Narrative:

During the VOR/GPS a approach to runway 21 at smo; we received a call from the smo tower stating an altitude alert had been triggered for us. I immediately leveled off at approximately 1;200 MSL as my co-pilot and I worked to determine if we had a problem. We were in VMC conditions at that time and descending to the circling MDA of 1;120. We called the runway in sight and were cleared to land on runway 21 at smo. In reflection after landing; my co-pilot and I reached the conclusion that we must have mis-identified the bevey intersection (6.7 DME fix) and begun the descent to MDA prematurely. Company SOP is to fly non-precision approaches with a constant descent angle whenever possible. We normally use the aircraft's VNAV function to accomplish this. The co-pilot with me that day is relatively new in the aircraft and new to our company. While we had accomplished training in the aircraft and company SOP's were distributed to him along with ground school concerning company procedures and aircraft sops; he is still becoming comfortable with procedures that are substantially different from those of his former company. The result being that the VNAV did not capture because the aas was not reset from our assigned initial altitude of 4;000 ft. I was attempting to recapture the VNAV angle and thought I was inside bevey intersection and could continue the descent to 1;120 ft at culve. Company SOP is designed with strict procedures for resetting the aas and callouts for iaps. I can only speculate that I became fixated on recapturing the VNAV descent angle and lost situational awareness as to the aircraft position on the approach. ATC had vectored us inside the initial approach fix (darts) and at our altitude of 4;000 ft any delay in beginning our descent quickly put us well above the descent path. The sops our company uses being so different from the co-pilot's former company contributed to his confusion during a time compressed situation and is a contributing factor to the breakdown of crew coordination during the approach. We had been flying a demanding schedule in adverse weather during the week prior to this event; and fatigue may have also been a contributing factor. Because the co-pilot was new; I should have been more thorough during my briefing of the approach and reviewing SOP; callouts and the co-pilot duties. If the aas had been set to the MDA when we intercepted the final approach course; we would not have missed the top of descent point; which prompted me to try to recapture the VNAV angle.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMO Tower issued a Low Altitude Alert to a corporate jet crew after their aircraft descended below the VOR/GPS A altitude restraint prior to BEVEY Intersection. The new First Officer had not set the altitude alerter per SOP.

Narrative: During the VOR/GPS A approach to Runway 21 at SMO; we received a call from the SMO Tower stating an altitude alert had been triggered for us. I immediately leveled off at approximately 1;200 MSL as my co-pilot and I worked to determine if we had a problem. We were in VMC conditions at that time and descending to the Circling MDA of 1;120. We called the runway in sight and were cleared to land on Runway 21 at SMO. In reflection after landing; my co-pilot and I reached the conclusion that we must have mis-identified the BEVEY Intersection (6.7 DME fix) and begun the descent to MDA prematurely. Company SOP is to fly non-precision approaches with a constant descent angle whenever possible. We normally use the aircraft's VNAV function to accomplish this. The co-pilot with me that day is relatively new in the aircraft and new to our company. While we had accomplished training in the aircraft and Company SOP's were distributed to him along with ground school concerning Company procedures and aircraft SOPs; he is still becoming comfortable with procedures that are substantially different from those of his former company. The result being that the VNAV did not capture because the AAS was not reset from our assigned initial altitude of 4;000 FT. I was attempting to recapture the VNAV angle and thought I was inside BEVEY Intersection and could continue the descent to 1;120 FT at CULVE. Company SOP is designed with strict procedures for resetting the AAS and callouts for IAPs. I can only speculate that I became fixated on recapturing the VNAV descent angle and lost situational awareness as to the aircraft position on the approach. ATC had vectored us inside the Initial Approach Fix (DARTS) and at our altitude of 4;000 FT any delay in beginning our descent quickly put us well above the descent path. The SOPs our company uses being so different from the co-pilot's former company contributed to his confusion during a time compressed situation and is a contributing factor to the breakdown of crew coordination during the approach. We had been flying a demanding schedule in adverse weather during the week prior to this event; and fatigue may have also been a contributing factor. Because the co-pilot was new; I should have been more thorough during my briefing of the approach and reviewing SOP; callouts and the co-pilot duties. If the AAS had been set to the MDA when we intercepted the final approach course; we would not have missed the top of descent point; which prompted me to try to recapture the VNAV angle.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.