Narrative:

I reported in for work at XA15 for a XB20 departure. I called in to our operations to check passenger loads and receive our aircraft assignment. I also was informed that we would be accompanied by an FAA safety inspector for our first leg to phl. At approximately XX45 I left to preflight our aircraft. The captain had still not arrived. After completing the internal and external preflight checklists, and halfway through the visibility inspection, the inspector idented himself and proceeded to do a visual inspection of his own. He asked about the whereabouts of the captain and I told him that I had not seen him as of yet. After I completed the walkaround, I returned to the cockpit and finished my before flight duties of receiving the ATIS and clearance and filled in our speed card. Also included on the speed card was our reduced power limitations to check on the takeoff roll. At approximately XB05 the captain boarded the aircraft and apologized for his late arrival to the inspector. He explained that his wife had set the wrong time in their alarm. He then proceeded to develop a friendly rapport with the inspector discussing his past employment and the fact that he used to fly with the flying circus and had done free airshows for the FAA. He checked with me to see if the preflight checks had been done and I told him they had. The captain was obviously rushed, as he forgot to turn the navigation and anti-collision lights on when he started the first engine. I reached up and turned them on. I have been flying with this particular captain for 2 months and I sometimes have a difficult time communicating with him about procedure. We left the gate at approximately XB20 and continued to finish our remaining checks. Our departure runway was very close and we finished our before takeoff checks just as we approached the runway. The flight to phl was normal and after we parked at the gate the inspector inquired as to why the automatic feather had not been tested. The captain's reply was vague and basically said that he was rushed. When the inspector left, he said that he would check with our operations to see if it was a required check. I had tested the automatic feather on my internal checks, however the overspd governor had not been tested on our propellers. I made the mistake of assuming that there was a reason for the checks not being made (either that the crew had tested them on the same day previously and were not required or the fact that it was 6 in the morning and the captain had opted to waive the checks until a later hour). I nevertheless said nothing in fear of asking a stupid question and besides the captain was handling all the communications with the inspector and I did not want the inspector feel that I knew more about the airplane that the captain, who is known around the company as being outspoken and somewhat intimidating. I feel that this problem would not have occurred if: the captain had showed up for work on time and had a little more time to plan the flight. I had not been flying with this captain for 2 months and not have developed the attitude that I had about him. I had discussed my problems of communications with our chief pilot and we had remedied the problem before it became a real one, and it had not been our first safety check with the FAA and we both weren't so nervous.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACI ON BOARD AND FLT CREW FAILED TO CHECK AUTOFEATHER SYSTEM PRIOR TO TKOF.

Narrative: I RPTED IN FOR WORK AT XA15 FOR A XB20 DEP. I CALLED IN TO OUR OPS TO CHK PAX LOADS AND RECEIVE OUR ACFT ASSIGNMENT. I ALSO WAS INFORMED THAT WE WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN FAA SAFETY INSPECTOR FOR OUR FIRST LEG TO PHL. AT APPROX XX45 I LEFT TO PREFLT OUR ACFT. THE CAPT HAD STILL NOT ARRIVED. AFTER COMPLETING THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PREFLT CHKLISTS, AND HALFWAY THROUGH THE VIS INSPECTION, THE INSPECTOR IDENTED HIMSELF AND PROCEEDED TO DO A VISUAL INSPECTION OF HIS OWN. HE ASKED ABOUT THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE CAPT AND I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD NOT SEEN HIM AS OF YET. AFTER I COMPLETED THE WALKAROUND, I RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT AND FINISHED MY BEFORE FLT DUTIES OF RECEIVING THE ATIS AND CLRNC AND FILLED IN OUR SPD CARD. ALSO INCLUDED ON THE SPD CARD WAS OUR REDUCED PWR LIMITATIONS TO CHK ON THE TKOF ROLL. AT APPROX XB05 THE CAPT BOARDED THE ACFT AND APOLOGIZED FOR HIS LATE ARR TO THE INSPECTOR. HE EXPLAINED THAT HIS WIFE HAD SET THE WRONG TIME IN THEIR ALARM. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO DEVELOP A FRIENDLY RAPPORT WITH THE INSPECTOR DISCUSSING HIS PAST EMPLOYMENT AND THE FACT THAT HE USED TO FLY WITH THE FLYING CIRCUS AND HAD DONE FREE AIRSHOWS FOR THE FAA. HE CHKED WITH ME TO SEE IF THE PREFLT CHKS HAD BEEN DONE AND I TOLD HIM THEY HAD. THE CAPT WAS OBVIOUSLY RUSHED, AS HE FORGOT TO TURN THE NAV AND ANTI-COLLISION LIGHTS ON WHEN HE STARTED THE FIRST ENG. I REACHED UP AND TURNED THEM ON. I HAVE BEEN FLYING WITH THIS PARTICULAR CAPT FOR 2 MONTHS AND I SOMETIMES HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME COMMUNICATING WITH HIM ABOUT PROC. WE LEFT THE GATE AT APPROX XB20 AND CONTINUED TO FINISH OUR REMAINING CHKS. OUR DEP RWY WAS VERY CLOSE AND WE FINISHED OUR BEFORE TKOF CHKS JUST AS WE APCHED THE RWY. THE FLT TO PHL WAS NORMAL AND AFTER WE PARKED AT THE GATE THE INSPECTOR INQUIRED AS TO WHY THE AUTO FEATHER HAD NOT BEEN TESTED. THE CAPT'S REPLY WAS VAGUE AND BASICALLY SAID THAT HE WAS RUSHED. WHEN THE INSPECTOR LEFT, HE SAID THAT HE WOULD CHK WITH OUR OPS TO SEE IF IT WAS A REQUIRED CHK. I HAD TESTED THE AUTO FEATHER ON MY INTERNAL CHKS, HOWEVER THE OVERSPD GOVERNOR HAD NOT BEEN TESTED ON OUR PROPS. I MADE THE MISTAKE OF ASSUMING THAT THERE WAS A REASON FOR THE CHKS NOT BEING MADE (EITHER THAT THE CREW HAD TESTED THEM ON THE SAME DAY PREVIOUSLY AND WERE NOT REQUIRED OR THE FACT THAT IT WAS 6 IN THE MORNING AND THE CAPT HAD OPTED TO WAIVE THE CHKS UNTIL A LATER HOUR). I NEVERTHELESS SAID NOTHING IN FEAR OF ASKING A STUPID QUESTION AND BESIDES THE CAPT WAS HANDLING ALL THE COMS WITH THE INSPECTOR AND I DID NOT WANT THE INSPECTOR FEEL THAT I KNEW MORE ABOUT THE AIRPLANE THAT THE CAPT, WHO IS KNOWN AROUND THE COMPANY AS BEING OUTSPOKEN AND SOMEWHAT INTIMIDATING. I FEEL THAT THIS PROB WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED IF: THE CAPT HAD SHOWED UP FOR WORK ON TIME AND HAD A LITTLE MORE TIME TO PLAN THE FLT. I HAD NOT BEEN FLYING WITH THIS CAPT FOR 2 MONTHS AND NOT HAVE DEVELOPED THE ATTITUDE THAT I HAD ABOUT HIM. I HAD DISCUSSED MY PROBS OF COMS WITH OUR CHIEF PLT AND WE HAD REMEDIED THE PROB BEFORE IT BECAME A REAL ONE, AND IT HAD NOT BEEN OUR FIRST SAFETY CHK WITH THE FAA AND WE BOTH WEREN'T SO NERVOUS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.