Narrative:

Aircraft X departed VFR from ogg en route to koa. I took radar and advised aircraft X to resume own navigation and altitude pilots discretion. When aircraft X was on the south point of maui; offshore of big beach; I advised about heavy and extreme precipitation at twelve o'clock; and south and west of that. I offered a suggested heading of 125 to clear the worst of the depicted weather. Aircraft X asked for a 'tops report' of which I had none. I coordinated with sector 5; who had taken the hand off. I advised aircraft X any southeast bound heading would clear the worst of the weather in 8 or 9 miles. I asked if they copied [but got] no response. Around 11 minutes after departure I switched communications to frequency 126.0; pilot immediately responded. Twenty two minutes after takeoff radar position 5 coordinated heading 290; to maui. Aircraft X checked on; I gave a clearance to kahului airport (ogg); heading 020 and maintain 9;000 ft. The response is heading 020. I knew the pilot was stressing on the weather situation; I asked the pilot to verify heading 020; and the pilot response is heading 011; back to 020. I advised the pilot that I would keep altitude until the shoreline; and then descend; and that last two aircraft inbound shot visual approaches from about 10 to 15 miles from the field. After my conversation with the tower on the status of aircraft X inbound; I asked aircraft X what heading it was on; and response is 029. I gave the pilot heading 330 and descent to 3;000 ft. Since aircraft X was not descending very fast; I cleared an air carrier for approach. I asked aircraft X a few times what approach was wanted/was able to fly. I gave the pilot direct krane intersection; descending to 3;100 ft; and aircraft X responded that they didn't have that; just muncy (both are on the approach) so I gave the pilot a heading to intercept the localizer backcourse. Aircraft X reports the shoreline in sight. Aircraft X seemed to turn toward the airport; my supervisor advised to keep on heading to intercept the localizer; which I did. When the aircraft appeared on the localizer; I cleared aircraft X for the localizer back course runway 20 approach. I coordinated with the tower; and then switched communications over to the tower.I think that the pilot should have been more prepared for the weather conditions; and the possibility of flying or encountering IFR conditions. There was a SIGMET and three airmet's out for the area; so the pilot should have been aware of the conditions. I think this pilot was taking a chance and not prepared for the conditions the aircraft encountered; and panicked and if the pilot had just taken the advice for the 125 heading; would have gotten to better weather and a visual approach to koa. The situation may have happened on the return flight from koa to ogg; regardless. The frequencies were not as good as they normally are; and I was having a hard time getting responses from aircraft X and also other aircraft. It may be that the pilot was in a very stressful situation; and did not hear or fully comprehend the instructions; and was just trying to save the aircraft through very difficult weather situation; of which the pilot did not appear to be familiar with shooting instrument approaches to runway 20; which is not used very often.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Two HCF Controllers describe the assistance they provided to a Cessna pilot on a VFR flight from Maui to Kona when the aircraft inadvertently enters IMC.

Narrative: Aircraft X departed VFR from OGG en route to KOA. I took radar and advised Aircraft X to resume own navigation and altitude pilots discretion. When Aircraft X was on the south point of Maui; offshore of Big Beach; I advised about heavy and extreme precipitation at twelve o'clock; and south and west of that. I offered a suggested heading of 125 to clear the worst of the depicted weather. Aircraft X asked for a 'tops report' of which I had none. I coordinated with Sector 5; who had taken the hand off. I advised Aircraft X any southeast bound heading would clear the worst of the weather in 8 or 9 miles. I asked if they copied [but got] no response. Around 11 minutes after departure I switched communications to frequency 126.0; pilot immediately responded. Twenty two minutes after takeoff radar position 5 coordinated heading 290; to Maui. Aircraft X checked on; I gave a clearance to Kahului airport (OGG); heading 020 and maintain 9;000 FT. The response is heading 020. I knew the pilot was stressing on the weather situation; I asked the pilot to verify heading 020; and the pilot response is heading 011; back to 020. I advised the pilot that I would keep altitude until the shoreline; and then descend; and that last two aircraft inbound shot visual approaches from about 10 to 15 miles from the field. After my conversation with the Tower on the status of Aircraft X inbound; I asked Aircraft X what heading it was on; and response is 029. I gave the pilot heading 330 and descent to 3;000 FT. Since Aircraft X was not descending very fast; I cleared an Air Carrier for approach. I asked Aircraft X a few times what approach was wanted/was able to fly. I gave the pilot direct KRANE Intersection; descending to 3;100 FT; and Aircraft X responded that they didn't have that; just MUNCY (both are on the approach) so I gave the pilot a heading to intercept the localizer backcourse. Aircraft X reports the shoreline in sight. Aircraft X seemed to turn toward the airport; my Supervisor advised to keep on heading to intercept the localizer; which I did. When the aircraft appeared on the localizer; I cleared Aircraft X for the LOC BC RWY 20 approach. I coordinated with the Tower; and then switched communications over to the Tower.I think that the pilot should have been more prepared for the weather conditions; and the possibility of flying or encountering IFR conditions. There was a SIGMET and three AIRMET's out for the area; so the pilot should have been aware of the conditions. I think this pilot was taking a chance and not prepared for the conditions the aircraft encountered; and panicked and if the pilot had just taken the advice for the 125 heading; would have gotten to better weather and a visual approach to KOA. The situation may have happened on the return flight from KOA to OGG; regardless. The frequencies were not as good as they normally are; and I was having a hard time getting responses from Aircraft X and also other aircraft. It may be that the pilot was in a very stressful situation; and did not hear or fully comprehend the instructions; and was just trying to save the aircraft through very difficult weather situation; of which the pilot did not appear to be familiar with shooting instrument approaches to Runway 20; which is not used very often.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.