Narrative:

Fatigue played a large factor in this chain of events. Copilot leg; in vtbs (bkk); day 6 of an 8 day trip; 11 hours out of home time. Ground power dropped off at gate. We had to reestablish power and start over again after full setup. Pushback clearance told us to face east. We did not push back quite as far we should have; but I assumed ground crew knew where to be. We pushed just far enough that I could not see T9. 20-9B/C shows taxi routing to be in to ramp via T9; out by T8. Clearance to taxi from ramp was taxi T9; gulf; hold short H2. I taxied via T8 per the chart; but realized my mistake; and cut across the ramp after making sure it was clear. Ramp did not like this; said should have had clearance to deviate; so I apologized and told him we read back T9; not T8. Silence; then he said it was okay. On take off; a very large bird; a crane came across the nose of the aircraft headed straight for the engine 1 nacelle. I was sure we hit it. Told tower; all engine indications were normal. On climbout; ATC asked about aircraft status and damage if any. During evaluation; ATC cleared us unrestricted direct to papra. It was then we accelerated to 280 KTS below 10;000 ft. To many distractions; I should have done a better job of oversight and task management. [We] resumed 250 KTS below 10;000 ft after we entered direct papra into FMC and executed. [We] advised dispatch and line maintenance of possible bird strike.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Air Carrier Captain on day six of an eight day trip failed to follow the prescribed VTBS (BKK) taxi route from the departure gate; an error mostly the result of fatigue. On takeoff the aircraft may have hit a very large bird.

Narrative: Fatigue played a large factor in this chain of events. Copilot leg; in VTBS (BKK); day 6 of an 8 day trip; 11 hours out of home time. Ground power dropped off at gate. We had to reestablish power and start over again after full setup. Pushback clearance told us to face east. We did not push back quite as far we should have; but I assumed ground crew knew where to be. We pushed just far enough that I could not see T9. 20-9B/C shows taxi routing to be in to ramp via T9; out by T8. Clearance to taxi from ramp was taxi T9; Gulf; hold short H2. I taxied via T8 per the chart; but realized my mistake; and cut across the ramp after making sure it was clear. Ramp did not like this; said should have had clearance to deviate; so I apologized and told him we read back T9; not T8. Silence; then he said it was okay. On take off; a very large bird; a crane came across the nose of the aircraft headed straight for the engine 1 nacelle. I was sure we hit it. Told Tower; all engine indications were normal. On climbout; ATC asked about aircraft status and damage if any. During evaluation; ATC cleared us unrestricted direct to PAPRA. It was then we accelerated to 280 KTS below 10;000 FT. To many distractions; I should have done a better job of oversight and task management. [We] resumed 250 KTS below 10;000 FT after we entered direct PAPRA into FMC and executed. [We] advised Dispatch and Line Maintenance of possible bird strike.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.