Narrative:

We were cleared to FL370 heading 185 degrees and advised of traffic at FL390, wbound at 1100' and 20 mi. Out of 36000' we heard FL390. I thought we were reclred to FL390, and reset the altitude alert system to 39000', the radio was a little broken. I thought the first officer read back to atl 'climb to 390.' I was flying so I started to climb out of 37000'. At 37500' center told us we had 20 seconds to get back down to 37000' due to traffic (which I had thought we were clear of). The problem was due to lack of communication in the cockpit, and a new first officer that did not understand the duties of the PF and PNF. Was a new pilot with the company on only his second flight. Upon landing at apa I asked him to call for our clearance to vny and put times in the can. After the after-landing checklist was complete (we had 'hot cargo' and I was in a big hurry) he got very upset and said for me to do it myself. This is a very demanding business, and the PF and PNF both have a job to do, which must be done to have a safe flight. He was getting very defensive and threatened. I was not talking to him as captain and first officer, but as PF doing my job and PNF doing his. He did not understand this. There were bad feelings in the cockpit. I previously worked for a commuter airline which used cockpit recourse management training of PF and PNF with open communication in cockpit, but captain makes final decision. No one person being better than the next--but one person is responsible. The company I work for now gives no training for 2-M crew's duties or responsibilities. I believe that any aircraft requiring 2 pilots should require training in cockpit resource management. When it is used right PF and PNF, open communication, same goal safe and legal flight, use of checklist and manuals. There is no need or reason for anything else.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATX SMT ALT DEVIATION OVERSHOT DURING CLIMB IN RESPONSE TO WRONG CALL SIGN OR TRAFFIC ADVISORY.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED TO FL370 HDG 185 DEGS AND ADVISED OF TFC AT FL390, WBOUND AT 1100' AND 20 MI. OUT OF 36000' WE HEARD FL390. I THOUGHT WE WERE RECLRED TO FL390, AND RESET THE ALT ALERT SYS TO 39000', THE RADIO WAS A LITTLE BROKEN. I THOUGHT THE F/O READ BACK TO ATL 'CLB TO 390.' I WAS FLYING SO I STARTED TO CLB OUT OF 37000'. AT 37500' CENTER TOLD US WE HAD 20 SECS TO GET BACK DOWN TO 37000' DUE TO TFC (WHICH I HAD THOUGHT WE WERE CLR OF). THE PROB WAS DUE TO LACK OF COM IN THE COCKPIT, AND A NEW F/O THAT DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE DUTIES OF THE PF AND PNF. WAS A NEW PLT WITH THE COMPANY ON ONLY HIS SECOND FLT. UPON LNDG AT APA I ASKED HIM TO CALL FOR OUR CLRNC TO VNY AND PUT TIMES IN THE CAN. AFTER THE AFTER-LNDG CHKLIST WAS COMPLETE (WE HAD 'HOT CARGO' AND I WAS IN A BIG HURRY) HE GOT VERY UPSET AND SAID FOR ME TO DO IT MYSELF. THIS IS A VERY DEMANDING BUSINESS, AND THE PF AND PNF BOTH HAVE A JOB TO DO, WHICH MUST BE DONE TO HAVE A SAFE FLT. HE WAS GETTING VERY DEFENSIVE AND THREATENED. I WAS NOT TALKING TO HIM AS CAPT AND F/O, BUT AS PF DOING MY JOB AND PNF DOING HIS. HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THIS. THERE WERE BAD FEELINGS IN THE COCKPIT. I PREVIOUSLY WORKED FOR A COMMUTER AIRLINE WHICH USED COCKPIT RECOURSE MGMNT TRNING OF PF AND PNF WITH OPEN COM IN COCKPIT, BUT CAPT MAKES FINAL DECISION. NO ONE PERSON BEING BETTER THAN THE NEXT--BUT ONE PERSON IS RESPONSIBLE. THE COMPANY I WORK FOR NOW GIVES NO TRNING FOR 2-M CREW'S DUTIES OR RESPONSIBILITIES. I BELIEVE THAT ANY ACFT REQUIRING 2 PLTS SHOULD REQUIRE TRNING IN COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT. WHEN IT IS USED RIGHT PF AND PNF, OPEN COM, SAME GOAL SAFE AND LEGAL FLT, USE OF CHKLIST AND MANUALS. THERE IS NO NEED OR REASON FOR ANYTHING ELSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.