Narrative:

An aircraft was on delay for a maintenance discrepancy on another gate; that aircraft was subsequently taken out of service. Another aircraft was used as a replacement for this flight. The replacement aircraft was moved from the east auxiliary pad to the gate on short notice so the flight could dispatch. At departure time; the flight crew notified maintenance that they had a malfunction with the engine fire detection system. I arrived at the aircraft to assess the situation. I determined after some preliminary troubleshooting that the number one fire bottle squib indication light for the number two engine was not illuminating during testing. I determined that MEL 26-21-02A would be an effective solution; but it would require additional in-depth troubleshooting of the fire detection and suppression system inside the engine pylon before the MEL could be applied. This would cause considerable delay in departure. I briefed the flight crew of the situation; they were obviously displeased. While troubleshooting the fire protection indication on the fire control panel in the cockpit; the number one fire bottle for the #2 engine was inadvertently discharged. The fire bottle was replaced inside the engine pylon; but in the course of this maintenance procedure; the explosive squib used to activate the fire bottle was not replaced. A new fire bottle squib was not included with the replacement fire bottle assembly. The troubleshooting procedures were completed and it was determined that MEL 26.21.02A could be applied in this situation and the aircraft returned to service. Late in my shift with very low outdoor air temperatures and several through flight aircraft in my work area; I was tasked with troubleshooting the fire indication/suppression system for an aircraft at departure time. Suggest adequate staffing to address the daily workload placed on maintenance personnel with adequate and complete parts availability and support. [We need] a work environment without the ongoing disruption and upheaval of multiple interests with differing agendas and divergent goals.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Three Line Mechanics describe a chain of events that led to an inadvertent discharge of an A319 aircraft's forward (#1) Fire Bottle for #2 Engine. Mechanics were attempting to accomplish a Fire Bottle/Squib Firing Circuit Test Maintenance (M) procedure; required by their MEL; to defer a Squib Indication fault. Excessive cold and fatigue were also noted.

Narrative: An aircraft was on delay for a maintenance discrepancy on another gate; that aircraft was subsequently taken out of service. Another aircraft was used as a replacement for this flight. The replacement aircraft was moved from the east auxiliary pad to the gate on short notice so the flight could dispatch. At departure time; the flight crew notified Maintenance that they had a malfunction with the Engine Fire Detection System. I arrived at the aircraft to assess the situation. I determined after some preliminary troubleshooting that the Number One Fire Bottle Squib indication light for the number two engine was not illuminating during testing. I determined that MEL 26-21-02A would be an effective solution; but it would require additional in-depth troubleshooting of the Fire Detection and Suppression System inside the engine pylon before the MEL could be applied. This would cause considerable delay in departure. I briefed the flight crew of the situation; they were obviously displeased. While troubleshooting the Fire Protection Indication on the Fire Control Panel in the cockpit; the Number One Fire Bottle for the #2 engine was inadvertently discharged. The fire bottle was replaced inside the engine pylon; but in the course of this maintenance procedure; the explosive squib used to activate the fire bottle was not replaced. A new Fire Bottle Squib was not included with the replacement Fire Bottle Assembly. The Troubleshooting Procedures were completed and it was determined that MEL 26.21.02A could be applied in this situation and the aircraft returned to service. Late in my shift with very low outdoor air temperatures and several through flight aircraft in my work area; I was tasked with troubleshooting the Fire Indication/Suppression System for an aircraft at departure time. Suggest adequate staffing to address the daily workload placed on maintenance personnel with adequate and complete parts availability and support. [We need] a work environment without the ongoing disruption and upheaval of multiple interests with differing agendas and divergent goals.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.