Narrative:

I scheduled a pleasure flight for sat afternoon, 1/89, the plans for the flight was made on fri after listening to a NOAA WX radio forecast for clearing WX fri and partly cloudy WX for sat and after personally observing clearing WX on fri. Sat morning was foggy but fog lifted in the morning hours. I monitored ATIS at home and conditions 800 scattered, 1600 broken, 2500 overcast and visibility 7 were reported. By flight time, conditions had deteriorated somewhat to 800 scattered, 1400 scattered, 3500 overcast and 5 mi visibility. Conditions were VFR. Wind was 180 degrees at 8. I decided that it was better not to immediately leave the pattern and informed ground control of the desire to execute a touch and go for the purpose first officer seeing how bad it was before deciding to leave the pattern. Ground control informed me of clearer WX to the east. I interpreted this as advice that if I were to leave the pattern, flying eastward would be more advisable. On climb out on runway 16, just a few hundred feet off the ground, I began to encounter clouds. Shortly after executing a normal right hand turn to crosswind on runway 16, all visibility was lost. Altitude was at or below pattern altitude and below that at which those conditions were expected to exist. Shortly thereafter, visibility contact with the ground was again established. A heading change was made to maintain contact with the ground. I informed the tower of 0 visibility conditions. Because of the heading deviations I had made and lack of visibility contact with the runway, I requested that the tower vector me back into a pattern position. When near enough to see the runway, I requested the most direct landing route. This was a left turn into runway 34. The tower asked whether a passenger jet approaching for landing on runway 16 should be diverted. I replied in the affirmative and immediately landed on runway 34. Summary: basic cause: WX conditions in the area not reflecting those reported. A short discussion was held with the controller about the advice he had given about clear WX to the east. I interpreted this as advice about direction to fly if leaving the pattern. Controller stated that he expected me to make a nonstandard left turn from runway 16. Explicit advice from the controller suggesting a left turn in the pattern rather than the normal right turn would have been helpful. Also, advice that the cloud bank was in the immediate vicinity of the field and affected those in the pattern would have been helpful.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GA SMA VFR IN IMC IN TRAFFIC AT AVL.

Narrative: I SCHEDULED A PLEASURE FLT FOR SAT AFTERNOON, 1/89, THE PLANS FOR THE FLT WAS MADE ON FRI AFTER LISTENING TO A NOAA WX RADIO FORECAST FOR CLEARING WX FRI AND PARTLY CLOUDY WX FOR SAT AND AFTER PERSONALLY OBSERVING CLEARING WX ON FRI. SAT MORNING WAS FOGGY BUT FOG LIFTED IN THE MORNING HRS. I MONITORED ATIS AT HOME AND CONDITIONS 800 SCATTERED, 1600 BROKEN, 2500 OVCST AND VISIBILITY 7 WERE RPTED. BY FLT TIME, CONDITIONS HAD DETERIORATED SOMEWHAT TO 800 SCATTERED, 1400 SCATTERED, 3500 OVCST AND 5 MI VISIBILITY. CONDITIONS WERE VFR. WIND WAS 180 DEGS AT 8. I DECIDED THAT IT WAS BETTER NOT TO IMMEDIATELY LEAVE THE PATTERN AND INFORMED GND CTL OF THE DESIRE TO EXECUTE A TOUCH AND GO FOR THE PURPOSE FO SEEING HOW BAD IT WAS BEFORE DECIDING TO LEAVE THE PATTERN. GND CTL INFORMED ME OF CLEARER WX TO THE E. I INTERPRETED THIS AS ADVICE THAT IF I WERE TO LEAVE THE PATTERN, FLYING EASTWARD WOULD BE MORE ADVISABLE. ON CLBOUT ON RWY 16, JUST A FEW HUNDRED FEET OFF THE GND, I BEGAN TO ENCOUNTER CLOUDS. SHORTLY AFTER EXECUTING A NORMAL RIGHT HAND TURN TO XWIND ON RWY 16, ALL VISIBILITY WAS LOST. ALT WAS AT OR BELOW PATTERN ALT AND BELOW THAT AT WHICH THOSE CONDITIONS WERE EXPECTED TO EXIST. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, VIS CONTACT WITH THE GND WAS AGAIN ESTABLISHED. A HDG CHANGE WAS MADE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE GND. I INFORMED THE TWR OF 0 VISIBILITY CONDITIONS. BECAUSE OF THE HDG DEVIATIONS I HAD MADE AND LACK OF VIS CONTACT WITH THE RWY, I REQUESTED THAT THE TWR VECTOR ME BACK INTO A PATTERN POS. WHEN NEAR ENOUGH TO SEE THE RWY, I REQUESTED THE MOST DIRECT LNDG ROUTE. THIS WAS A LEFT TURN INTO RWY 34. THE TWR ASKED WHETHER A PAX JET APCHING FOR LNDG ON RWY 16 SHOULD BE DIVERTED. I REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE AND IMMEDIATELY LANDED ON RWY 34. SUMMARY: BASIC CAUSE: WX CONDITIONS IN THE AREA NOT REFLECTING THOSE RPTED. A SHORT DISCUSSION WAS HELD WITH THE CTLR ABOUT THE ADVICE HE HAD GIVEN ABOUT CLR WX TO THE E. I INTERPRETED THIS AS ADVICE ABOUT DIRECTION TO FLY IF LEAVING THE PATTERN. CTLR STATED THAT HE EXPECTED ME TO MAKE A NONSTANDARD LEFT TURN FROM RWY 16. EXPLICIT ADVICE FROM THE CTLR SUGGESTING A LEFT TURN IN THE PATTERN RATHER THAN THE NORMAL RIGHT TURN WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL. ALSO, ADVICE THAT THE CLOUD BANK WAS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE FIELD AND AFFECTED THOSE IN THE PATTERN WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.