had been cleared for the ILS 36R approach and both identification's disappeared and the localizer's just disappeared for five seconds. We were at 5;000 in the clear and when the signal came back and the localizer identification's we re-coupled and completed the approach. On touchdown....the same thing occurred...loss of signal...red box FD on both pfd's. It went away on engine shut down. This was not a factor on our turn to a different airport; but once again in at this airport; on 36L this time; the same thing happened. Maintenance decided to defer both flight directors. That is option two. This MEL forces the deferral of the autopilot system; rvsm; toga switches. Read the toga MEL. It states that 'all normal flight director modes are available.' so here you have an MEL that forces you defer systems that must be operational in order to comply with the MEL. This aircraft would have been un-airworthy if we would have taken it. Once the failure to comply with this MEL had been discovered any pilot that had flown this aircraft would have been self-disclosed to the FAA by our company. I was on the phone with maintenance and the chief pilot and the union over raw data dispatch of aircraft when he found this. MEL autopilot system 22-10-01 states: except where enroute operations procedures or approach procedures require its use; may be inoperative provided: a. Altitude alerting system is operative. -Note- auto pilot is required for rvsm operations. -Note- relief for inoperative individual flight guidance operational modes is provided by MEL item 22-10-02 flight directors. -Note- rvsm system must be deferred under MEL 90-10-01. Placard. Place a placard/sticker on the flight control panel (fcp). (M) maintenance. Not required. (O) operations. Not required. MEL flight directors 22-10-02 - or option 2 - (O) except where enroute operations; approach or departure procedures require its use; both may be inoperative provided: a. Autopilot is considered inoperative; and b. Toga switches are considered inoperative. -Note- windshear escape guidance will be inoperative. However; all remaining windshear functions will be available. -Note- rvsm system must be deferred under MEL 90-10-01. -Note- autopilot must be deferred under MEL 22-10-01. -Note- toga switches must be deferred under MEL 22-11-03. Placard. Place a placard/sticker on the flight control panel (fcp). (M) maintenance. Not required. (O) operations. -Note- if windshear is encountered; the windshear 'eyebrows' (pitch limited indication from the GPWS) will appear on both pfd's to indicate the amount of pitch attitude change that can be made before the airplane reaches stall angle of attack (aoa). Excessive pitch rates may activate the stall protection system. -Note- pilot with inoperative flight director cannot fly RNAV 1 sids or stars; or reduced approach/landing minima requiring the use of the flight director and/or the autopilot. MEL takeoff/go around (toga) switches (on thrust levers) 22-11-03 (O) both may be inoperative provided the procedures below are used. -Note- all normal flight director modes are available. -Note- windshear escape guidance is not affected by the loss of the toga function and remains operative during the approach and takeoff phases of flight. Placard. Place a placard/sticker on the flight control panel (fcp). (M) maintenance. Not required. (O) operations. Takeoff. Takeoff will be performed in raw data (approximately fifteen degree pitch up for two engines; in the event of engine failure approximately ten degrees pitch up) until the 'speed mode' callout. Go around. Pilot not flying should select both flight directors off while the pilot flying advances the thrust levers toward go around thrust. Rotate to approximately ten degrees pitch up until the 'speed mode' callout. -Note- to/to and GA/GA mode on the flight mode annunciator are unavailable. Note- in the event of a go around the ap/sp switch must be used to disconnect the autopilot and the FMS must be manually sequenced to the missed approach. It is also my opinion that flying 'raw data' just because there is an MEL that says we can is unacceptable. If we are expected to fly with no FD and ap then there should be training and our company should not frown upon flight crews turning off ap and FD while flying 121 operations. Past practice of this company is to question the reasoning behind flying raw data and it is now apparent that this company now expects me to accept an aircraft that require me to fly raw data and this company should actively pursue training all pilots in raw data departures; enroute and arrivals. The mels are poorly written and contradictory. [We] contacted company and maintenance to the inability to accept this MEL. Fix the contradictions. Train our pilots in raw data flight in the crj or don't expect them to fly these aircraft in deteriorated conditions with absurd mels.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ200 crew refused an aircraft with the Flight Directors MEL'ed to correct an ILS/LOC anomaly because it also removed nearly all automated flight guidance; the autopilot as well as prevented flight in RVSM.

Narrative: My First Officer and I were dealing with a RED boxed FD (flight Director) on both PFDs (Primary Flight Displays) when within eighteen miles of the localizer (LOC). We had been cleared for the ILS 36R approach and both ID's disappeared and the LOC's just disappeared for five seconds. We were at 5;000 in the clear and when the signal came back and the LOC ID's we re-coupled and completed the approach. On touchdown....the same thing occurred...loss of signal...RED box FD on both PFD's. It went away on engine shut down. This was not a factor on our turn to a different airport; but once again in at this airport; on 36L this time; the same thing happened. Maintenance decided to defer both flight directors. That is option two. This MEL forces the deferral of the autopilot system; RVSM; TOGA switches. READ THE TOGA MEL. It states that 'All normal flight director modes are available.' So here you have an MEL that forces you defer systems that must be operational in order to comply with the MEL. This aircraft would have been un-airworthy if we would have taken it. Once the failure to comply with this MEL had been discovered any pilot that had flown this aircraft would have been self-disclosed to the FAA by our company. I was on the phone with Maintenance and the Chief Pilot and the Union over raw data dispatch of aircraft when he found this. MEL Autopilot System 22-10-01 states: Except where enroute operations procedures or approach procedures require its use; may be inoperative provided: a. Altitude Alerting System is operative. -Note- Auto Pilot is required for RVSM operations. -Note- Relief for inoperative individual flight guidance operational modes is provided by MEL item 22-10-02 Flight Directors. -Note- RVSM System must be deferred under MEL 90-10-01. PLACARD. Place a placard/sticker on the Flight Control Panel (FCP). (M) MAINTENANCE. Not required. (O) OPERATIONS. Not required. MEL Flight Directors 22-10-02 - OR OPTION 2 - (O) except where enroute operations; approach or departure procedures require its use; both may be inoperative provided: a. Autopilot is considered inoperative; and b. TOGA Switches are considered inoperative. -Note- Windshear escape guidance will be inoperative. However; all remaining windshear functions will be available. -Note- RVSM System must be deferred under MEL 90-10-01. -Note- Autopilot must be deferred under MEL 22-10-01. -Note- TOGA switches must be deferred under MEL 22-11-03. PLACARD. Place a placard/sticker on the Flight Control Panel (FCP). (M) MAINTENANCE. Not required. (O) OPERATIONS. -Note- If windshear is encountered; the windshear 'eyebrows' (pitch limited indication from the GPWS) will appear on both PFD's to indicate the amount of pitch attitude change that can be made before the airplane reaches stall angle of attack (AOA). Excessive pitch rates may activate the stall protection system. -Note- Pilot with inoperative Flight Director CANNOT fly RNAV 1 SIDS or STARS; or reduced approach/landing minima requiring the use of the Flight Director and/or the Autopilot. MEL Takeoff/Go Around (TOGA) Switches (On Thrust Levers) 22-11-03 (O) both may be inoperative provided the procedures below are used. -Note- All normal flight director modes are available. -Note- Windshear escape guidance is not affected by the loss of the TOGA function and remains operative during the approach and takeoff phases of flight. PLACARD. Place a placard/sticker on the Flight Control Panel (FCP). (M) MAINTENANCE. Not required. (O) OPERATIONS. Takeoff. Takeoff will be performed in raw data (approximately fifteen degree pitch up for two engines; in the event of engine failure approximately ten degrees pitch up) until the 'speed mode' callout. Go Around. Pilot not flying should select both flight directors off while the pilot flying advances the thrust levers toward go around thrust. Rotate to approximately ten degrees pitch up until the 'speed mode' callout. -Note- TO/TO and GA/GA mode on the flight mode annunciator are unavailable. Note- In the event of a go around the AP/SP switch must be used to disconnect the autopilot and the FMS must be manually sequenced to the missed approach. It is also my opinion that flying 'Raw Data' just because there is an MEL that says we can is unacceptable. If we are expected to fly with no FD and AP then there should be training and our company should not frown upon flight crews turning off AP and FD while flying 121 operations. Past practice of this company is to question the reasoning behind flying raw data and it is now apparent that this company now expects me to accept an aircraft that require me to fly raw data and this company should actively pursue training all pilots in raw data departures; enroute and arrivals. The MELs are poorly written and contradictory. [We] contacted Company and Maintenance to the inability to accept this MEL. Fix the contradictions. Train our pilots in RAW DATA flight in the CRJ or don't expect them to fly these aircraft in deteriorated conditions with absurd MELs.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.