Narrative:

While conducting an aircraft swap at ZZZ; we met the outgoing flight crew in the jetway and learned that they had refused the aircraft for their international turn based on an inbound write-up of erroneous glideslope indications on the captain's pfd. We learned that maintenance had ops-checked the captain's glideslope as normal but had deferred inoperative the #2 fgmc. The mechanic then explained that the systems were related and cross-connected. Based on the mechanic's explanation; dispatches' decision to release the aircraft with the deferral; and the VMC weather forecast for the flight we agreed to take the aircraft to our destination. On our ensuing visual approach we observed the same indications that had been written up for three consecutive days: grossly erroneous captain's glideslope indications and no match between captain's and first officer's glideslope displays. Also; the flight director bars did not command the aircraft to follow the glideslope even though the aircraft was on the glide path based on the first officer's raw data glideslope and the PAPI. We entered a maintenance log write-up detailing the indications on the approach. Maintenance and dispatch again wanted to defer the defect and send the aircraft back to ZZZ. They told us; 'the weather is VFR now; forecast to be 500 overcast and 3 miles at your arrival time; so technically you're legal to go'. The captain refused the aircraft. Our current policy of operating aircraft with critical navigation indication discrepancies; the culture of pushing crews to accept unsafe aircraft and to use these aircraft in the airline operation; and the willingness to push beyond the boundaries of legality with respect to weather and navigational equipment requirements may be 'acceptable' at non-scheduled; fly by night air-charter operations--but that our respected major airline would; today; employ these cost-saving tactics; processes; and procedures; is shocking and bordering on criminal. I urge any FAA representative who reviews this report to strongly caution the company to conduct a serious bottom-up review of how this airline is conducting its operations. I am disappointed and disgusted that my company would even ask a crew to operate unsafe aircraft in revenue passenger flights.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 Captain expressed concern over the company's willingness to defer critical auto-flight navigation displays.

Narrative: While conducting an aircraft swap at ZZZ; we met the outgoing flight crew in the jetway and learned that they had refused the aircraft for their international turn based on an inbound write-up of erroneous glideslope indications on the Captain's PFD. We learned that Maintenance had ops-checked the Captain's glideslope as normal but had deferred inoperative the #2 FGMC. The mechanic then explained that the systems were related and cross-connected. Based on the mechanic's explanation; Dispatches' decision to release the aircraft with the deferral; and the VMC weather forecast for the flight we agreed to take the aircraft to our destination. On our ensuing visual approach we observed the same indications that had been written up for three consecutive days: grossly erroneous Captain's glideslope indications and no match between Captain's and First Officer's glideslope displays. Also; the Flight Director bars did not command the aircraft to follow the glideslope even though the aircraft was on the glide path based on the First Officer's raw data glideslope and the PAPI. We entered a maintenance log write-up detailing the indications on the approach. Maintenance and Dispatch again wanted to defer the defect and send the aircraft back to ZZZ. They told us; 'The weather is VFR now; forecast to be 500 overcast and 3 miles at your arrival time; so technically you're legal to go'. The Captain refused the aircraft. Our current policy of operating aircraft with critical navigation indication discrepancies; the culture of pushing crews to accept unsafe aircraft and to use these aircraft in the airline operation; and the willingness to push beyond the boundaries of legality with respect to weather and navigational equipment requirements may be 'acceptable' at non-scheduled; fly by night air-charter operations--but that our respected major airline would; today; employ these cost-saving tactics; processes; and procedures; is shocking and bordering on criminal. I urge any FAA representative who reviews this report to strongly caution the company to conduct a serious bottom-up review of how this airline is conducting its operations. I am disappointed and disgusted that my company would even ask a crew to operate unsafe aircraft in revenue passenger flights.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.