Narrative:

While executing a river visual approach to runway 18 at dca,the captain became disoriented, and made a very firm landing. A good portion of the problem can be blamed on the approach itself, it is just plain unsafe. To be flying a transport category aircraft at low altitude, slow airspeed and steep bank angles is asking for an accident. Both the captain and flight engineer had flown the approach many times. It was my first time into dca. The initial approach was good, speed, flap settings, etc were all done early to get all set up for the approach. The problem arose when the controller asked us to 'hold the north bank' of the potomac when we were about 2 1/2-3 mi out. That confused me. The captain banked left and I believe that set the stage for him to confuse runway 18 and 21, because he temporarily lost sight of the airport in his left turn. The reason for the controller's request was an airplane on a 2 mi final for 21. The captain overshot 18, then realized his mistake. He turned back to the right and called for 30 degrees of flaps. We were extremely high. The controller told the aircraft landing on runway 21 to go around. The captain dove for the runway, the GPWS went off, I called 500', plus 12 sinking 1500. We were then just about at the threshold. Both the flight engineer and myself told the captain to go around. I said that several times. The captain seemed confused and said, 'why?' at that point he closed the throttles, at about 50'. And we landed at least 1/2-way down the runway. It was the hardest landing I have ever felt in 10 yrs with the airline. The impact was so hard that the O2 masks fell down in the rear of the airplane. I felt the captain's big mistake was to continue the landing. We should have made a go around. The initial confusion over the wrong runway was nothing in comparison to his decision to land. I was ashamed, angry and felt helpless. Should I have been more forceful in telling him to go around? Should I have taken the airplane from him? I see 3 problems here. First, the river visual approach is a bad, unsafe approach. The approach should be changed, or not used. Second, the controller giving us instruction while on a difficult approach caused a bit of confusion. I don't know how wise it was to have 2 airplane landing on intersecting runways at the same time. Third, more emphasis should be placed on cockpit resource training. 2 qualified observers told the captain to go around and yet he continued. Finally, I think I should have been more prepared. I saw the captain beginning to overshoot the runway and yet I assumed he knew what he was doing. I should have spoken up sooner.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT HARD LNDG AT DCA FOLLOWING WRONG RWY APCH.

Narrative: WHILE EXECUTING A RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18 AT DCA,THE CAPT BECAME DISORIENTED, AND MADE A VERY FIRM LNDG. A GOOD PORTION OF THE PROB CAN BE BLAMED ON THE APCH ITSELF, IT IS JUST PLAIN UNSAFE. TO BE FLYING A TRANSPORT CATEGORY ACFT AT LOW ALT, SLOW AIRSPD AND STEEP BANK ANGLES IS ASKING FOR AN ACCIDENT. BOTH THE CAPT AND FE HAD FLOWN THE APCH MANY TIMES. IT WAS MY FIRST TIME INTO DCA. THE INITIAL APCH WAS GOOD, SPD, FLAP SETTINGS, ETC WERE ALL DONE EARLY TO GET ALL SET UP FOR THE APCH. THE PROB AROSE WHEN THE CTLR ASKED US TO 'HOLD THE N BANK' OF THE POTOMAC WHEN WE WERE ABOUT 2 1/2-3 MI OUT. THAT CONFUSED ME. THE CAPT BANKED L AND I BELIEVE THAT SET THE STAGE FOR HIM TO CONFUSE RWY 18 AND 21, BECAUSE HE TEMPORARILY LOST SIGHT OF THE ARPT IN HIS L TURN. THE REASON FOR THE CTLR'S REQUEST WAS AN AIRPLANE ON A 2 MI FINAL FOR 21. THE CAPT OVERSHOT 18, THEN REALIZED HIS MISTAKE. HE TURNED BACK TO THE R AND CALLED FOR 30 DEGS OF FLAPS. WE WERE EXTREMELY HIGH. THE CTLR TOLD THE ACFT LNDG ON RWY 21 TO GAR. THE CAPT DOVE FOR THE RWY, THE GPWS WENT OFF, I CALLED 500', PLUS 12 SINKING 1500. WE WERE THEN JUST ABOUT AT THE THRESHOLD. BOTH THE FE AND MYSELF TOLD THE CAPT TO GAR. I SAID THAT SEVERAL TIMES. THE CAPT SEEMED CONFUSED AND SAID, 'WHY?' AT THAT POINT HE CLOSED THE THROTTLES, AT ABOUT 50'. AND WE LANDED AT LEAST 1/2-WAY DOWN THE RWY. IT WAS THE HARDEST LNDG I HAVE EVER FELT IN 10 YRS WITH THE AIRLINE. THE IMPACT WAS SO HARD THAT THE O2 MASKS FELL DOWN IN THE REAR OF THE AIRPLANE. I FELT THE CAPT'S BIG MISTAKE WAS TO CONTINUE THE LNDG. WE SHOULD HAVE MADE A GAR. THE INITIAL CONFUSION OVER THE WRONG RWY WAS NOTHING IN COMPARISON TO HIS DECISION TO LAND. I WAS ASHAMED, ANGRY AND FELT HELPLESS. SHOULD I HAVE BEEN MORE FORCEFUL IN TELLING HIM TO GAR? SHOULD I HAVE TAKEN THE AIRPLANE FROM HIM? I SEE 3 PROBS HERE. FIRST, THE RIVER VISUAL APCH IS A BAD, UNSAFE APCH. THE APCH SHOULD BE CHANGED, OR NOT USED. SECOND, THE CTLR GIVING US INSTRUCTION WHILE ON A DIFFICULT APCH CAUSED A BIT OF CONFUSION. I DON'T KNOW HOW WISE IT WAS TO HAVE 2 AIRPLANE LNDG ON INTERSECTING RWYS AT THE SAME TIME. THIRD, MORE EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON COCKPIT RESOURCE TRNING. 2 QUALIFIED OBSERVERS TOLD THE CAPT TO GAR AND YET HE CONTINUED. FINALLY, I THINK I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PREPARED. I SAW THE CAPT BEGINNING TO OVERSHOOT THE RWY AND YET I ASSUMED HE KNEW WHAT HE WAS DOING. I SHOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP SOONER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.