Narrative:

I was walking around in the area monitoring the sectors and I noticed that aircraft Y had been given a descent clearance to FL260. I also noticed that air carrier X had been issued holding instructions at zzzzz descending to FL260. I know that the holding pattern is left turns and I knew immediately that air carrier X was going to turn left in the direct flight path of aircraft Y. When the aircraft were approximately 14 miles apart and aircraft Y was above FL300 descending to FL260; I told the d-side to make sure the r-side was aware of the potential conflict because of the left hand turns of the holding pattern. The d-side assured me he would take care of it. I walked around the area and checked on R01 and a NORAC aircraft and then I returned to sector 6 to see that the situation had been corrected. The aircraft were approximately 12 miles apart at this time with air carrier X level at FL260 and aircraft Y's data block reflected the aircraft was out of FL285 descending to FL240. I saw that air carrier X was about to make the left turn at zzzzz and that he would be in direct conflict with aircraft Y. I asked the r-side what altitude aircraft Y was descending to and the r-side said FL270. The d-side then said; 'I dressed the data block up; but aircraft Y is only going to FL270.' I did not address that the data block was dressed up at the time; but decided I would discuss it with both of them when they got off of the sector. I walked around to the flm desk and I heard the r-side issuing a traffic alert to air carrier X and I immediately returned to the sector to see the aircraft barely miss each other. I wanted to ensure that everyone had the entire story of this event so that they could understand that the flm had advised them of the traffic on two separate occasions and the event still happened. I think that the environment that we work in these days is much different from the environment I trained in. There is less of an emphasis on safety and there is little to no accountability for the controllers working the aircraft. I understand that people make mistakes; but the mistakes that are being made have shown an outright disregard for safety or a desire to maintain the proper spacing. I don't think that this was the case in this incident; but I have to wonder how hard people try to keep planes apart when they think that nothing is going to happen to them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Enroute FLM described a loss of separation event after two separate notifications to the Controller involved that a conflict was developing; the Supervisor questioning current Controllers' safety culture commitment.

Narrative: I was walking around in the area monitoring the sectors and I noticed that Aircraft Y had been given a descent clearance to FL260. I also noticed that Air Carrier X had been issued holding instructions at ZZZZZ descending to FL260. I know that the holding pattern is left turns and I knew immediately that Air Carrier X was going to turn left in the direct flight path of Aircraft Y. When the aircraft were approximately 14 miles apart and Aircraft Y was above FL300 descending to FL260; I told the D-Side to make sure the R-Side was aware of the potential conflict because of the left hand turns of the holding pattern. The D-Side assured me he would take care of it. I walked around the area and checked on R01 and a NORAC aircraft and then I returned to Sector 6 to see that the situation had been corrected. The aircraft were approximately 12 miles apart at this time with Air Carrier X level at FL260 and Aircraft Y's data block reflected the aircraft was out of FL285 descending to FL240. I saw that Air Carrier X was about to make the left turn at ZZZZZ and that he would be in direct conflict with Aircraft Y. I asked the R-Side what altitude Aircraft Y was descending to and the R-Side said FL270. The D-Side then said; 'I dressed the data block up; but Aircraft Y is only going to FL270.' I did not address that the data block was dressed up at the time; but decided I would discuss it with both of them when they got off of the sector. I walked around to the FLM desk and I heard the R-Side issuing a traffic alert to Air Carrier X and I immediately returned to the sector to see the aircraft barely miss each other. I wanted to ensure that everyone had the entire story of this event so that they could understand that the FLM had advised them of the traffic on two separate occasions and the event still happened. I think that the environment that we work in these days is much different from the environment I trained in. There is less of an emphasis on safety and there is little to no accountability for the controllers working the aircraft. I understand that people make mistakes; but the mistakes that are being made have shown an outright disregard for safety or a desire to maintain the proper spacing. I don't think that this was the case in this incident; but I have to wonder how hard people try to keep planes apart when they think that nothing is going to happen to them.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.