A B747-400 captain rejected the takeoff at less than 60 KTS when the configuration warning horn soun...

Attributes
ACN	953970
Time
Date	201106
Local Time Of Day	0601-1200
Place
Locale Reference	ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference	FO
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	B747-400
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Takeoff
Route In Use	None
Flight Plan	IFR
Component
Aircraft Component	Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Person 1
Function	First Officer Pilot Not Flying
Experience	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 134 Flight Crew Total 6000 Flight Crew Type 265
Person 2
Function	Pilot Not Flying Relief Pilot
Experience	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140 Flight Crew Total 11000 Flight Crew Type 1200
Events
Anomaly	Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Narrative:

Pilot flying was the captain. We were cleared for takeoff. As the throttles advanced to takeoff thrust; we received a configuration warning caution. The captain immediately rejected. Once we cleared the runway we identified the problem as the trim being set at three degree's vice 6.6 per the FMS. The before start checklist was completed in two phases: 1) down to the line; and 2) below the line. The below the line was accomplished during push back and I obviously did not double check the trim setting as the checklist was being read. As a result of this event; one might consider not having the first officer read the after start checklist until the trim has been set. The aom has both the captain and first officer doing their flows with the first officer reading the checklist when he is finished with his flow. If memory serves me right; on the 75/76; the first officer did not start reading the checklist until he saw the captain cancel the warnings/cautions; the last item on the captain's flow. Not to abrogate responsibility for what occurred; but this might prevent it from happening in the future.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-400 Captain rejected the takeoff at less than 60 KTS when the configuration warning horn sounded because the stabilizer trim was not at the correct setting.

Narrative: Pilot flying was the Captain. We were cleared for takeoff. As the throttles advanced to takeoff thrust; we received a configuration warning caution. The Captain immediately rejected. Once we cleared the runway we identified the problem as the trim being set at three degree's vice 6.6 per the FMS. The Before Start Checklist was completed in two phases: 1) down to the line; and 2) below the line. The below the line was accomplished during push back and I obviously did not double check the trim setting as the checklist was being read. As a result of this event; one might consider not having the First Officer read the After Start Checklist until the trim has been set. The AOM has both the Captain and First Officer doing their flows with the First Officer reading the checklist when he is finished with his flow. If memory serves me right; on the 75/76; the First Officer did not start reading the checklist until he saw the Captain cancel the warnings/cautions; the last item on the Captain's flow. Not to abrogate responsibility for what occurred; but this might prevent it from happening in the future.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

A B747-400 captain rejected the takeoff at less than 60 KTS when the configuration warning horn sounded because the stabilizer trim was not at the correct setting.