Narrative:

Our flight was routine and the weather was good. As we entered new york's airspace we were being descended and were performing our normal arrival duties; such as getting the ATIS and landing data from ACARS and setting the landing elevation and v-speeds. The captain said he would be off frequency calling operations and notifying the cabin crew; while I listened to the #1 radio. We both had new york center in the #1 radio and dca operations in the #2 radio; monitoring both frequencies at all times. I followed my standard operating procedure and had my #2 radio turned to about half the volume of the #1 radio; so I could hear both and differentiate between the two radios. During the time I was monitoring both radios; new york center cleared us to descend to 12;000 and fly direct to clipr. I responded to ATC as the captain returned from his in range call to operations. As I was setting in 12000; he confirmed it; set clipr in the FMS and executed it. As we began to descend we performed the arrival checklist and then prepared for the mount vernon visual approach to runway 1; briefing it thoroughly and setting up our navigation and radios. We continued to fly towards clipr at 12;000 in navigation mode on the clipr arrival; when I noticed that the ADF needles we had set up to identify oxonn did not seem to be pointing to oxonn. I mentioned it to the captain and he agreed so we de-selected them and briefed that we would use the 5.6 DME off of the dca VOR to identify the recommended 1600 altitude for the mt. Vernon visual approach to runway 1. As we discussed this and completed the approach briefing; we were still hearing radio communication on the new york frequency and were awaiting our hand-off to potomac approach. We had just started discussing our concern that we should have been handed off to potomac approach as we approached the brunc intersection. Just then we both heard dca operations calling us on the #2 radio; saying that potomac approach was trying to reach us. I never heard ny center hand us off to potomac approach and to the best of my recollection do not believe that it occurred. I had no trouble hearing operations call us on our #2 radio; even at half volume. The captain immediately switched over and checked in with potomac approach. We were still on the clipr arrival in navigation mode on downwind. Potomac approach then gave us a heading for a base leg and descent for the mount vernon visual to runway 1. The approach was normal; and then several minutes later; after already being in contact with potomac approach; we received an ACARS message from dispatch telling us to contact potomac approach. There was no SELCAL aural message. The approach and landing were uneventful. A discussion on the phone with washington center subsequent to the flight revealed that they claim to have called us 9 times and requested an identify over a two and one half minute span in order to hand us off to potomac approach on 133.17. To the best of my recollection; we were never issued that frequency. I don't know how this late hand-off to potomac approach occurred; but I do not believe that we missed nine radio calls and a request for an identify . What I find interesting about this event is that the identical thing has happened to every pilot I know numerous times over their careers. Personally; I can think of at least a dozen times in the last 10 years that center has 'forgotten' to hand us off to approach in a timely manner. In every case; it is a non-issue and the flight proceeds normally. The only difference with this event is that it happened in the most high-profile airport in the united states. Therefore it strikes me as odd that our arrival procedures are exactly the same at dca as they are at every airport in the country; when dca is clearly a very special case. If security at dca is so critical that military jets are scrambled when a timely hand-off to potomac approach is not completed; there should be a different hand-off procedureat dca. At a minimum there should be a fix noted on the arrival procedures depicting the point at which an aircraft should be communicating with potomac approach before proceeding. I am certain ATC knows where this point is already; so why are the pilots not informed of it? In our flight plans we are cleared all the way to dca. Perhaps there should be a clearance limit outside the 'protected' area around dca; and potomac approach then clears arriving aircraft to the final destination. If a clearance and/or hand-off has not been received by that fix; a hold should be commenced at the clearance limit on the flight plan. This would accomplish the goal of protecting dca from an aircraft that has been compromised.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The flight crew of a CRJ-900 believed Washington Center failed to hand them over to Potomac Approach in a timely fashion. The flight was alerted by a call from their destination operations advising them ATC had not received a response to repeated attempts to hand them off.

Narrative: Our flight was routine and the weather was good. As we entered New York's airspace we were being descended and were performing our normal arrival duties; such as getting the ATIS and Landing Data from ACARS and setting the landing elevation and V-Speeds. The Captain said he would be off frequency calling OPS and notifying the cabin crew; while I listened to the #1 radio. We both had New York Center in the #1 radio and DCA Operations in the #2 radio; monitoring both frequencies at all times. I followed my standard operating procedure and had my #2 radio turned to about half the volume of the #1 radio; so I could hear both and differentiate between the two radios. During the time I was monitoring both radios; New York Center cleared us to descend to 12;000 and fly direct to CLIPR. I responded to ATC as the Captain returned from his in range call to OPS. As I was setting in 12000; he confirmed it; set CLIPR in the FMS and executed it. As we began to descend we performed the Arrival checklist and then prepared for the Mount Vernon Visual Approach to Runway 1; briefing it thoroughly and setting up our navigation and radios. We continued to fly towards CLIPR at 12;000 in NAV mode on the CLIPR Arrival; when I noticed that the ADF needles we had set up to identify OXONN did not seem to be pointing to OXONN. I mentioned it to the Captain and he agreed so we de-selected them and briefed that we would use the 5.6 DME off of the DCA VOR to identify the recommended 1600 altitude for the Mt. Vernon Visual Approach to Runway 1. As we discussed this and completed the approach briefing; we were still hearing radio communication on the New York frequency and were awaiting our hand-off to Potomac Approach. We had just started discussing our concern that we should have been handed off to Potomac Approach as we approached the BRUNC intersection. Just then we both heard DCA Operations calling us on the #2 radio; saying that Potomac Approach was trying to reach us. I never heard NY Center hand us off to Potomac Approach and to the best of my recollection do not believe that it occurred. I had no trouble hearing OPS call us on our #2 radio; even at half volume. The Captain immediately switched over and checked in with Potomac Approach. We were still on the CLIPR Arrival in NAV mode on downwind. Potomac Approach then gave us a heading for a base leg and descent for the Mount Vernon Visual to runway 1. The approach was normal; and then several minutes later; after already being in contact with Potomac Approach; we received an ACARS message from dispatch telling us to contact Potomac Approach. There was no SELCAL aural message. The approach and landing were uneventful. A discussion on the phone with Washington Center subsequent to the flight revealed that they claim to have called us 9 times and requested an IDENT over a two and one half minute span in order to hand us off to Potomac Approach on 133.17. To the best of my recollection; we were never issued that frequency. I don't know how this late hand-off to Potomac Approach occurred; but I do not believe that we missed nine radio calls and a request for an IDENT . What I find interesting about this event is that the identical thing has happened to every pilot I know numerous times over their careers. Personally; I can think of at least a dozen times in the last 10 years that Center has 'forgotten' to hand us off to Approach in a timely manner. In every case; it is a non-issue and the flight proceeds normally. The only difference with this event is that it happened in the most high-profile airport in the United States. Therefore it strikes me as odd that our arrival procedures are exactly the same at DCA as they are at every airport in the country; when DCA is clearly a very special case. If security at DCA is so critical that military jets are scrambled when a timely hand-off to Potomac approach is not completed; there should be a different hand-off procedureat DCA. At a minimum there should be a fix noted on the Arrival Procedures depicting the point at which an aircraft should be communicating with Potomac Approach before proceeding. I am certain ATC knows where this point is already; so why are the pilots not informed of it? In our flight plans we are cleared all the way to DCA. Perhaps there should be a clearance limit outside the 'protected' area around DCA; and Potomac Approach then clears arriving aircraft to the final destination. If a clearance and/or hand-off has not been received by that fix; a hold should be commenced at the clearance limit on the flight plan. This would accomplish the goal of protecting DCA from an aircraft that has been compromised.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.