Narrative:

I was the captain. I was the non-flying pilot. There was a MEL on the aircraft; MEL # 22- 30-01; auto throttle servo inoperative. During pre-flight I reviewed the MEL book as did the relief pilot. We talked about the MEL and agreed that the autothrottles would not be used; and reviewed the placarding procedures as per the MEL. We agreed that the placarding was correct. In condition 'B' of that MEL; there is no mention that the tms (thrust management system) was also inoperative; that is addressed in condition 'a' of the MEL. The thrust ref set switch was set in manual control position during pre-flight. During taxi; the weight and balance information was received. While I was taxiing the aircraft; the first officer input the weight and balance data into the FMC. After entering the runway for take-off and control was exchanged to the first officer; he pushed up the power above the N1 bug. 'Man' in green on the EICAS screen between the left and right N1 indicators was illuminated; indicating the N1 bug was set manually by the thrust ref switch knob. As I said earlier the thrust ref set switch was in manual. I was not watching everything the first officer was doing while inputting the weight and balance data into the FMC. I was taxiing the aircraft. I assumed that he also set the N1 bug to the take-off thrust setting with the thrust ref set switch knob. So; as a result I retarded the thrust levers a little. We did use a little more of the runway; but we were never in any danger as to being able to abort the take-off safely or continue the take-off safely. It was a long runway and we did have a good climb gradient considering the weight of the aircraft. After passing 10;000 ft; I started investigating what happened. The first officer said he did not set the N1 bug for the correct take-off thrust setting. The result was that I set the take-off thrust to just below the maximum take-off setting but well above the climb setting. This happened because the first officer did not correctly set the N1 bug manually to the take-off thrust setting nor did he vocalize the correct setting after getting the weight and balance info and inputting it into the FMC. Maybe the MEL for condition B could include that the FMS is inoperative also. This might have jogged the mind of the first officer. Other than that; getting the weight and balance data at the gate would have me; the captain fully in the loop regarding the correct input of weight and balance data.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-200 Autothrottle Servo was inoperative which eliminated use of the thrust management computer and required manual takeoff thrust setting. The First Officer failed to tell the Captain the correct takeoff N1 setting and so a lower than required N1 was set extending the takeoff roll.

Narrative: I was the Captain. I was the non-flying pilot. There was a MEL on the aircraft; MEL # 22- 30-01; Auto Throttle Servo Inoperative. During pre-flight I reviewed the MEL book as did the Relief Pilot. We talked about the MEL and agreed that the autothrottles would not be used; and reviewed the placarding procedures as per the MEL. We agreed that the placarding was correct. In condition 'B' of that MEL; there is no mention that the TMS (Thrust Management System) was also inoperative; that is addressed in Condition 'A' of the MEL. The Thrust Ref Set Switch was set in MANUAL control position during pre-flight. During taxi; the weight and balance information was received. While I was taxiing the aircraft; the First Officer input the weight and balance data into the FMC. After entering the runway for take-off and control was exchanged to the First Officer; he pushed up the power above the N1 bug. 'MAN' in green on the EICAS screen between the left and right N1 indicators was illuminated; indicating the N1 bug was set manually by the Thrust Ref Switch knob. As I said earlier the Thrust Ref Set Switch was in Manual. I was not watching EVERYTHING the First Officer was doing while inputting the weight and balance data into the FMC. I was taxiing the aircraft. I assumed that he also set the N1 bug to the Take-off thrust setting with the Thrust Ref Set Switch knob. So; as a result I retarded the thrust levers a little. We did use a little more of the runway; but we were never in any danger as to being able to abort the take-off safely or continue the take-off safely. It was a long runway and we did have a good climb gradient considering the weight of the aircraft. After passing 10;000 FT; I started investigating what happened. The First Officer said he did not set the N1 bug for the correct take-off thrust setting. The result was that I set the take-off thrust to just below the maximum take-off setting but well above the climb setting. This happened because the First Officer did not correctly set the N1 bug manually to the take-off thrust setting nor did he vocalize the correct setting after getting the weight and balance info and inputting it into the FMC. Maybe the MEL for Condition B could include that the FMS is inoperative also. This might have jogged the mind of the First Officer. Other than that; getting the weight and balance data at the gate would have me; the Captain fully in the loop regarding the correct input of weight and balance data.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.