Narrative:

Long call-out reserve; first officer and I received call out notification at 0728 for a 2145 departure on a ferry flight for maintenance. On arrival at flight planning area; weather was deteriorating rapidly with severe thunderstorm and tornado watch in the vicinity. Aircraft we were receiving diverted resulting in a 2.5-hour delay to a 0318 (0118 body clock) scheduled arrival. After push back from the gate; a thunderstorm was near overhead. We chose to delay start and listen to tower. Tower was issuing takeoff clearances with 'loss of 20 knots.' I called dispatch to get a better idea of the present cell and other cells heading our way. After consulting with dispatch I determined present cell was slow moving and the next cell was close behind and also slow moving. If anything I felt I had a very small window to safely takeoff. I chose to cancel the flight for weather and related fatigue issues. I was asked by scheduling if I was willing to be reassigned to a flight a captain had just fatigued out on. I respectfully told the scheduler I was not. The reason was the takeoff threat had not changed except now I would have 132 passengers versus an empty airplane. In a separate but related issue; I was concerned about fatigue from the start. Both the first officer and myself were unable to get any sleep from callout to pushback. With a scheduled body clock arrival of 0118; I was vigilant but not concerned. As the time continued to creep; my vigilance became concern. In a february 2002 NASA study (NASA/tm?2002-211394); a dawson and reid study of fatigue versus performance impairment is referenced which equates fatigue to blood alcohol equivalence. At 17 hours of straight wakefulness performance levels are at the equivalence of blood alcohol (bae) .05%. At 21 hours of straight wakefulness; bae is .09%. The decision for takeoff is now being determined at 17-hour and the landing will occur at the 21-hour point. Had either one of us been able to get rest before flight; my decision might have been different (weather remained my #1 concern). I felt threats were piling up too quickly. I like 12-hour callout and believe it to be a sound way of assigning reserves. Unfortunately; in this case; rest before flight could not be achieved. Again; with a scheduled 0118 body clock arrival; vigilance was warranted but not a game changer. Increased threat of weather and delay became a problem I chose to act on.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier Captain describes the circumstances leading up to a flight cancellation due to fatigue and weather.

Narrative: Long call-out reserve; First Officer and I received call out notification at 0728 for a 2145 departure on a ferry flight for maintenance. On arrival at Flight Planning Area; weather was deteriorating rapidly with severe thunderstorm and tornado watch in the vicinity. Aircraft we were receiving diverted resulting in a 2.5-hour delay to a 0318 (0118 body clock) scheduled arrival. After push back from the gate; a thunderstorm was near overhead. We chose to delay start and listen to Tower. Tower was issuing takeoff clearances with 'loss of 20 knots.' I called Dispatch to get a better idea of the present cell and other cells heading our way. After consulting with Dispatch I determined present cell was slow moving and the next cell was close behind and also slow moving. If anything I felt I had a very small window to safely takeoff. I chose to cancel the flight for weather and related fatigue issues. I was asked by Scheduling if I was willing to be reassigned to a flight a Captain had just fatigued out on. I respectfully told the Scheduler I was not. The reason was the takeoff threat had not changed except now I would have 132 passengers versus an empty airplane. In a separate but related issue; I was concerned about fatigue from the start. Both the First Officer and myself were unable to get any sleep from callout to pushback. With a scheduled body clock arrival of 0118; I was vigilant but not concerned. As the time continued to creep; my vigilance became concern. In a February 2002 NASA study (NASA/TM?2002-211394); a Dawson and Reid study of fatigue versus performance impairment is referenced which equates fatigue to blood alcohol equivalence. At 17 hours of straight wakefulness performance levels are at the equivalence of blood alcohol (BAE) .05%. At 21 hours of straight wakefulness; BAE is .09%. The decision for takeoff is now being determined at 17-hour and the landing will occur at the 21-hour point. Had either one of us been able to get rest before flight; my decision MIGHT have been different (weather remained my #1 concern). I felt threats were piling up too quickly. I like 12-hour callout and believe it to be a sound way of assigning reserves. Unfortunately; in this case; rest before flight could not be achieved. Again; with a scheduled 0118 body clock arrival; vigilance was warranted but not a game changer. Increased threat of weather and delay became a problem I chose to act on.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.