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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 973719 |
Time | |
Date | 201110 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.TRACON |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dusk |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A319 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Brake System |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
After taxing to runway 19L and normal takeoff; ECAM indication alert for wheel brake hot appeared. I asked the pilot not flying if it was immediate action/ECAM exception. Pilot not flying checked QRH and responded no. I asked pilot not flying if he wanted me to slow down so we can drop gear as per ECAM action. Pilot not flying said no; we needed to maintain profile speed for operation. I watched the number two wheel temperature reach 330 degrees maximum temperature. We continued climb and on to destination. It took approximately 26 minutes for the temperature to go 'green' and ECAM to return to normal. We arrived late to our departure airport for our return flight. We were issued a ground hold of 30 minutes past departure for the return. We had a long taxi to the other side of the airport that might have required more braking than normal. Captain's taxi speed was normal. I don't know why that number two brake got hot and the other three did not rise in temp like number two did. I feel the captain was under pressure to maintain an on-time schedule. I feel his choice to not follow the ECAM action was a poor one. We discussed his decision but his order stood. The captain was not incapacitated so I followed his command to continue. I don't believe it would have cost us a significant amount of time to comply with the ECAM action as we were not going to be able to land on-time regardless. I had a very tense period watching the wheel temperature climb and then slowly go back down. Aside from the distraction that it was causing me; I know it was a poor choice not to do the ECAM action. When it comes to the potential fire or tire damage risk we could have faced; being on-time is irrelevant. I believe the pressure this air carrier's management is placing on pilots and their ability to maintain an 'on-time' schedule is dangerous. When a captain is weighing safety over disciplinary action by his chief pilot because of our corporate culture; I wonder how long it will be before we have a fatal accident at this airline.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An A319 ECAM alerted WHEEL BRAKE HOT after takeoff but the Captain did not follow the ECAM brake cooling procedure because of a disciplinary action fear for being late so the brake temperature rose to 330 degrees before cooling 26 minutes later.
Narrative: After taxing to Runway 19L and normal takeoff; ECAM indication alert for Wheel Brake Hot appeared. I asked the pilot not flying if it was immediate action/ECAM exception. Pilot not flying checked QRH and responded no. I asked pilot not flying if he wanted me to slow down so we can drop gear as per ECAM action. Pilot not flying said no; we needed to maintain profile speed for operation. I watched the number two wheel temperature reach 330 degrees maximum temperature. We continued climb and on to destination. It took approximately 26 minutes for the temperature to go 'Green' and ECAM to return to normal. We arrived late to our departure airport for our return flight. We were issued a ground hold of 30 minutes past departure for the return. We had a long taxi to the other side of the airport that might have required more braking than normal. Captain's taxi speed was normal. I don't know why that number two brake got hot and the other three did not rise in temp like number two did. I feel the Captain was under pressure to maintain an on-time schedule. I feel his choice to not follow the ECAM action was a poor one. We discussed his decision but his order stood. The Captain was not incapacitated so I followed his command to continue. I don't believe it would have cost us a significant amount of time to comply with the ECAM action as we were not going to be able to land on-time regardless. I had a very tense period watching the wheel temperature climb and then slowly go back down. Aside from the distraction that it was causing me; I know it was a poor choice not to do the ECAM action. When it comes to the potential fire or tire damage risk we could have faced; being on-time is irrelevant. I believe the pressure this Air Carrier's Management is placing on pilots and their ability to maintain an 'on-time' schedule is dangerous. When a Captain is weighing safety over disciplinary action by his Chief Pilot because of our corporate culture; I wonder how long it will be before we have a fatal accident at this airline.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.