Narrative:

Departing the gate at iah we taxied to the runway for departure west/O incident: on takeoff roll, things started to go wrong. With the captain flying, power was advanced to approximately 75% N1. He then engaged the autothrottle, which attempted to push the power up to the computer generated takeoff power of approximately 93% N1. The left engine reached takeoff power, but the right engine stopped accelerating at approximately 90.5%. The throttles split as the autothrottle tried to reach takeoff power, and I pushed the right throttle up myself, but the N1 remained at 90.5%. I called out that we did not have full power on the right engine, so we aborted at about 95-100 KTS. After clearing the runway, we ran up the engine to see if it would reach full power. It made the computed takeoff power setting west/O any problem. We did, however, return to the gate to complete brake cooling and have maintenance look at the problem. Maintenance found a black box in the right engine that showed a failure, and it was replaced. The next takeoff was made west/O incident. On departure from dfw, en route to ewr, I did much the same thing as the captain had done earlier, and when I engaged the autothrottle, the same problem occurred. The left engine reached takeoff power, but the right engine was approximately 3% below computed takeoff power, and was not responding to throttle movement. I aborted the takeoff at about 50-60 KTS and we cleared the runway. The captain made an announcement to the passenger that we had not gotten full power out of one of the engines, but that we would go out and try again and hope that this time we could get full power. The captain decided that since it was the same problem that had occurred earlier and we knew that the engine was capable of making full power, that we would merely get back into line and make the takeoff west/O the autothrottle. Because of earlier personality problems with this captain, I was hesitant to make him go back to the gate and have maintenance look at the airplane. I did not agree that we should attempt a takeoff, though, because of possible legal ramifications arising from 2 aborted takeoffs in 1 day on the same aircraft for the same reasons. My whole point in filing this report is that I failed to do my job as a flight crew member and make the captain do what was correct, all because of personality conflicts in the cockpit. I do not like this captain either personally or professionally, and because I had earlier in the trip been pushing on him to do things more according to my interpretation of company policy, I did not push him in an area where legality was the prime consideration. If anything was unsafe on the trip, it was the personality conflict in the cockpit.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW BEHAVIOR INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIP LEADING TO WHAT FO THINKS WAS POSSIBLY AN ILLEGAL TKOF.

Narrative: DEPARTING THE GATE AT IAH WE TAXIED TO THE RWY FOR DEP W/O INCIDENT: ON TKOF ROLL, THINGS STARTED TO GO WRONG. WITH THE CAPT FLYING, PWR WAS ADVANCED TO APPROX 75% N1. HE THEN ENGAGED THE AUTOTHROTTLE, WHICH ATTEMPTED TO PUSH THE PWR UP TO THE COMPUTER GENERATED TKOF PWR OF APPROX 93% N1. THE LEFT ENG REACHED TKOF PWR, BUT THE RIGHT ENG STOPPED ACCELERATING AT APPROX 90.5%. THE THROTTLES SPLIT AS THE AUTOTHROTTLE TRIED TO REACH TKOF PWR, AND I PUSHED THE RIGHT THROTTLE UP MYSELF, BUT THE N1 REMAINED AT 90.5%. I CALLED OUT THAT WE DID NOT HAVE FULL PWR ON THE RIGHT ENG, SO WE ABORTED AT ABOUT 95-100 KTS. AFTER CLRING THE RWY, WE RAN UP THE ENG TO SEE IF IT WOULD REACH FULL PWR. IT MADE THE COMPUTED TKOF PWR SETTING W/O ANY PROB. WE DID, HOWEVER, RETURN TO THE GATE TO COMPLETE BRAKE COOLING AND HAVE MAINT LOOK AT THE PROB. MAINT FOUND A BLACK BOX IN THE RIGHT ENG THAT SHOWED A FAILURE, AND IT WAS REPLACED. THE NEXT TKOF WAS MADE W/O INCIDENT. ON DEP FROM DFW, ENRTE TO EWR, I DID MUCH THE SAME THING AS THE CAPT HAD DONE EARLIER, AND WHEN I ENGAGED THE AUTOTHROTTLE, THE SAME PROB OCCURRED. THE LEFT ENG REACHED TKOF PWR, BUT THE RIGHT ENG WAS APPROX 3% BELOW COMPUTED TKOF PWR, AND WAS NOT RESPONDING TO THROTTLE MOVEMENT. I ABORTED THE TKOF AT ABOUT 50-60 KTS AND WE CLRED THE RWY. THE CAPT MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX THAT WE HAD NOT GOTTEN FULL PWR OUT OF ONE OF THE ENGS, BUT THAT WE WOULD GO OUT AND TRY AGAIN AND HOPE THAT THIS TIME WE COULD GET FULL PWR. THE CAPT DECIDED THAT SINCE IT WAS THE SAME PROB THAT HAD OCCURRED EARLIER AND WE KNEW THAT THE ENG WAS CAPABLE OF MAKING FULL PWR, THAT WE WOULD MERELY GET BACK INTO LINE AND MAKE THE TKOF W/O THE AUTOTHROTTLE. BECAUSE OF EARLIER PERSONALITY PROBS WITH THIS CAPT, I WAS HESITANT TO MAKE HIM GO BACK TO THE GATE AND HAVE MAINT LOOK AT THE AIRPLANE. I DID NOT AGREE THAT WE SHOULD ATTEMPT A TKOF, THOUGH, BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS ARISING FROM 2 ABORTED TKOFS IN 1 DAY ON THE SAME ACFT FOR THE SAME REASONS. MY WHOLE POINT IN FILING THIS RPT IS THAT I FAILED TO DO MY JOB AS A FLT CREW MEMBER AND MAKE THE CAPT DO WHAT WAS CORRECT, ALL BECAUSE OF PERSONALITY CONFLICTS IN THE COCKPIT. I DO NOT LIKE THIS CAPT EITHER PERSONALLY OR PROFESSIONALLY, AND BECAUSE I HAD EARLIER IN THE TRIP BEEN PUSHING ON HIM TO DO THINGS MORE ACCORDING TO MY INTERPRETATION OF COMPANY POLICY, I DID NOT PUSH HIM IN AN AREA WHERE LEGALITY WAS THE PRIME CONSIDERATION. IF ANYTHING WAS UNSAFE ON THE TRIP, IT WAS THE PERSONALITY CONFLICT IN THE COCKPIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.