Narrative:

Both pilots loaded the clearance into the FMS (departure runway; SID; enroute fixes; STAR; and arrival runway). After loaded; both pilots reviewed the clearance and compared clearance prior to gate departure. During taxi checklist; both pilots again confirmed departure runway and first fix. After takeoff; the first portion of the departure was flown correctly. It was not a RNAV SID; however the departure was selectable into the FMS. For this reason; the pilot flying flew in FMS mode and the pilot not flying operated in conventional navigation. After the first fix was reached; a radar vector was required. The initial heading of this vector was depicted in the FMS as D176B; however; it was not labeled as a vector of 176. As a result; the aircraft turned toward the next fix (coate) and not the required radar vector. While the FMS commanded a turn toward coate; both the pilot flying and pilot not flying began to determine the required action. While in this turn; ATC also queried us of our heading. ATC immediately assigned a new heading; and we began the corrective turn. ATC did not provide any additional information; and continued to vector us toward our next fix. Upon reaching that fix; we continued on to our destination with no further issue. During the entire departure we received no TCAS advisories; warnings or ras. We also feel that there was no loss of separation between us and any other aircraft. During our initial review of the clearance and FMS review; we had a distraction from the cabin. While we reviewed the chart and FMS; the distraction may have lead to us observing a heading of 176; not necessarily a vector of 176 after our first fix. Second; the fact that it was not an RNAV departure; yet it was selectable from the FMS database; and depicted the first three ATC departure procedures correctly; may have lead to this oversight. Lastly; the initial heading of 176 was depicted after our first fix; depicting that the FMS would turn to that heading after our first fix. This was not the case; as we further discovered; it was a heading assigned for 2.2 miles; and then the aircraft would turn toward the next fix (coate). I feel that crew members need to remain vigilant in avoiding and working through distractions. I also feel that pilots should remain vigilant in determining the aircrafts next course of action after passing every fix; even when the fixes are close to one another. Lastly; I feel that if a procedure is selectable via the FMS data base; it should be an accurate depiction of the actual procedure it is representing in the chart.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A flight crew on the KENNEDY ONE SID failed to program the FMS to remain on the CRI 176 radial for subsequent vectors; so the aircraft turned toward the COATE Intersection 2 DME after CRI.

Narrative: Both pilots loaded the clearance into the FMS (departure runway; SID; enroute fixes; STAR; and arrival runway). After loaded; both pilots reviewed the clearance and compared clearance prior to gate departure. During taxi checklist; both pilots again confirmed departure runway and first fix. After takeoff; the first portion of the departure was flown correctly. It was not a RNAV SID; however the departure was selectable into the FMS. For this reason; the pilot flying flew in FMS mode and the pilot not flying operated in conventional navigation. After the first fix was reached; a radar vector was required. The initial heading of this vector was depicted in the FMS as D176B; however; it was not labeled as a vector of 176. As a result; the aircraft turned toward the next fix (COATE) and not the required radar vector. While the FMS commanded a turn toward COATE; both the pilot flying and pilot not flying began to determine the required action. While in this turn; ATC also queried us of our heading. ATC immediately assigned a new heading; and we began the corrective turn. ATC did not provide any additional information; and continued to vector us toward our next fix. Upon reaching that fix; we continued on to our destination with no further issue. During the entire departure we received no TCAS advisories; warnings or RAs. We also feel that there was no loss of separation between us and any other aircraft. During our initial review of the clearance and FMS review; we had a distraction from the cabin. While we reviewed the chart and FMS; the distraction may have lead to us observing a heading of 176; not necessarily a vector of 176 after our first fix. Second; the fact that it was not an RNAV departure; yet it was selectable from the FMS database; and depicted the first three ATC Departure procedures correctly; may have lead to this oversight. Lastly; the initial heading of 176 was depicted after our first fix; depicting that the FMS would turn to that heading after our first fix. This was not the case; as we further discovered; it was a heading assigned for 2.2 miles; and then the aircraft would turn toward the next fix (COATE). I feel that crew members need to remain vigilant in avoiding and working through distractions. I also feel that pilots should remain vigilant in determining the aircrafts next course of action after passing every fix; even when the fixes are close to one another. Lastly; I feel that if a procedure is selectable via the FMS data base; it should be an accurate depiction of the actual procedure it is representing in the chart.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.