Narrative:

We had just established ourselves on the localizer course inbound on the ILS prm approach to runway 10 into atl after a late final vector and were just intercepting the glide slope; when the final monitor for our runway came on the radio. He canceled our approach clearance and told us to maintain 3;000 ft MSL (which at that point was still below us). About the same time; we received a TCAS TA temporarily and correctly assumed that an aircraft had drifted through the other course and we would be shortly cleared for the approach again. After approximately 30 seconds the approach controller asked if we could accept the approach clearance from our present position (one dot above glide slope and on the localizer) and we replied that we could. We were cleared for the approach a second time and wasted no time returning to the glide slope.at approximately 2;800 ft; we again heard the final monitor begin to issue us breakout instructions and; almost concurrently; we received another TCAS TA which then quickly changed to an RA. The controller's instructions (right turn heading 180; climb and maintain 3;500 MSL) contradicted the TCAS RA (which began with a climb and as we descended below the traffic; turned into a descend command); so I took a second to verify our position/options and chose a descending turn to the right until the TCAS RA was complete and then immediately began a climb to 3;500 ft on a heading of 180 degrees. The other aircraft must have been slowly drifting towards us; because we estimated the other aircraft to be within 1;000 ft laterally and at our altitude at the time of the RA. We were given vectors for another approach; briefed the flight attendant shortly after the incident; and landed safely with no further problems.some threats present in this situation were high workload (pilots and controllers); weather conditions; uncertain/hesitant ATC instructions; and conflicting instructions. The undesirable state (close proximity to another aircraft) was created; in part; due to these threats.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The apparent failure of all or part of one ILS signal during PRM approaches at ATL; coupled with a failure of the PRM monitor to provide appropriate clearances for the aircraft involved; forced the Local Controller to attempt to separate three sequential aircraft; two of whom were subsequently involved in a TCAS RA event.

Narrative: We had just established ourselves on the localizer course inbound on the ILS PRM approach to Runway 10 into ATL after a late final vector and were just intercepting the glide slope; when the final monitor for our runway came on the radio. He canceled our approach clearance and told us to maintain 3;000 FT MSL (which at that point was still below us). About the same time; we received a TCAS TA temporarily and correctly assumed that an aircraft had drifted through the other course and we would be shortly cleared for the approach again. After approximately 30 seconds the Approach Controller asked if we could accept the approach clearance from our present position (one dot above glide slope and on the localizer) and we replied that we could. We were cleared for the approach a second time and wasted no time returning to the glide slope.At approximately 2;800 FT; we again heard the final monitor begin to issue us breakout instructions and; almost concurrently; we received another TCAS TA which then quickly changed to an RA. The Controller's instructions (right turn heading 180; climb and maintain 3;500 MSL) contradicted the TCAS RA (which began with a climb and as we descended below the traffic; turned into a descend command); so I took a second to verify our position/options and chose a descending turn to the right until the TCAS RA was complete and then immediately began a climb to 3;500 FT on a heading of 180 degrees. The other aircraft must have been slowly drifting towards us; because we estimated the other aircraft to be within 1;000 FT laterally and at our altitude at the time of the RA. We were given vectors for another approach; briefed the Flight Attendant shortly after the incident; and landed safely with no further problems.Some threats present in this situation were high workload (pilots and controllers); weather conditions; uncertain/hesitant ATC instructions; and conflicting instructions. The undesirable state (close proximity to another aircraft) was created; in part; due to these threats.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.