Narrative:

Flight departed uneventfully. Captain briefed possible bad weather at destination (dfw) during takeoff brief. Enroute and approaching emg (elm grove); we received re-route from filed clearance of cedar creek arrival too direct -waco- direct brownwood; direct glen rose for the glen rose 9 due to weather between waco and dfw moving north at 30 KTS with tops above 40 K. Immediately noticed our new route increased by approximately 200 miles. Captain contacted dispatch via ACARS notifying of a possible divert into waco. Dispatch concurred. Arrived overhead act with 6;000 pounds; did not divert; continued to brownwood. Center putting flights into holding over geeni on the JEN9 arrival as we were headed to brownwood. Over brownwood dispatch informed us abi would now be a better divert; still no decision to divert. Arrived overhead brownwood with 5;500 pounds of fuel. I voiced my opinion too divert to either abi or act as I was not comfortable with the aircraft already holding and bad weather at the field; not to mention; in my opinion; a low fuel state. Captain pressed on; (I did not know his personal fuel limitations); overhead glen rose; low fuel light illuminated; we were now below 5;000 pounds of fuel remaining and entering the dallas weather. I continued to query for the logic/plan behind the decisions being made. 'We can just drop into alliance if we need too' was the reply; fuel now below 4;700 pounds. Approach offered us 13R or 18R with reports of heavy rain and high winds on the approach and at the field. Captain elected 13R. The captain flew actual ILS approach; broke out 400 ft above minimums; touching down with 4;000 pounds remaining. In the event of a missed approach; it is my estimation that fuel to the captain's alternate; (alliance) would have been approximately 1;500 pounds with an on-deck state of 2;500.this event could have been avoided had the captain simply asked the first officer if he was 'comfortable'; with his plan to continue under the given fuel states. The first officer had told the captain he was uncomfortable but his plea's fell on deaf ears. Captain failed to recognize that the first officer had major concerns about continuing the flight at such a low fuel state. Crew failed to communicate with dispatch after reroute to get new alternate/fuel plan. Captain only stated he may divert to act via ACARS. First officer didn't manually/aggressively hand phone to captain so he could call dispatch. Dispatch failed to see reroute and issue new release; fuel plan; alternate. Captain put himself; passengers; and crew in an unsafe situation by continuing into severe weather with low fuel. Captain didn't communicate well. Captain seemed to be in a fatigued state. Captain stated he did not get a good night's sleep. Captain could have been fatigued. Captain didn't re-evaluate plan continually as fuel dwindled.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 First Officer describes a decision by the Captain to continue a flight to destination after a reroute for weather adding 200 NM to the flight. Flight eventually lands at destination in heavy rain with 4;000 LBS of fuel.

Narrative: Flight departed uneventfully. Captain briefed possible bad weather at destination (DFW) during takeoff brief. Enroute and approaching EMG (ELM Grove); we received re-route from filed clearance of Cedar Creek arrival too direct -Waco- direct Brownwood; direct Glen Rose for the Glen Rose 9 due to weather between Waco and DFW moving north at 30 KTS with tops above 40 K. Immediately noticed our new route increased by approximately 200 miles. Captain contacted Dispatch via ACARS notifying of a possible divert into Waco. Dispatch concurred. Arrived overhead ACT with 6;000 LBS; did not divert; continued to Brownwood. Center putting flights into holding over GEENI on the JEN9 arrival as we were headed to Brownwood. Over Brownwood Dispatch informed us ABI would now be a better divert; still no decision to divert. Arrived overhead Brownwood with 5;500 LBS of fuel. I voiced my opinion too divert to either ABI or ACT as I was not comfortable with the aircraft already holding and bad weather at the field; not to mention; in my opinion; a low fuel state. Captain pressed on; (I did not know his personal fuel limitations); overhead Glen Rose; LOW FUEL Light illuminated; we were now below 5;000 LBS of fuel remaining and entering the Dallas weather. I continued to query for the logic/plan behind the decisions being made. 'We can just drop into Alliance if we need too' was the reply; fuel now below 4;700 LBS. Approach offered us 13R or 18R with reports of heavy rain and high winds on the approach and at the field. Captain elected 13R. The Captain flew actual ILS approach; broke out 400 FT above minimums; touching down with 4;000 LBS remaining. In the event of a missed approach; it is my estimation that fuel to the Captain's alternate; (Alliance) would have been approximately 1;500 LBS with an on-deck state of 2;500.This event could have been avoided had the Captain simply asked the First Officer if he was 'comfortable'; with his plan to continue under the given fuel states. The First Officer had told the Captain he was uncomfortable but his plea's fell on deaf ears. Captain failed to recognize that the First Officer had major concerns about continuing the flight at such a low fuel state. Crew failed to communicate with Dispatch after reroute to get new alternate/fuel plan. Captain only stated he may divert to ACT via ACARS. First Officer didn't manually/aggressively hand phone to Captain so he could call Dispatch. Dispatch failed to see reroute and issue new release; fuel plan; alternate. Captain put himself; passengers; and crew in an unsafe situation by continuing into severe weather with low fuel. Captain didn't communicate well. Captain seemed to be in a fatigued state. Captain stated he did not get a good night's sleep. Captain could have been fatigued. Captain didn't re-evaluate plan continually as fuel dwindled.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.