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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 972132 |
Time | |
Date | 201109 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Tower |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B757-200 |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Trailing Edge Flap |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200 Flight Crew Total 19000 Flight Crew Type 3000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
During the approach phase to landing trailing edge flap disagree light illuminated. Feed back in the controls felt more like trailing edge flap asymmetry. Approximately 11;000 on left base for landing [we] attempted to move flaps to 20 degrees. Attempted to move flap handle to 15 and 25 degrees with no movement and left flap handle at 20 degrees. Used alternate method to move flaps to agree with flap handle at 20 degrees. During the initial phase of the issue determined to divert [to a more suitable airport] and declare an emergency. Unable to contact dispatch for a prolonged period [so] requested ATC to contact dispatch. Requested runway performance and conference call with maintenance and dispatch. Due to the lack of adequate training and known errors (60 plus) very low confidence in the QRH creates a second guess situation with limited time available (fuel critical). The true division of workload never occurred. Thus a reduction in situational awareness and efficient processing through the problem to successful completion of the flight. The PF and pm were forced to both review each line of the checklist for errors or emissions or our part and company's. During the transition [to the alternate] the auto-throttle also would not engage for a long period of time. Lessons learned: 1. Fuel required for mountain airport single runway VFR still requires an alternate; with fuel for a gear or flap issue to compensate for increased fuel flow. 2. Effective training in the fbs or sim of the QRH to help increase awareness and knowledge base. This will in reduce workload; increase situational awareness; and improve crew coordination. Under the present situation add snow; ice and turbulence lack of fuel = hull loss. 3. Alternate charts need to be on both sides of the cockpit. 4. Support team for the flight crews needs decreased response time to questions and issues during a divert and emergencies. Dispatch very slow with information. Maintenance [provided] no additional assistance with questions. Confusion on use of QRH. Summary: if trained as a crew to bring forth crew coordination in the fbs or sim the QRH could be a effective tool in the pilots tool bag. But with out this we are moving forward to a hull loss.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B757-200 Captain had a trailing edge flap problem on approach to a high elevation mountain airport; declared an emergency; and diverted to a more suitable alternate. The Captain reported difficulty with company communications and a lack of confidence in the QRH.
Narrative: During the approach phase to landing Trailing Edge Flap Disagree light illuminated. Feed back in the controls felt more like Trailing Edge Flap asymmetry. Approximately 11;000 on left base for landing [we] attempted to move flaps to 20 degrees. Attempted to move flap handle to 15 and 25 degrees with no movement and left flap handle at 20 degrees. Used Alternate method to move flaps to agree with flap handle at 20 degrees. During the initial phase of the issue determined to divert [to a more suitable airport] and declare an emergency. Unable to contact Dispatch for a prolonged period [so] requested ATC to contact Dispatch. Requested runway performance and conference call with Maintenance and Dispatch. Due to the lack of adequate training and known errors (60 plus) very low confidence in the QRH creates a second guess situation with limited time available (fuel critical). The true division of workload never occurred. Thus a reduction in situational awareness and efficient processing through the problem to successful completion of the flight. The PF and PM were forced to both review each line of the checklist for errors or emissions or our part and company's. During the transition [to the alternate] the auto-throttle also would not engage for a long period of time. Lessons Learned: 1. Fuel required for mountain airport single runway VFR still requires an alternate; with fuel for a gear or flap issue to compensate for increased fuel flow. 2. Effective training in the FBS or SIM of the QRH to help increase awareness and knowledge base. This will in reduce workload; increase situational awareness; and improve crew coordination. Under the present situation add snow; ice and turbulence lack of fuel = HULL LOSS. 3. Alternate charts need to be on both sides of the cockpit. 4. Support team for the flight crews needs decreased response time to questions and issues during a divert and emergencies. Dispatch very slow with information. Maintenance [provided] no additional assistance with questions. Confusion on use of QRH. Summary: If trained as a crew to bring forth crew coordination in the FBS or Sim the QRH could be a effective tool in the pilots tool bag. But with out this we are moving forward to a hull loss.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.