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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 944031 |
Time | |
Date | 201104 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Fan Case |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Maintenance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Arriving at the aircraft for our morning flight to hnl; I was informed by the first officer that he had just completed his walk around inspection and found the number 1 engine attrition liner [fan abradable shroud] to be in very poor condition and with multiple holes. He stated that 'he had flown many that were damaged; but that this was one of the worst he had seen.' I went down and personally inspected the engine and found the liner to be in very poor condition; worn throughout the entire circumference; with approximately 6 holes in all quadrants. The vast majority of damage was located on the outboard section at the aircraft 9 o'clock position. I found multiple holes; old patch material that was shedding and very thin and apparently recently shed liner surface material. I was informed that the aircraft was on a 100 hour exemption for attrition liner damage and that 14 hours were remaining with repairs planned after two more flights. The damage was to the extent that I decided to speak with maintenance control about the write-up. After describing the damage; I was advised that the holes in the liner were not within limits and that further maintenance action would be required. Local maintenance informed me that a long delay would be encountered as photos of the damage would need to be taken and sent to engineering for analysis. It was at this point that events began to occur that this report addresses.while informing the passengers and waiting for word from maintenance on a time estimate I received a phone call on my cell phone from the chief pilot (apparently maintenance contacted the chief) advising me that several other hnl flights had recently canceled for mechanical reasons and this would be the third in a week. I was told that we would lose our hnl flying in the base if this trip did not go out that day. It was also mentioned that my contacting maintenance control was not a good idea in that it took that problem out of our hands. I requested operations to have the passengers deplaned. I was then confronted at the cockpit door by agent who then began to complain to me that I was responsible for ruining the plans of many people that were already inconvenienced by the previous day's cancellations. She left the cockpit; began deplaning the passengers; and as I was later told by the flight attendants; complained to many of our passengers about my decision.during the next couple of hours; and while waiting for maintenance; I conferred with my first officer; and other captains about the extent of the damage to the attrition liner. It was noted that engineering would only be looking at the pictures of a small area of the liner and would not be witness to the very poor condition and damage of the entire liner. It was also noted that the maintenance supervisor told us that the entire liner would require replacement due to its degraded condition. I carefully weighed the advice; reviewed the damage and history on the deferral; noted that only 14 hours were left on a 100 hour deferral; that the deferral was not correct or legal to begin with; the extensive damage to the liner; and that maintenance had attempted to convince me that I was not accurate in my observations. I made the decision that this aircraft was not suitable for an ocean crossing with no alternates. Upon leaving the aircraft; a flight attendant supervisor was meeting with the flight attendants and told them that the agent had just made a PA throughout the terminal 'that the captain was to blame for everyone not getting to hnl; that the plane was fine; and that the captain was refusing to fly and did not communicate with operations properly; and just canceled the flight.' when the crew entered the terminal; the flight attendants were immediately confronted by passengers wanting to know my name.I only provide this information as a background to the fact that during this entire event I received not a single bit of support from any department at this airline.I was 'pushed;' harassed; lied to; and treated with little to no respect by almost every department involved. I made a very difficult decision; of which I was quite aware of the consequences. I made that decision as a captain entrusted to the ultimate safe operation of this airline and experienced one of the worst days of my almost 26 year career as a result. I have never been insulted and disrespected to the extent I was by operations and the agent(s) involved; and have never had to deal with such obvious attempts to push a un-airworthy plane and crew into service.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B757 flight crew describes the circumstances surrounding the decision to refuse an aircraft for an over water flight due to the degraded condition of the fan attrition liner.
Narrative: Arriving at the aircraft for our morning flight to HNL; I was informed by the First Officer that he had just completed his walk around inspection and found the number 1 engine attrition liner [fan abradable shroud] to be in very poor condition and with multiple holes. He stated that 'he had flown many that were damaged; but that this was one of the worst he had seen.' I went down and personally inspected the engine and found the liner to be in very poor condition; worn throughout the entire circumference; with approximately 6 holes in all quadrants. The vast majority of damage was located on the outboard section at the aircraft 9 o'clock position. I found multiple holes; old patch material that was shedding and very thin and apparently recently shed liner surface material. I was informed that the aircraft was on a 100 hour exemption for attrition liner damage and that 14 hours were remaining with repairs planned after two more flights. The damage was to the extent that I decided to speak with Maintenance Control about the write-up. After describing the damage; I was advised that the holes in the liner were not within limits and that further maintenance action would be required. Local Maintenance informed me that a long delay would be encountered as photos of the damage would need to be taken and sent to engineering for analysis. It was at this point that events began to occur that this report addresses.While informing the passengers and waiting for word from Maintenance on a time estimate I received a phone call on my cell phone from the Chief Pilot (apparently Maintenance contacted the Chief) advising me that several other HNL flights had recently canceled for mechanical reasons and this would be the third in a week. I was told that we would lose our HNL flying in the base if this trip did not go out that day. It was also mentioned that my contacting Maintenance Control was not a good idea in that it took that problem out of our hands. I requested Operations to have the passengers deplaned. I was then confronted at the cockpit door by agent who then began to complain to me that I was responsible for ruining the plans of many people that were already inconvenienced by the previous day's cancellations. She left the cockpit; began deplaning the passengers; and as I was later told by the flight attendants; complained to many of our passengers about my decision.During the next couple of hours; and while waiting for Maintenance; I conferred with my First Officer; and other Captains about the extent of the damage to the attrition liner. It was noted that engineering would only be looking at the pictures of a small area of the liner and would not be witness to the very poor condition and damage of the entire liner. It was also noted that the Maintenance Supervisor told us that the entire liner would require replacement due to its degraded condition. I carefully weighed the advice; reviewed the damage and history on the deferral; noted that only 14 hours were left on a 100 hour deferral; that the deferral was not correct or legal to begin with; the extensive damage to the liner; and that Maintenance had attempted to convince me that I was not accurate in my observations. I made the decision that this aircraft was not suitable for an ocean crossing with no alternates. Upon leaving the aircraft; A Flight Attendant Supervisor was meeting with the flight attendants and told them that the agent had just made a PA throughout the terminal 'that the Captain was to blame for everyone not getting to HNL; that the plane was fine; and that the Captain was refusing to fly and did not communicate with Operations properly; and just canceled the flight.' When the crew entered the terminal; the flight attendants were immediately confronted by passengers wanting to know my name.I only provide this information as a background to the fact that during this entire event I received not a single bit of support from any department at this airline.I was 'pushed;' harassed; lied to; and treated with little to no respect by almost every department involved. I made a very difficult decision; of which I was quite aware of the consequences. I made that decision as a Captain entrusted to the ultimate safe operation of this airline and experienced one of the worst days of my almost 26 year career as a result. I have never been insulted and disrespected to the extent I was by operations and the agent(s) involved; and have never had to deal with such obvious attempts to push a un-airworthy plane and crew into service.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.