Narrative:

During initial flaps 9 climb out my first officer made a normal 1;000 AGL callout stating 'acceleration altitude'. I replied 'flaps up; climb thrust; low bank off; yaw damp on' and continued the climb on runway heading per our clearance. Simultaneously; the tower assigned us a frequency change to contact departure. I did not visually observe the following: the pilot not flying selected climb thrust; low bank off; yaw damp on. He did not select flaps up. I did not notice this as I was manually flying the aircraft and was watching my pfd; mfd. 9.5 times out of 10 when I am flying I have experienced our 1;000 ft call and subsequent flow being interfered with by a simultaneous call by tower instructing us to contact departure. As a pilot you are conflicted with flying the plane first; selecting the proper airplane configuration and replying to tower's radio call in a timely manner. I feel it was only a matter of time until something such as this flap overspeed event would occur due to simultaneous communication with tower and crew callouts/flows. Between 5;000 and 7;000 ft I called for flch and autopilot on. The airplane continued to fly normal as I monitored its progress. It was near 10;000 ft that I initially noticed a slight rumble in my seat and in the floor boards. At 10;000 ft I called for the climb checklist; the airplane began its airspeed increase to 270 KIAS as per scheduled in flch. The first officer verbally read the climb checklist. I did not look at the items as he 'verified' them. I then called back to the flight attendant to ask him if he heard or felt anything out of the ordinary. He indicated that he also felt the rumble in the floor. I indicated to the first officer that I thought maybe a gear door wasn't fully closed or maybe a latch on the fueling panel wasn't locked. I didn't suspect anything else as all checklists and flows were completed to my knowledge.we then checked all system pages to see if any avionics doors or other doors were indicating open. We also looked at the gear and they all three indicated up and locked. Flaps and spoilers indications apparently did not make it into my scan. The only abnormal indication I had noticed during the climb was that we weren't climbing as fast as we should have been with our given weight and the slight rumble in the floor. It wasn't until approximately 18;000 ft that the first officer noticed that the flaps were still at 9 degrees. At this point we raised the flaps and I continued up to our cruising altitude of FL270. I radioed dispatch and maintenance to notify them of a flap 9 overspeed at 270 KIAS. We continued the flight without incident and landed normally at our destination. Maintenance met us at the gate and took the aircraft out of service.I wish I could think of a suggestion to avoid a recurrence of event but the best I can come up with is that I will now look in the direction of the switch or lever being manipulated by my co-pilot to verify their action. But in this case; it was an in-action. I truly can attribute this event to low-grade mental fatigue from the previous days' early shows and extensive flying and rote actions of making the same callouts over way-too-many legs in a day along with poorly timed ATC calls with intensive crucial crew actions.as for the possible fatigue factor; I attribute the lack of awareness of the flaps still being extended was due to a pairing that began much too early two days earlier. The pairing began with a pre-dawn show. The subsequent day was also a pre dawn show; with 12:40 on duty and included 8 legs--of which the longest was only 170 NM. All other legs were 24 minutes block or less! Despite getting approximately 11 hours of sleep the night prior to this event; the prior day of 8 legs and 12:40 duty was still a mental and physical drain. I also attribute the possible fatigue to having to wait around in the hotel room until late afternoon on the day of the event to begin the last day of the trip which was going to end very late at night.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An ERJ Captain believed a lengthy flap overspeed that occurred after takeoff through FL180 was contributed to by untimely ATC communications; fatigue and inattentive performance of after takeoff checklist by his First Officer.

Narrative: During initial flaps 9 climb out my First Officer made a normal 1;000 AGL callout stating 'acceleration altitude'. I replied 'Flaps up; Climb thrust; Low Bank Off; Yaw Damp On' and continued the climb on runway heading per our clearance. Simultaneously; the Tower assigned us a frequency change to contact Departure. I did not visually observe the following: The pilot not flying selected climb thrust; low bank off; yaw damp on. He did not select flaps up. I did not notice this as I was manually flying the aircraft and was watching my PFD; MFD. 9.5 times out of 10 when I am flying I have experienced our 1;000 FT call and subsequent flow being interfered with by a simultaneous call by Tower instructing us to contact Departure. As a pilot you are conflicted with flying the plane first; selecting the proper airplane configuration and replying to Tower's radio call in a timely manner. I feel it was only a matter of time until something such as this flap overspeed event would occur due to simultaneous communication with Tower and crew callouts/flows. Between 5;000 and 7;000 FT I called for FLCH and autopilot ON. The airplane continued to fly normal as I monitored its progress. It was near 10;000 FT that I initially noticed a slight rumble in my seat and in the floor boards. At 10;000 FT I called for the climb checklist; the airplane began its airspeed increase to 270 KIAS as per scheduled in FLCH. The First Officer verbally read the climb checklist. I did not look at the items as he 'verified' them. I then called back to the Flight Attendant to ask him if he heard or felt anything out of the ordinary. He indicated that he also felt the rumble in the floor. I indicated to the First Officer that I thought maybe a gear door wasn't fully closed or maybe a latch on the fueling panel wasn't locked. I didn't suspect anything else as all checklists and flows were completed to my knowledge.We then checked all system pages to see if any avionics doors or other doors were indicating open. We also looked at the gear and they all three indicated up and locked. Flaps and spoilers indications apparently did not make it into my scan. The only abnormal indication I had noticed during the climb was that we weren't climbing as fast as we should have been with our given weight and the slight rumble in the floor. It wasn't until approximately 18;000 FT that the First Officer noticed that the flaps were still at 9 degrees. At this point we raised the flaps and I continued up to our cruising altitude of FL270. I radioed Dispatch and Maintenance to notify them of a flap 9 overspeed at 270 KIAS. We continued the flight without incident and landed normally at our destination. Maintenance met us at the gate and took the aircraft out of service.I wish I could think of a suggestion to avoid a recurrence of event but the best I can come up with is that I will now look in the direction of the switch or lever being manipulated by my co-pilot to verify their action. But in this case; it was an in-action. I truly can attribute this event to low-grade mental fatigue from the previous days' early shows and extensive flying and rote actions of making the same callouts over way-too-many legs in a day along with poorly timed ATC calls with intensive crucial crew actions.As for the possible fatigue factor; I attribute the lack of awareness of the flaps still being extended was due to a pairing that began much too early two days earlier. The pairing began with a pre-dawn show. The subsequent day was also a pre dawn show; with 12:40 on duty and included 8 legs--of which the longest was only 170 NM. All other legs were 24 minutes block or less! Despite getting approximately 11 hours of sleep the night prior to this event; the prior day of 8 legs and 12:40 duty was still a mental and physical drain. I also attribute the possible fatigue to having to wait around in the hotel room until late afternoon on the day of the event to begin the last day of the trip which was going to end very late at night.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.