Less than standard separation when spc climbed to the altitude occupied by inbound bmb.

Attributes
ACN	94679
Time
Date	198809
Day	Fri
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : edw
State Reference	CA
Altitude	msl bound lower : 11000 msl bound upper : 11000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : edw tower : lga
Operator	other
Make Model Name	Experimental
Flight Phase	climbout : intermediate altitude cruise other
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Operator	other
Make Model Name	Military Transport
Flight Phase	cruise other descent other
Route In Use	arrival other
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	government : faa
Function	controller : handoff position
Qualification	controller : developmental controller : radar
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 5 flight time total : 4
ASRS Report	94679
Person 2
Affiliation	government : faa
Function	controller : approach
Qualification	controller : radar
Events
Anomaly	conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : required legal separation
Independent Detector	other controllera other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	flight crew : took evasive action none taken : insufficient time
Consequence	faa : investigated
Miss Distance	horizontal : 12000 vertical : 0
Supplementary
Primary Problem	ATC Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Operational Error

Narrative:

Working the handoff position for palmdale sector at edw RAPCON I released spc X climbing northbound to 11000'. The sector was busy with training going on at the radar. 2 mins later ZLA made a handoff to us with bmb Y sebnd at 11000'. I took the handoff and then realized spc X would be a factor so I called palmdale tower to restrict spc X to 10000'. Tower advised they weren't talking to spc X. I told the radar controller about the situation but nothing was done. Spc X came off with no transponder and NORDO. Bmb Y said he was turning to the right to miss spc X. Spc X called after he'd pass bmb Y. In my opinion the radar controller should have turned bmb Y to avoid the projected flight path of spc X as soon as the situation was brought to light. Also I, being just recently certified on the position with virtually no time on the position since being certified, should not have been there. The emphasis to run people through the training program west/O seasoning on a position is an accident waiting to happen. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter has been at this facility for 4 months and has very recently certified on this radar handoff position and its associated radar position. After qualifying on these 2 positions, reporter was immediately put into training on the next position. Reporter does not feel comfortable on these 2 positions because he works them so seldomly. He advocates that the facility allow a newly certified controller to work the new position for at least 20 hours of seasoning before moving on to the next position. Re: the system error in the report, reporter was held responsible for the less than standard separation incident because he failed to notify the radar controller in time to prevent the loss of separation. Reporter apparently took the handoff on the inbound bmb and then took some time before he realized the pending conflict. He was faulted for not remembering the released spc and restricting the altitude of the inbound bmb at the time of handoff.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION WHEN SPC CLIMBED TO THE ALT OCCUPIED BY INBOUND BMB.

Narrative: WORKING THE HDOF POS FOR PALMDALE SECTOR AT EDW RAPCON I RELEASED SPC X CLBING NBOUND TO 11000'. THE SECTOR WAS BUSY WITH TRNING GOING ON AT THE RADAR. 2 MINS LATER ZLA MADE A HDOF TO US WITH BMB Y SEBND AT 11000'. I TOOK THE HDOF AND THEN REALIZED SPC X WOULD BE A FACTOR SO I CALLED PALMDALE TWR TO RESTRICT SPC X TO 10000'. TWR ADVISED THEY WEREN'T TALKING TO SPC X. I TOLD THE RADAR CTLR ABOUT THE SITUATION BUT NOTHING WAS DONE. SPC X CAME OFF WITH NO TRANSPONDER AND NORDO. BMB Y SAID HE WAS TURNING TO THE RIGHT TO MISS SPC X. SPC X CALLED AFTER HE'D PASS BMB Y. IN MY OPINION THE RADAR CTLR SHOULD HAVE TURNED BMB Y TO AVOID THE PROJECTED FLT PATH OF SPC X AS SOON AS THE SITUATION WAS BROUGHT TO LIGHT. ALSO I, BEING JUST RECENTLY CERTIFIED ON THE POS WITH VIRTUALLY NO TIME ON THE POS SINCE BEING CERTIFIED, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THERE. THE EMPHASIS TO RUN PEOPLE THROUGH THE TRNING PROGRAM W/O SEASONING ON A POS IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR HAS BEEN AT THIS FAC FOR 4 MONTHS AND HAS VERY RECENTLY CERTIFIED ON THIS RADAR HDOF POS AND ITS ASSOCIATED RADAR POS. AFTER QUALIFYING ON THESE 2 POSITIONS, RPTR WAS IMMEDIATELY PUT INTO TRNING ON THE NEXT POS. RPTR DOES NOT FEEL COMFORTABLE ON THESE 2 POSITIONS BECAUSE HE WORKS THEM SO SELDOMLY. HE ADVOCATES THAT THE FAC ALLOW A NEWLY CERTIFIED CTLR TO WORK THE NEW POS FOR AT LEAST 20 HRS OF SEASONING BEFORE MOVING ON TO THE NEXT POSITION. RE: THE SYSTEM ERROR IN THE RPT, RPTR WAS HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION INCIDENT BECAUSE HE FAILED TO NOTIFY THE RADAR CTLR IN TIME TO PREVENT THE LOSS OF SEPARATION. RPTR APPARENTLY TOOK THE HDOF ON THE INBOUND BMB AND THEN TOOK SOME TIME BEFORE HE REALIZED THE PENDING CONFLICT. HE WAS FAULTED FOR NOT REMEMBERING THE RELEASED SPC AND RESTRICTING THE ALT OF THE INBOUND BMB AT THE TIME OF HDOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.