Narrative:

Inbound flight logged 2 items- system 1 fault displayed on upper ECAM-brakes and autobrake fault displayed on upper ECAM screen-brakes. Maintenance deferred the first ECAM with MEL 32-42-03 bscu 1 inoperative. That deferral makes a reference to the autobrake panel mode lights being inoperative and has a note for bscu channel/system 1 inoperative refer to MEL for automatic/brk panel mode lights deferral. Maintenance took that reference and used it to defer the second ECAM listed above (MEL 32-42-04). In my review of the MEL; once on board; I did not question the linking of the second ECAM to the first ECAM MEL; guidance that was made by maintenance. I assumed that maintenance had specific guidance that the second ECAM was a result of the loss of bscu 1 and the autobrake panel lights; nothing more complex that had to be evaluated for compound failures. We complied with all MEL restrictions prior to departure to include verifying that the autobrakes were armed on the wheels sd page. Checking recall prior to departure only brought up the first ECAM. No autobrake ECAM or status messages were present. This furthered my belief that the maintenance issues had been addressed correctly. Taxi; takeoff and initial climb were normal. Nearing FL350 we received the same autobrake fault ECAM received by the first crew. We complied with the irregular procedure. We determined that we had lost normal brakes but did have antiskid. Further review of the flight manual to include the system resets section made it apparent to me that the autobrakes ECAM; while obviously related to the brake system fault ECAM; was not linked to it as a secondary failure due to the lights failure. We had two separate failures; as did the inbound flight that should have been treated as such. The maintenance dispatch was improper/illegal. Trust but verify everything! Careful verification of maintenance actions could have prevented this.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew experiences an autobrake fault in cruise after the fault had been previously written up and diagnosed as an autobrake panel light fault and MELed as such. BSCU 1 was also MELed separately. Flight continues to destination.

Narrative: Inbound flight logged 2 items- SYS 1 FAULT DISPLAYED ON UPPER ECAM-BRAKES and AUTOBRAKE FAULT DISPLAYED ON UPPER ECAM SCREEN-BRAKES. Maintenance deferred the first ECAM with MEL 32-42-03 BSCU 1 inoperative. That deferral makes a reference to the autobrake panel mode lights being inoperative and has a note FOR BSCU CHANNEL/SYSTEM 1 INOPERATIVE REFER TO MEL FOR AUTO/BRK PANEL MODE LIGHTS DEFERRAL. Maintenance took that reference and used it to defer the second ECAM listed above (MEL 32-42-04). In my review of the MEL; once on board; I did not question the linking of the second ECAM to the first ECAM MEL; guidance that was made by Maintenance. I ASSUMED that Maintenance had specific guidance that the second ECAM was a result of the loss of BSCU 1 and the autobrake panel lights; nothing more complex that had to be evaluated for compound failures. We complied with all MEL restrictions prior to departure to include verifying that the autobrakes were armed on the wheels SD page. Checking recall prior to departure only brought up the first ECAM. No autobrake ECAM or status messages were present. This furthered my belief that the maintenance issues had been addressed correctly. Taxi; takeoff and initial climb were normal. Nearing FL350 we received the same autobrake fault ECAM received by the first crew. We complied with the Irregular Procedure. We determined that we had lost normal brakes but did have antiskid. Further review of the Flight Manual to include the system resets section made it apparent to me that the autobrakes ECAM; while obviously related to the brake system fault ECAM; was not linked to it as a secondary failure due to the lights failure. We had two separate failures; as did the inbound flight that should have been treated as such. The maintenance dispatch was improper/illegal. Trust but VERIFY everything! Careful verification of maintenance actions could have prevented this.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.