Narrative:

As we approached abq; ATIS was reporting high overcast clouds (10;000 ft); light winds out of the west; and to expect the visual to runway 26. Our flight departure paperwork had a crew bulletin/abq NOTAM explaining the high incidence of egpws warnings to runway 26; with detailed guidance and warnings regarding the approach. It stated; in part; 'pilots should plan to fly an extended left base to intercept final no more than 3.5 NM from the landing threshold of runway 26.' accordingly; I set up and briefed the visual approach to runway 26 as stated in the departure paperwork. There is no instrument approach to runway 26 and the runway has a PAPI for visual glideslope guidance.in addition to the flight departure paperwork; the following information is provided on the commercially prepared airport page: 'safety alert approach: stable approach planning 'gate' recommendations (B767): runway 26: 4 NM final; speed vref +5/6; 600 ft; gear down; F30; (field elevation 5;355 ft).' with the discrepancy between the recommendations on this page (4 NM final at 6;600 ft) and the abq NOTAM saying pilots 'should' intercept final no more than 3.5 NM from the threshold; I put a fix in the FMS at 3.5 NM at 6;400 ft and briefed to be fully configured and intercept final at this point; from a left base. My approach brief also included a review of the surrounding terrain and all the associated history of egpws warnings and relevant information. We were not fatigued and saw no reason to not fly this approach as briefed.we were given vectors on the descent and visually picked up the field passing 9;300 ft MSL on a heading of approximately 220. We were cleared for the visual to runway 26. I told the first officer to select 6;400 ft in the altitude window and I continued the descent at flaps 5 ref speed on that heading to set us up for the right turn toward the fix I created (this would be our extended left base). On a heading of approximately 350; I asked for flaps 15; then gear down; to start configuring; and continued the descent at approximately 1;500 FPM. We were both in terrain [mode] and could clearly see we were skirting the edge of the terrain out to the east. Beyond the runway extended centerline; on our present heading; there was terrain in front of us; so perhaps the predictive feature picked this up. Shortly thereafter; we received a 'caution terrain' warning twice. As trained; I shallowed out the descent and turned away from the terrain slightly that was to our right (east). Shortly thereafter again; we received another 'caution terrain' warning; so I believe I started to level off around 6;600 ft with 2-3 miles to go to intercept final. I think by now we were at flaps 30 and approaching vref +5 when we received a 'terrain; terrain; (whoop; whoop) pull up' egpws warning. I immediately performed the CFIT escape maneuver; wings level; heading approximately 350. Immediately the warning ceased and the first officer called clear of terrain. At this point; we were almost ready to intercept final and we were on the PAPI and in a safe position to make a stabilized approach and land. We proceeded to continue the visual approach to a landing. The approach was stabilized and the landing was uneventful.I will say I was surprised that we received any terrain warnings in the first place. In the eyes of both myself and the first officer (previously a captain and certainly a very experienced pilot); we briefed and flew the approach as well as anyone could have. It seemed like there was nothing we could have done differently; yet the terrain warnings can't be argued with; so we both look forward to an analysis of what happened. In our opinions; we followed the recommendations of all of the safety alerts; bulletins; and notams to the best of our ability; while following all company procedures. Yet; we still found ourselves in an apparent unsafe situation; performing what amounts to an emergency procedure. This should not be so!in retrospect; having never attempted a visual approach to this runway in the daytime before; I should have requested another runway that was well clear of the terrain; such as runway 3. However; I was led to believe that if we followed the guidance in the paperwork; there would not be an issue. I would recommend not accepting approaches and landings to this runway at night if you have never done it before or in the daytime. Even had we flown past the field to enter a left downwind for runway 26; we would have had to turn the very same left base that we flew on this approach due to the necessity to be stabilized at 1;000 ft; which would be at roughly 3.5 miles on final. I do not see what we could have done to avoid the situation other than to avoid the approach entirely.I have already completed my annual training for this year; which included abq as one of the scenarios. However; we simply did a straight in to runway 8; which provided little training. What would have been beneficial is to practice the very scenario we found ourselves in; a visual to runway 26 at night. A situation that has already produced multiple warnings should either be trained more effectively or avoided.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 flight crew received EGPWS terrain warnings while on a night visual approach to ABQ.

Narrative: As we approached ABQ; ATIS was reporting high overcast clouds (10;000 FT); light winds out of the west; and to expect the visual to Runway 26. Our flight departure paperwork had a crew bulletin/ABQ NOTAM explaining the high incidence of EGPWS warnings to Runway 26; with detailed guidance and warnings regarding the approach. It stated; in part; 'Pilots should plan to fly an extended left base to intercept final no more than 3.5 NM from the landing threshold of Runway 26.' Accordingly; I set up and briefed the visual approach to Runway 26 as stated in the departure paperwork. There is no instrument approach to Runway 26 and the runway has a PAPI for visual glideslope guidance.In addition to the flight departure paperwork; the following information is provided on the commercially prepared airport page: 'SAFETY ALERT Approach: Stable approach planning 'gate' recommendations (B767): Runway 26: 4 NM final; speed Vref +5/6; 600 FT; gear down; F30; (Field elevation 5;355 FT).' With the discrepancy between the recommendations on this page (4 NM final at 6;600 FT) and the ABQ NOTAM saying pilots 'should' intercept final no more than 3.5 NM from the threshold; I put a fix in the FMS at 3.5 NM at 6;400 FT and briefed to be fully configured and intercept final at this point; from a left base. My approach brief also included a review of the surrounding terrain and all the associated history of EGPWS warnings and relevant information. We were not fatigued and saw no reason to not fly this approach as briefed.We were given vectors on the descent and visually picked up the field passing 9;300 FT MSL on a heading of approximately 220. We were cleared for the visual to Runway 26. I told the First Officer to select 6;400 FT in the altitude window and I continued the descent at flaps 5 Ref speed on that heading to set us up for the right turn toward the fix I created (this would be our extended left base). On a heading of approximately 350; I asked for flaps 15; then gear down; to start configuring; and continued the descent at approximately 1;500 FPM. We were both in terrain [mode] and could clearly see we were skirting the edge of the terrain out to the east. Beyond the runway extended centerline; on our present heading; there was terrain in front of us; so perhaps the predictive feature picked this up. Shortly thereafter; we received a 'CAUTION TERRAIN' warning twice. As trained; I shallowed out the descent and turned away from the terrain slightly that was to our right (east). Shortly thereafter again; we received another 'CAUTION TERRAIN' warning; so I believe I started to level off around 6;600 FT with 2-3 miles to go to intercept final. I think by now we were at flaps 30 and approaching Vref +5 when we received a 'TERRAIN; TERRAIN; (WHOOP; WHOOP) PULL UP' EGPWS warning. I immediately performed the CFIT escape maneuver; wings level; heading approximately 350. Immediately the warning ceased and the First Officer called clear of terrain. At this point; we were almost ready to intercept final and we were on the PAPI and in a safe position to make a stabilized approach and land. We proceeded to continue the visual approach to a landing. The approach was stabilized and the landing was uneventful.I will say I was surprised that we received any terrain warnings in the first place. In the eyes of both myself and the First Officer (previously a Captain and certainly a very experienced pilot); we briefed and flew the approach as well as anyone could have. It seemed like there was nothing we could have done differently; yet the terrain warnings can't be argued with; so we both look forward to an analysis of what happened. In our opinions; we followed the recommendations of all of the safety alerts; bulletins; and NOTAMs to the best of our ability; while following all company procedures. Yet; we still found ourselves in an apparent unsafe situation; performing what amounts to an emergency procedure. This should not be so!In retrospect; having never attempted a visual approach to this runway in the daytime before; I should have requested another runway that was well clear of the terrain; such as Runway 3. However; I was led to believe that if we followed the guidance in the paperwork; there would not be an issue. I would recommend not accepting approaches and landings to this runway at night if you have never done it before or in the daytime. Even had we flown past the field to enter a left downwind for Runway 26; we would have had to turn the very same left base that we flew on this approach due to the necessity to be stabilized at 1;000 FT; which would be at roughly 3.5 miles on final. I do not see what we could have done to avoid the situation other than to avoid the approach entirely.I have already completed my annual training for this year; which included ABQ as one of the scenarios. However; we simply did a straight in to Runway 8; which provided little training. What would have been beneficial is to practice the very scenario we found ourselves in; a visual to Runway 26 at night. A situation that has already produced multiple warnings should either be trained more effectively or avoided.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.